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 i 
 
Summary 
 
One summary finding that has found much support in empirical growth and development 
literature is that a country's economic and social institutions are important in encourag-
ing and promoting economic activity. The governance of these institutions result in ei-
ther fostering or hindering the growth and development prospects of the country. Eco-
nomic performance of countries is also often attributed to its geography. Since countries 
are not endowed in the same fashion, growth prospects are primarily dependent on these 
differences. According to the proponents of this literature the geography of a country has 
remained the same over time while countries have remained poor during and after the 
colonial era. This is because of the impact of geography on a country's on its growth 
prospects. Those who support the institutional hypothesis agree that geography is im-
portant but only indirectly and through its influence on institutions which in turn deter-
mine how a country performs. What this literature does not take into account are the 
spatial interactions between countries that lead to similar institutions in neighbouring 
countries. Neighbouring countries share common histories and are more likely to be 
influenced by each other than those further away. In this thesis, we propose that taking 
into account these spatial interactions leads to different conclusions  
We start by introducing the literature and the motivation for this thesis in the first chap-
ter. In the second chapter we introduce the methods of spatial principal component anal-
ysis (SPCA) and spatial canonical correlation analysis (SCCA). Using SPCA and SCCA 
methodologies we construct summary measures. The aim of these methods is to maxim-
ize spatial correlation underlying each dataset. While SPCA is used to summarize a 
single data set with a number of variables, SSCA is used to maximize spatial correlation 
between and within two data sets measuring two different phenomena. In this chapter we 
compare the two methods, providing examples for each. Further we compare out results 
to Wartenberg's method of spatial principal component analysis. In order to show the 
benefits of using these particular methods, we introduce an example application using 
geography data. We find that our methods give us results that are easier to interpret with 
a spatial narrative than a previously available method. 
Using the methods developed and explained in Chapter 2, the aim of Chapter 3 is to use 
SPCA and SCCA to construct summary measures for various phenomena which are 
multi-dimensional in nature. We develop a new set of measures for institutions, absolute 
geography, economic and financial performance of countries. By doing so, we evaluate 
how the institutional quality measure is related to the latter three measures. This study 
thus contributes to the understanding of the interactions between the above mentioned 
phenomena using a spatial narrative. What we find is that when spatially weighted, the 
first components of the SPCA and SCCA conform to previous literature. However, the 
second components give us new stylized facts. We find that while economic develop-
ment is highly correlated to high levels institutional quality, economic growth is strongly 
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correlated to higher levels of government intervention. Similarly, geography does not 
necessarily determine the economic fate of a country. Countries that share similar geog-
raphy need not have the same or similar institutions. We conclude that taking account of 
space could change the way we understand and approach institutional change within a 
country. 
In the next chapter, we use these spatially constructed measures of institutions and geog-
raphy to see which of these along with trade best explain economic development. Using 
the Rodrik et al (2004) framework, which attempts to measure the contribution of each 
of these factors, we find that institutions are the most important explanatory variables 
only when we consider GDP per capita as our measure of development. When we use a 
broader definition of economic performance (which we construct using SPCA) we find 
that institutions lose their "primacy". Moreover, our results suggest that these same insti-
tutions could be detrimental to economic performance, suggesting that having high 
quality institutions are correlated to, but may not be the primal cause of economic per-
formance.  
Scale and spatial interaction need not be limited to cross country level. In Chapter 5, we 
shift focus to a multi-level analysis. We analyze the determinants of foreign ownership 
in domestic firms using a multi-level framework. Using data on firm structural and insti-
tutional variables as well as macroeconomic and institutional country characteristics, we 
estimate a multi-level logit model. This chapter contributes to existing literature by using 
a multi-level model which accounts for both micro and macro-level idiosyncrasies that 
lead to foreign investment. We find that firm structural characteristics and obstacles they 
face in day to day business are the most important determinants of foreign investment. 
At the country level, we find that macroeconomic variables that could influence profits 
of the firm are important and institutional variables are not influential in attracting for-
eign investment in host countries. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by providing a 
summary of the results. 
In summary, this thesis attempts to analyze the spatial interactions that influence institu-
tional quality in countries. One contribution of this thesis was to develop a method by 
which we could maximize spatial correlation between variables in a data set. Additional-
ly, using these methods, we attempt to understand the links between institutions, geogra-
phy and economic performance. Further, the multi-level analysis, aims at disentangling 
country level perceptions of institutional quality and firm level perceptions to see which 
matter more for business enterprises. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
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1. Motivation 
 
Among the most fundamental questions posed by economists since the establishment of 
the discipline itself, has been that of what causes economic growth and development. 
Why are some countries richer than others? Why have some of them managed to grow 
faster than others, some able to sustain growth while others stagnate? Why are some 
more productive than others? Traditional growth models starting from the Harrod-Domar 
model and Solow model emphasized the importance of saving, investment and human 
capital and improving efficiency in order to obtain more output per unit of input. The 
first endogenous growth theories relaxed the assumptions of diminishing marginal re-
turns to scale, thus introducing positive externalities to explain economic growth. En-
dogenous growth models introduced by Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) also endogenized technical progress and 
explained that those countries that invested more in technological innovations and 
knowledge experienced better growth prospects. While Lucas introduces endogenous 
growth via investment in human capital, Romer introduces it via investment in R&D.  
Factor accumulation and technological change however were later believed to fall short 
in answering differences in economic growth countries. The above mentioned explana-
tions of economic growth are described as proximate sources of growth (Maddison 1988; 
Rodrik 2003). They are considered proximate sources since the accumulation and as-
similation conditions differ across countries and over time. These tend to be those 
growth causing variables that can be measured related to output. Intermediate sources of 
growth are those social, economic and technology policies as well as demand trends, 
which are in turn influenced by the ultimate sources of growth. Szirmai (2012) identifies 
policies that uphold macroeconomic stability, trade and financial openness that promote 
foreign investment and minimize protectionism among others as growth promoting in-
termediate sources. Ultimate sources of growth include socio-political and economic 
institutions prevailing in the country and their governance, physical geographic condi-
tions of the country, culture and attitudes, prevalent social structures, historical shocks, 
etc. Szirmai (2012) further includes demographic and epidemiological trends, technolog-
ical trends in the long run and distance from the technological frontier, absorptive capac-
ities, class relations and political conflicts, international trade regimes. 
Acemoglu (2009) classifies the ultimate or “fundamental causes” of growth into four 
categories of hypotheses: (i) the ‘luck’ hypothesis (ii) the geography hypothesis (iii) the 
culture hypothesis and (iv) the institutions hypothesis. The ‘luck’ hypothesis explains 
that the differences in growth among countries arose due to some uncertainty or hetero-
geneity that led to different choices that in turn led to different results (growth rates). 
This could also be due to different paths chosen among multiple equilibria. Chance or 
luck cannot be reasonably measured empirically (Acemoglu 2009). Accounting for all 
other sources of growth, it could be however be treated as a residual. Further, it is hard to 
decide on which factors are due to luck and which are not. The “geography” hypothesis 
refers to all the geographic factors that can lead to different rates of growth in the long 
run. Thus, factors such as soil quality, weather conditions, and natural resource availabil-
ity affect productivity and attitudes directly. The “culture” hypothesis states that cultural 
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differences affect growth rates of an economy. Culture influences an indivual's choice on 
such things as occupation, percentage of income saved/spent, trust towards other indi-
viduals, work ethics, political participation etc. Max Weber in his “The Protestant Ethic 
and ‘The Spirit of Capitalism’ ” states that it was the protestant belief of Western Europe 
that allowed it to grow faster than other parts of the world. The fourth hypothesis is that 
of institutional development. According to this hypothesis, the institutional set up of an 
economy affects productivity. 
Similarly, Rodrik (2003) in his framework of proximate and ultimate sources includes 
three key sources. These are geography, institutions and trade openness. In his view, 
geography is seen as the ultimate while trade openness and institutions are seen as inter-
mediate sources that explain economic growth. The main difference between institutions 
hypothesis and the rest is that institutions are social choices that are historically persis-
tent. They are endogenous in that they can change over time. Culture too is historically 
persistent (less so than institutional persistence) but is much harder to influence, and is 
outside the ambit of government directives and laws unlike institutions. Acemoglu 
(2009) puts it succinctly "Even though institutions might be hard to change in practice, 
culture is much harder to influence, and any advice to a society to change its culture is 
almost vaccuous". Sen (2004) argues that culture important as it is, is dependent on the 
institutional structure that supports it, determining the incentives on which our actions 
are based. Although they take time to change, they can be altered to foster growth and 
hence development in the long run. Both the above mentioned frameworks focus on the 
importance of one factor as being more important than the others in influencing econom-
ic growth and development. It is however essential to recognize that these factors are not 
entirely independent of each other in their influence on growth and development. Abu-
Lughod (1989) explains how chance played a role in the rise of European hegemony 
after the 13th century leading to growth prospects over the centuries that followed. She 
also points out how geographical and historical circumstances, as well as cultural influ-
ences, lead to different institutional features such as credit systems and the various fi-
nancial instruments.  
In this thesis, we will be focusing on the (1) institutions (and their governance) and (2) 
the geography hypothesis as explanations of economic growth and development which 
will be discussed in more detail below. Rather than focusing on the primacy of these 
factors, we study the interactions between them.  We make two assertions in this study. 
One, institutional quality in a country cannot be studied within the confines of nation-
state boundaries, given its own physical endowments, independent of influences from 
other nations. Influences from across the border have a sizeable impact on the economic 
performance of a country. Two, the analysis of institutions have to recognize that micro 
and macro level forces together form the institutional set up of a country, and need to be 
taken into account while studying their impact on economic performance. These will be 
discussed in the sections below. The reasons for concentrating on the geography and the 
institutions hypothesis is due their policy relevance. As mentioned above, if one country 
were to get lucky by chance, this cannot be replicated by other countries. Similary, if one 
was to identify certain cultural practices that lead to improved economic performances of 
countries, it would be rather difficult to persuade others to change their practices from a 
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policy perspective. This is not to say that luck and culture do not play a role in a coun-
try's economic performance. We now proceed by outlining the literature on institutions 
and geography and then explain how geography and institutions are linked. We also 
explain how institutional quality should not be confined to the country level to under-
stand how it impacts economic performance. 
   
2.  Institutions 
 
There are three main views on why and how institutions cause growth. The first view is 
one in which institutions are seen as posing “constraints” on free markets, which reduce 
inefficiencies. According to North (2003) “institutions would not exist in a frictionless 
world where there is no uncertainty. Institutions exist to reduce uncertainty in the 
world.” He further notes that they constitute a set of constraints on behaviour in the form 
of rules and regulations which enable markets to function efficiently (North 1984, 1990). 
A second view sees institutions as “enabling” mechanisms which allow for smooth func-
tioning of the economy, even if this is obtained through constraining certain actors, cer-
tain types of behaviour or activities (Chang and Evans 2000). Another view is one in 
which institutions are both constraining and enabling. Additionally, they are also “con-
stitutive” (Chang 2002). This is to say, institutions have a cultural dimension which 
imposes a certain “world view” into people who live under a certain institutional set up. 
Hence, there is a certain degree of path dependency involved. This view (still largely 
ignored according to Chang) states that there is no clear boundary between institutions 
and culture in the long-run. According to this view rules practiced for a long time be-
come embedded in the society, and eventually become a part of their “culture” (Srivasta-
va 2004). Whether seen as constraining, enabling or constitutive, the consensus among 
institutionalists emerges in the importance of studying institutions in determining eco-
nomic growth and development in countries across the world. 
According to the current literature, “good institutions” provide an environment with the 
“right” incentives to agents in the economy. These incentives lead to learning and inno-
vation, encourage investment in human and physical capital and hence increase capabili-
ties. These factors in turn lead to higher growth rates in an economy. An improper or 
“bad” institutional set up on the other hand, does not incentivize such activities. Instead, 
it leads to corruption, rent-seeking and other non-productive or growth repressing activi-
ties (Chang 2001, Bennedsen et al. 2005).     
To create these right incentives, the story goes (Bennedsen et al. 2005); states have to 
ensure that the private return (profits earned by risk taking individuals) and social return 
(returns to the economy) of an economic activity should be brought as close as possible 
since productive activities have a high social return, and are good for the growth of an 
economy. This would also include reducing uncertainty in the creation and expropriation 
of wealth, by ensuring return. Lessening uncertainty allows in building agents’ confi-
dence in the economy. Consequently, if rules are followed by all the agents in the econ-
omy, it would lead to more productive economic activity, and would also reduce transac-
tion costs.  
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‘Institutions’ cover many factors that affect the growth rates and development in an 
economy. Among these secure property rights is considered as one of the most important 
that foster growth. Well-defined property rights allow agents to invest in improvements 
in land or install state of the art technology, with long term gains in mind. This in turn 
improves productivity. In the case of no proper security available, agents would hesitate 
to plough back their profits to improve their productivity. Another important economic 
institution is the existence of markets and the quality if these markets. In most develop-
ing countries, one finds missing markets as well as low quality of existing markets. If 
there are no proper markets, the incentives to trade are reduced and this in turn implies 
improper allocation of resources. This results in an unequal distribution of wealth. 
Among the political institutions, democracy is considered to be one of the most im-
portant institutions. In a democratic economy, one is ensured of a voice in the system, 
and is ensured both economic and social rights. However, empirical and historical evi-
dence does not always support the need for democracy to ensure high growth rates. For 
example, South Korea under General Park saw very high growth rates (even though this 
could be attributed to the “catching up” that the economy achieved after its transition 
into a market economy). 
Social institutions are as important as economic or political institutions when economic 
growth in terms of increased GDP, as well as economic development in terms of equality 
is to be achieved. Social institutions consist of proper health care markets, which ensure 
basic health needs of workers in an economy. When a proper health system is not in 
place, it will result in reduced productivity. In tropical countries, since the disease envi-
ronments are much larger, it becomes more of a necessity to ensure proper health care 
for all. Most underdeveloped economies also suffer from a high population growth rate. 
Along with the lack of other institutional infrastructure this results in a higher rate of 
unemployment. Most of these countries also lack a proper unemployment support sys-
tem. Labour market regulation through job search facilities can help an economy to pro-
duce more. Informal social institutions such as social norms present in a country also 
have an impact on productivity.  
The mere presence of institutions themselves does not guarantee a well-functioning 
economy, and thus one that leads to growth and development. The governance of these 
institutions is equally important. Institutional development under the slogan of “good 
governance” has come to the forefront in recent years. Governance refers to the “essen-
tial parts of the broad cluster of institutions” (North et al. 2008). The interactions be-
tween governance and growth are “intimately linked” to interactions between institutions 
and economic growth (North et al. 2008). This will be discussed below. 
 
2.1.  Governance 
 
Governance allows an economy to reduce uncertainty and increase confidence of indi-
viduals in it, by providing assurance that rules will be followed by all individuals. This 
increases economic activity in the economy and thus leads to a better performance. 
Kaufmann et al. (2000) define governance as comprising “of the traditions and institu-
tions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which 
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governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” The 
World Bank measures governance using six indicators (World Governance Indicators). 
These are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Vio-
lence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Con-
trol of Corruption1.  
In his book “Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective” 
Chang includes the following institutions as constituting the “good governance package” 
that is currently being promoted as that which will lead to economic growth and devel-
opment in developing countries. The list consists of (i) Democracy, (ii) Bureaucracy and 
the Judiciary, (iii) Property rights regimes and their quality, (iv) Corporate Governance 
which includes limited liability, bankruptcy law, financial reporting and information 
disclosure to public, and a competition law, (v) Financial institutions which include 
banking regulation, central banking, securities regulation and public finance institutions, 
(vi) Social welfare and labour institutions which include social welfare institutions 
which work as ‘safety nets’ for the economy, institutions to eradicate child labour, and 
institutions regulating working hours for the adults.  
The goals of anti-corruption and democracy can hardly be questioned as ends in them-
selves. The post-war period gave rise to arguments that democratic institutions were 
expensive for countries to maintain. The present institutional view however is that de-
mocracy is a pre-condition for economic development. On the other hand, historical 
evidence shows that the current advanced countries did not have democratic institutions 
before the time of take-off. Empirical evidence is also ambiguous. Butkiewicz and Yan-
ikkaya (2004) finds that democratization of institutions lead to higher growth rates. 
Persson and Tabellini (2006) finds that economic development is dependent on the type 
of democratic reforms. Barro (1996, 1999) shows that while a minimal level of democ-
racy is necessary for productive economic activity to occur, higher levels of democracy 
have a negative impact on growth. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) find that democ-
ratization has long run impacts, but does not show any significant increase in growth 
rates in the short run. Alesina et al. (1996) finds an insignificant relationship between 
democracy and growth while Dollar and Kraay (2003) find a negative and significant 
relationship between the ‘Voice’ variable of the World Bank governance indicators.  
Recent historical evidence has shown that those developing countries that have success-
fully transformed themselves into fast growing countries have not had the prescribed 
“investment climate” of a ‘service delivery state’ and instead their governments have 
played a critical role in assuring structural change (Khan 2005). We can also state that 
there are no historical examples wherein improved governance has been undertaken first, 
and growth rates have risen after these changes (Chang 2002).  
The existence of corruption in an economy leads to inefficiencies no doubt. Khan (2006) 
identifies a circular relationship between economic stagnation, high transaction costs, 
                                                          
1 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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weak property rights, corruption and rent-seeking and unaccountable government. Em-
pirical evidence is abundant to show that there is a strong negative relationship between 
the two (Mauro 1995, Welsch 2003). There are counter examples such as Indonesia 
under Suharto, where corruption was at its highest levels when the country achieved very 
high growth rates. India and China, which have been growing at rates over 5% also, rank 
very low on the transparency index, at around 3.5 out of 10.  
The implicit advantages of improved governance, such as lack of corruption or the pres-
ence of democracy are not unknown to us. However, major questions arise: can there be 
a universal solution to all institutional problems of economic growth? Can the institu-
tions that have worked for the developed economies be transferred to developing econ-
omies and will this improved governance and increased economic growth in these coun-
tries, irrespective of the historical, geographical and socio-economic situation of the 
economy? The question thus becomes one of “can the standard analysis be applied to 
developing countries?”  
 
2.2.  Governance in Developing Countries 
 
The current global political scenario is different from what it was when the now devel-
oped economies were still in the developing stage. The requirements to be fulfilled by all 
countries are more sophisticated now. Globalization and integration of world markets 
have led to greater sophistication of institutions now than those of developing countries 
earlier. These global requirements in themselves lead to some degree of universal stand-
ardization of institutions. It is nonetheless important to realize the importance of differ-
ent social set ups of different countries.  
Critics argue that international financial institutions intervening in ‘governance issues’ 
modeled on those of developed countries are too demanding both financially and on 
human resource requirements for developing countries. It should also be noted that some 
of these reforms go against the social and cultural values of some countries. Institutional 
transplantation has proven to be difficult and quite unsuccessful in countries with differ-
ent conditions than those in which the prescribed institutions have been fostering growth. 
Given that social, political and cultural factors also contribute to growth, imposing a 
common institutional standard may not be wise. Nevertheless, to avoid the justification 
of all existing institutions in the world, it is necessary to find some institutions that foster 
growth in given situations. Transplanting institutions has proven to fail in more than one 
case. The Structural adjustment programmes undertaken have failed in Latin America, 
and transition from a controlled economy to a market economy has resulted in greater 
poverty in erstwhile USSR. China, on the other hand, seems to have found a dual ap-
proach which ensures elimination of missing markets over a period. Learning from his-
torical examples is another approach (Chang 2002).  
Thus, even though there is a need to understand the relationship between various gov-
ernance and institutional factors and growth, it need not necessarily be done through 
universally applicable standards. In reality, we find countries at various stages of devel-
opment, with a wide variety of institutional arrangements and yet have similar growth 
rates. Thus, it is important to be able to understand and answer this phenomenon.  
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3.  The Geography Hypothesis 
 
The geography hypothesis is based on the fact that not all the areas in the world are en-
dowed in the same fashion. According to this hypothesis, the prosperity of an economy 
depends on its geographical endowments. It determines that characteristics such as soil 
quality which directly affects agricultural productivity, natural resources which contrib-
ute to wealth as well as provide the raw material base for industrial activity, topography 
which contributes to costs of transportation, climate that affects the productivity of 
workers, and the disease environment which also directly affects the productivity of 
workers (Acemoglu 2009, Diamond 1997, Gallup et al. 2001, Sachs 2001, Landes 1998). 
Similarly, lack of access to rivers as well as land-locked geography affects the growth of 
the country negatively. The geography hypothesis gained popularity over the last decade 
with some empirical work done on it as well.  
The proponents of this view argue that during and after colonization the poor countries 
have remained poor. There has been no reversal of fortunes. However, what has re-
mained the same is the geographical position of these countries (Sachs (2001) and 
Bloom and Sachs (1998)). Thus, it is primarily geography which determines the econom-
ic situation of a country.  
 
3.1.  How does geography affect growth? 
 
There are three different versions of the geography hypothesis. The first version of this 
theory comes from Montesquieu in ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ which states that the climate 
in a country affects physical strength and leads to laziness and passivity. Other propo-
nents of this view include Marshall. He believed that racial qualities could be explained 
by climate. 
A more sophisticated second view on how geography affects growth was developed by 
Gunnar Myrdal. In his Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations he writes 
“serious study of the problems of underdevelopment…should take into account the cli-
mate and its impact on soil, vegetation, animals, humans and physical assets- in short, on 
living conditions in economic development.” (Myrdal 1968). This view states that the 
productivity of technology of the countries in the temperate zone were far higher than 
those of technologies developed in the tropics. This argument refers mainly to technolo-
gies related to agriculture. However, when actual data are compared, it is during and 
after the industrial revolution that differences in incomes and growth rates started to 
become wider.  
The third view states that the disease environment is a burden to the country, and there-
fore, is directly linked to the poverty that is prevailing in it. This view has become popu-
lar over the past decade and has been treated in empirical studies such as Sachs (2000), 
Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup and Sachs (2001), etc. While this view seems more 
plausible than the previous two versions, the causality of poverty in the wake of disease 
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environment and economic development is not very clear2. McArthur and Sachs (2001), 
concludes that institutions and geographically-related variables affect the GNP per capita 
of countries.  
 
4.  Institutions, geography and space 
 
The underlying narrative of the geography hypothesis is that the natural endowments of 
the country determine the development path of a country, and this becomes the destiny 
of the country. This geographical determinism has been championed by economists like 
Jared Diamond, Jeffery Sachs, Andrew Mellinger, John Gallup, etc. They assert that 
these natural endowments encourage or hinder a country’s ability to trade with others, its 
agricultural productivity, etc., thus making absolute geography the ultimate determinant 
of economic growth and development. The reason this hypothesis attracts attention in the 
empirical literature is because geographical variables such as the length of the coastline, 
number of frost days in a year, the presence of specific types of parasites, are all “exoge-
nous.” This makes absolute geographic variables “as exogenous as an economist could 
hope for (Rodrik et al. 2004).  
This hypothesis is contested by the institutional hypothesis, which states that institutions 
are more important than geography in explaining economic growth and development. 
While agreeing that absolute geography does have an impact on growth and develop-
ment, it is relegated to a secondary role, one in which it influences the type of institu-
tions that develop in these countries. The story goes as follows: the colonizer (European) 
countries had a set of ‘good institutions’ conducive for growth, which in turn were de-
veloped due to the exogenously given good absolute geographic conditions. These good 
institutions were taken along with them to their “settler colonies.” In countries where the 
disease ecology and harsh living conditions made it difficult for them to settle, they built 
extractive institutions were set up. These historical, colonial institutions were path de-
pendent and have since persisted, detrimental to current economic prospects of these 
countries while settler colonies prospered. 
While both these hypotheses use absolute geography as the backcloth to explain past and 
present economic growth and development, they have been pitched against each other as 
contesting explanations of what causes growth and development.  
The geography hypothesis assumes that absolute geography of a country distorts an 
otherwise level playing field in which any country could have achieved development 
before the others. This hypothesis has been criticized by many, given the fact that coun-
tries in the tropical regions were once the thriving countries in the world, before the rise 
of Western Europe (Pomeranz 2000, Blaut 1999). Geographical location was, therefore, 
not the main reason for the West to get ahead in the last two hundred years. Also, many 
                                                          
2 Western Europe was plagued by many diseases in the previous two centuries. It was economic development 
which led to control of diseases and also providing healthier living conditions. (Acemoglu 2009). Diseases 
such as malaria in the tropics claim a lot of lives each year. However, this could as much be a consequence of 
the inability of provision of healthy living conditions. 
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of the tropical countries do not conform to this pattern. For example, Chile, Peru, Argen-
tina and Brazil have overcome their monetary instability, and over the last few years, 
displayed very respectable rates of growth. Similarly, China and India have had high 
growth rates, joining the list of emerging countries in the recent past. The dynamics of 
growth shown by these countries against the East Asian tigers which were the emerging 
countries in the previous decade is not answered by the geography hypothesis. 
The institutional hypothesis, on the other hand, assumes that the evolution of institutions 
is more or less internally driven and for the most part these institutions are not influ-
enced by the regional or international context in which they exist. Conversely, historical 
evidence shows that both these assumptions are incorrect. There are ample examples that 
show that geography is not destiny, the spatial interactions between countries, i.e., the 
relative geography of a country as an influence on the local mechanisms is not difficult 
to see. Peet (2011) points out that public health investment has helped developed coun-
tries counter the environmental threat, arguing that it is economic development that re-
sults in the social reconstruction of better environments. He further notes that since 
Western European exploitation of the world was mainly via sea transportation (as op-
posed to land-transportation), ports and navigable rivers had seen a higher GDP than 
other parts of the world. This, he says, was a historically-socially constructed advantage, 
rather than an inherent advantage that water had. Sheppard (2011) points out that the 
Gaza strip has the right set of absolute geographic conditions, but is extremely influ-
enced by the regional socio-political situation. Similarly, while landlocked Switzerland 
has “bad geography” it is influenced by the institutions of its surrounding countries. The 
influences need not necessarily be regional. For example, development over the past two 
centuries has led to the overuse of the world’s natural resources, and has resulted in the 
depletion of the ozone layer. The economic consequences of which are faced by Austral-
ia. More recently, Lin et al. (2014) suggests that trans-boundary pollution caused by 
Chinese production and transportation of goods to the West coast of the USA has in-
creased, even as pollution caused by production within the US has reduced due to out-
sourcing production. Giving the example of the impact of the Indian IT education on the 
Silicon Valley labour market, Harvey (2011) notes that space need not be continuous.  
Hence, it becomes important to study these spatial interactions, which could have signif-
icant impacts on the evolution of institutions within countries. We can thus say that ana-
lyzing institutions as determinants of growth by assuming them to be independent can 
lead to wrong conclusions.  In this thesis, we want to take into account the socio-spatial 
influence that countries have on each other's institutions. In order to do so, we take ac-
count of the relative geography/ spatial interactions of countries.  
Most growth literature that takes into account relative geography/ spatial interactions 
have been carried out using country data or regional data, most often studying regional 
convergence of incomes, growth, technology diffusion, etc. Regional income conver-
gence on intra-national scale as well as regional scale (EU) has resulted in strong con-
sensus on income convergence among these geographical units. The theoretical mecha-
nisms of technology diffusion, factor mobility, and transfer payments that drive regional 
convergence have explicit relative geographical components (Rey and Montouri 1998, 
Quah 1997, Cheshire and Magrini 2009, López-Bazo et al. 2004, Fingleton, and López-
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Bazo 2006, Verspagen 2010 among others).  Gleditsch and Ward (2000), and Cho 
(2003), Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley (2006) study the influence of spatial interactions 
on democracy. 
When analyzing diffusion of any socio-economic or political phenomenon, one needs to 
specify “proximity” very carefully. While there is no specific rule regarding which dis-
tance matrices should be used, and which should not be, some common ones are Euclid-
ean distances, trade dyadic distances, shared political borders, etc. In this thesis, we use 
bilateral distances between countries to understand the diffusion process of institutional 
quality. 
 
5.  Institutions, FDI and scale 
 
While studying the socio-spatial aspects of institutions, however, we need not limit our 
understanding of them to the scale of nation-states. Scale effects can be extended to 
firm-level and can in turn be linked to country level, to understand the impact of institu-
tions on economic growth. In the last chapter of this thesis, we turn to the influence of 
institutional quality at the firm level, within the country level. In order to do so, we 
choose to study the impact of institutional quality at both levels on the choice of foreign 
firms to invest in host countries. Capital mobility across countries has a strong spatial 
structure. These capital flows, are usually dependent on various characteristics of host 
countries, including their macroeconomic performance and institutional performance.  
Endogenous growth theory and related empirical growth studies show that by taking 
relevant policy measures a country can influence its long run growth rates. One such 
channel is by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country. International 
organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF have stressed that importance of 
opening up and liberalizing trade in order to generate growth in developing and less 
developed countries. Although there is no consensus on the influence of FDI on growth, 
there are numerous studies that advocate opening up of trade in these countries in order 
to allow FDI, which in turn would boost growth in these economies. FDI flows across 
countries have increased ten-fold over the last twenty years. Host country economic 
policies make efforts to attract FDI by making their markets conducive for MNE’s to 
enter. Along with the economic environment, a strong institutional credibility plays a 
role in attracting FDI into countries (Naude and Krugell 2007, Sharma and Bandara 
2010).  Rule of Law, democracy, low levels of corruption and flexible labour market 
institutions are all said to important country characteristics that lead to increased inward 
FDI flows (Daude and Stein 2007, Delbecque et al. 2008, Pajunen 2008, etc.). 
The scale at which a study is done is important the conclusions and policy suggestions 
made. There is a tendency of extrapolating results in such a way that results from macro-
level studies are used to make micro-level policy conclusions (Meentemeyer 1989). 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) perform a cross-country analysis and find that government 
stability, religious tensions, and democratic accountability, as well as corruption and 
bureaucratic quality impact the volume of inward FDI flows in countries. They go on to 
conclude “these political risk and institutional indicators matter the most when multina-
tional corporations confront decisions about where to invest in developing countries.” 
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Aggregate FDI flows are a macro-level measure where as a firm's entry decision is a 
micro-level phenomenon. In order to see if conclusions such as the one above can be 
made, we study the impact of institutional quality and other macroeconomic variables 
along with firm structural variables on inward FDI. We aim to understand with in and 
between country institutitons and other economic determinants of FDI in developing 
countries.  
 
6.  Thesis Outline  
 
The main objectives of the thesis are to understand the socio-spatial interactions of insti-
tutions between countries, and how this influences the level of economic performance in 
them.  
In the first part of the thesis, we focus on the debate on the fundamental causes of eco-
nomic performance which is centered on the institutional and geography hypothesis. In 
the second part of the thesis, we move shift focus to the inter-country differences in 
institutional performance and their impact on attracting capital into the host countries, 
which in turn are believed to influence economic performances. 
Institutions, economic performance and geography are all multi-dimensional in nature. 
Single variables such as democracy, GDP per capita or latitude do not fully capture these 
phenomena. Using such single variables, as has been done in most literature, only leads 
to partial understanding of economic performance. Given this premise, we introduce 
alternate methods of spatial principal component analysis and spatial canonical correla-
tion analysis. Both these methods are dimensionality reduction methods that allow us to 
summarize large data sets into smaller latent dimensions that are uncorrelated to each 
other. The second chapter introduces spatial principal component analysis and spatial 
canonical correlation analysis. These methods result in summary measures of any given 
data set that has maximum spatial correlation. The spatial principal correlation analysis 
is used when we want to summarize a single data set, and obtain the spatial correlation 
within the data set. Spatial canonical correlation is used when we have two data sets, 
each measuring a different phenomenon, that need to be summarized, while obtaining 
the spatial correlation between the two sets of data. Chapter 2 introduces these two 
methods with examples for each of them. We compare our method and the results, with 
previously available spatial principal component analysis by Wartenberg (1985). Fur-
ther, we show how the two methods proposed produce different results. 
Using these methods elaborated in Chapter 2, we construct summary measures of institu-
tions, economic performance, absolute geography and financial performance of coun-
tries. Using these new measures (variables), in Chapter 3, we examine the role of institu-
tions relative to a country’s economic performance, absolute geography and its financial 
performance, in the context of its relative geography. The intention of this chapter is to 
identify if relative geography is an important aspect that needs to be taken into account 
in order to better understand economic performances of countries in the context of insti-
tutional quality.  
In chapter 4, we test the Rodrik et al. (2004) framework to explain the differences in 
development levels across countries using the new measures of institutions, economic 
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performance, and absolute geography, constructed in Chapter 3. Rodrik et al. (2004) use 
a cross-sectional instrumental variable regression to measure “the respective contribu-
tions of institutions, geography and trade in determining cross-country income levels” 
using instruments for institutions and trade. They conclude that geography has “at best” 
an indirect effect on the income of a country and that “the quality of institutions ‘trumps’ 
everything else.” We test if this is indeed true, using the spatially weighted measures of 
each of these variables, using the same instruments as in their paper. 
After having analyzed the importance of institutions from a “territorial” perspective, we 
move to analyzing their “scale” aspects. In Chapter 5, we analyze the determinants of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) using a multi-level regression framework. We use micro-
level and macro-level measures of institutions and other economic determinants of FDI, 
and see which of these determinants are the most important in attracting inward FDI 
flows into developing countries.  
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.  This chapter provides a summary of the results and 
discusses the limitations of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Summarizing Large Spatial Datasets: 
Spatial Principal Components and 
Spatial Canonical Correlation3 
  
                                                          
3 This chapter has also been published as a UNU-MERIT working paper 2013-011 (Bhupatiraju, Verspagen 
and Ziesemer 2013a) 
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1. Introduction 
 
Principal components analysis is an often used technique used to summarize data. It is 
based on correlation analysis, and can, roughly, be seen as a way to summarize a dataset 
of many variables into only a few dimensions. Spatial analysis has a counterpart of cor-
relation analysis, e.g., in the form of the Moran coefficient. The Moran coefficient 
measures the extent to which a phenomenon, measured by an indicator, is spatially con-
centrated (a positive spatial correlation), or spread-out (a negative correlation).  
As spatial datasets often consist of a large number of variables, it was only natural that 
Wartenberg (1985) turned to the principal components method in order to summarize 
spatial correlations. He proposed a method that was closely analogous to principal com-
ponents. As “regular” principal components essentially means to undertake a spectral 
decomposition (obtaining eigenvalues and eigenvectors) of the correlation matrix of a 
dataset, Wartenberg (1985) simply proposed to spectrally decompose the matrix of Mo-
ran coefficients of a spatially organized dataset. 
While the spectral decomposition has a clear interpretation in the case of regular princi-
pal components, it does not have the same, nor an alternative, clear-cut interpretation in 
the case of Wartenberg’s proposed method. His justification of the method was purely at 
the intuitive level, both by the analogy of taken eigenvalues and eigenvectors, and by the 
results that it produced for a number of constructed datasets that show different kinds of 
spatial dependence. 
Below, we will first propose an alternative method for undertaking spatial principal 
components. Like Wartenberg’s method, it is based on spectral decomposition. Howev-
er, rather than taking eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the raw matrix of Moran coeffi-
cients in a dataset, we propose to spectrally decompose a slightly different matrix. Our 
method results from a clear objective, i.e., that the Moran coefficient of the resulting 
component is maximized. Thus, our summary measure is aimed at showing maximal 
spatial correlation itself. 
The spatial principal components method that we propose can also be extended in a 
direction that is similar to canonical correlation analysis. Canonical correlation analysis 
is a way of summarizing two separate datasets, each into one or a few components, in 
such a way that the correlation between these components, across the datasets, is maxim-
ized. Since our spatial principal components method already maximizes spatial correla-
tion within a single dataset, it can easily be extended to maximize spatial correlation 
between the summary measures of two datasets.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. The new method for spatial principal com-
ponents analysis is explained in the next Section (2). Section 3 presents the spatial ca-
nonical correlation method. Section 4 provides a few applications of the two methods, 
illustrating their use, and comparing the weighting schemes that they produce to Wart-
enberg’s method, and regular principal components.  
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2. Spatial Principal Components: A New Method 
 
Like Wartenberg (1985), our method starts from the Moran coefficient (e.g., Cliff and 
Ord, 1981). We will denote our data matrix of n observations (spatial units) and k varia-
bles by the symbol X (i.e., X is an n x k matrix of observations). Throughout the paper, 
we will assume that the k variables are z-scores, i.e., that for each variable the mean is 
zero and the standard deviation is one (this simplifies the notation). The n x n matrix of 
spatial weights is denoted by W, and we assume that the sum of elements of this matrix 
is equal to n (i.e., the weights matrix is standardized). Then, the n x n matrix of Moran 
coefficients between the k variables is calculated as  
 
M = XTWX.       (1) 
 
The superscript T denotes the matrix transpose.  
In case of no spatial weighting (W is the unity matrix), equation (1) would yield a matrix 
of normal (Pearson) correlation coefficients. In that case, an eigenvector of the correla-
tion matrix, denoted by u, would yield a set of weights that could be used to calculate a 
composite measure Xu. This composite measure is actually a projection of the data ma-
trix X onto the vector u, and it can be shown that the eigenvector that belongs to the 
largest eigenvalue is associated with the projection that minimizes the residual variance 
between X itself and the projection. In other words, that eigenvector maximizes the “fit” 
between the data and the lower-dimensional projection. The eigenvector associated with 
every next largest eigenvalue correspondingly maximizes the fit of the remaining residu-
al variance. This procedure is called principal components.  
Note that the length of the vector u is constrained to one, so that the projection is identi-
fied, and hence the procedure of minimizing residual variance (or maximizing fit) is a 
problem of constrained optimization. In particular, the principal components procedures 
maximizes uTXTXu subject to uTu = 1, which yields the first-order condition and eigen-
value problem XTXu = λu. 
Wartenberg’s spatial principal components analysis takes eigenvalues of the matrix M, 
which can be seen as the outcome of maximizing uTXTWXu subject to uTu = 1, which 
yields the first-order condition and eigenvalue problem XTWXu=λu. Note that this can 
also be written as Mu=λu, which brings out clearly that what we are, in fact, doing in this 
case is taking the eigenvalues of the matrix of Moran coefficients M. Thus, Wartenberg 
maximizes uTXTWXu, which can be seen as the covariance of the non-spatially weighted 
factor (Xu) and the spatially weighted factor (WXu). While this is mathematically sound, 
we argue that this maximization does not have a clear, intuitive interpretation, and hence 
the procedure is in need of an objective that is more directly related to the basics of spa-
tial analysis. 
Our proposal is to calculate a set of weights v in such a way that the Moran coefficient of 
the weighted summary variable Xv (which, as in the case of principal components, is the 
projection of the original data on the vector v) is maximized. This idea is the intuition 
that we want to put behind the spatial principal components procedure, which then be-
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comes aimed at finding a summary measure that yields maximum spatial correlation. 
Mathematically, it can be implemented as follows. As long as the vector Xv is a z-score, 
the Moran coefficient that we want to maximize can be written as 
 
(Xv)TW(Xv)       (2) 
 
The mean of Xv is zero because X is already expressed as z-scores. However, in order for 
Xv to be a z-score, we also need to choose the weights v such that the variance of Xv is 
one. Hence, given our objective of maximizing the Moran coefficient of Xv, we have to 
maximize equation (2) subject to the condition (Xv)T(Xv) = 1. Note that in comparison to 
Wartenberg’s procedure (as outlined above), we only propose to change the constraint, 
not the objective function. Wartenberg (implicitly) uses the constraint vTv = 1, whereas 
we use (Xv)T(Xv) =1.  
It can relatively easily be shown that this constrained maximization problem leads to the 
following first-order condition: 
 
(XTX)-1(XTWX)v = λv,      (3) 
 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. This is clearly an eigenvalue problem. On the left 
hand side of (3), we find the matrix of Moran coefficients (1), pre-multiplied with the 
inverse of the covariance matrix of the non-spatially weighted data. The solution of our 
constrained maximization problem is an eigenvector of this left hand side matrix. The 
eigenvector that belongs to the largest eigenvalue will maximize the Moran coefficient 
of the projection Xv, and the corresponding eigenvalue will be equal to the largest possi-
ble value of the Moran coefficient, given the constraint of unit variance.4  
Summarizing, our modification of Wartenberg’s procedure is to pre-multiply the Moran 
matrix M of the variables in the dataset by the inverse of its (non-spatially weighted) 
covariance matrix. Doing so provides a clear interpretation of the eigenvectors of the 
matrix: this eigenvector is the set of weights that maximizes the spatial correlation of the 
projection of the raw data on to this eigenvector.  
 
3. Spatial Canonical Correlation 
 
The method of spatial principal components as outlined in the previous section has an 
intuitive extension into the direction of canonical correlation analysis. Suppose that 
instead of just one dataset, we have two, i.e., a matrix X and a matrix Y. Both X and Y 
have n rows (observations), but their number of variables (columns, denoted by kX and 
kY) may differ. As before, we assume that X and Y are z-scores. 
                                                          
4 Note that we can also obtain (3) through maximizing vT(XTX)-1(XTWX)v subject to v’v=1, which would be a 
more general form that does not require the data to be standardized.  
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The aim of our spatial canonical correlation analysis will be to find two sets of weights, 
vectors vX and vY, such that the weighted summary variables XvX and YvY are maximally 
spatially correlated to each other. This can be achieved by maximizing the Moran coeffi-
cient 
 
(XvX)TW(YvY)       (4) 
 
subject to two conditions: (XvX)T(XvX) = 1 and (YvY)T(YvY) = 1 (the rationale for these 
conditions is the same as in the previous section). After re-arranging, this problem yields 
two first-order conditions: 
 
(XTX)-1XTWY(YTY)-1(WY)TXvX = λ1λ2vX    (5) 
(YTY)-1YTWTX(XTX)-1XTWYvY = λ1λ2vY    (6) 
 
where ߣଵ and ߣଶ are Lagrange multipliers. Each of these conditions is an eigenvalue 
problem. In fact, the first m (where m is the minimum of by kX and kY) eigenvalues of the 
two problems will be identical, and they will be equal to the square root of the (maxim-
ized) Moran coefficient that is associated to the eigenvectors in each of the two condi-
tions. Defining A = (XTX)-1XTWY(YTY)-1 and M=XTWY,  we get   
 
AMTvX = λ1λ2vX 
ATMvY = λ1λ2vY 
 
The solution then is  
 
λ1λ2 = vXTAMTvX  = vYTATMvY 
 
Thus, the two eigenvalue problems (5) and (6) provide a different perspective on sum-
marizing information in a spatial way: for each of the two datasets X and Y they provide 
a summary measure (XvX or YvY) that maximizes spatial correlation to the other dataset. 
The eigenvectors belonging to the largest eigenvalue in either (5) or (6) provide this 
summary measure, while the square of the largest eigenvalue is equal to the Moran coef-
ficient between the two summary measures.  
 
4. Applications 
 
We now proceed to illustrate the proposed procedures to some real-world data. The da-
tasets that we use are taken from Gallup et al. (1999), who provide a wealth of infor-
mation on geography related phenomena on a global, country-level scale. We use data 
from two of their subsets of data: the physical characteristics of countries (mainly access 
to waterways and climate), and agriculture-related indicators (soil condition and climate 
zone). The data are available for 162 countries, and we use data from the CEPII dataset 
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on distances between countries (Mayer and Zignano, 2011) in order to construct our 
spatial weights (we use the distance between the largest cities in a pair of countries). 
These spatial weights are constructed as binary weights, where each (row) country has a 
weight of one for each of its closest 10 neighbour countries, and zero for other countries. 
This matrix is symmetrized by taking the average of cells (i,j) and (j,i) and assigning this 
average to both cells. We use such a symmetric spatial weights matrix because it makes 
the interpretation of the various Moran coefficients somewhat easier (e.g., it produces a 
symmetric Moran matrix M), but we have also applied the method to cases with a non-
symmetric matrix W.5 Finally, the spatial weights matrix is standardized by dividing 
each cell by the matrix sum (which obviously is 162*10).  
 
4.1. Spatial Principal Components 
 
We start by applying spatial principal components analysis to the dataset on physical 
characteristics of countries. This dataset has 13 variables, which are presented in Table 
1. Nine of the 13 variables relate to access to waterways, either navigable rivers, or sea. 
The emphasis on this characteristic comes from the attention to landlocked countries in 
the debate on economic development (e.g., Gallup et al., 1999). The other variables 
relate to elevation, climate, and population density. 
We apply regular (non-spatially weighted) principal components analysis, Wartenberg’s 
spatial principal components analysis, and our own spatial principal components analysis 
to this dataset.6 We start by looking at what would be called loadings in regular principal 
components analysis, i.e., the eigenvectors that were extracted in each of the three pro-
cedures. These are documented for the first two components (two largest eigenvalues) in 
graphical format in Figure 1a and 1b.  
 
 
  
                                                          
5 If the spatial weights matrix (W) is non-symmetric, the matrix of Moran coefficients between the 13 variables 
will also be non-symmetric. This means that that the eigenvalues in the two spatial variants of principal com-
ponents (and spatial canonical correlation analysis) potentially have imaginary parts. When we worked with 
non-symmetric W matrices (i.e., not in this paper), we always obtained large purely real eigenvalues.  
6 All our calculations are done in Matlab. The functions that were written to perform the analysis are available 
on request. 
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Table 1. Variables in the physical characteristics dataset7 
Variable description Variable code 
mean elevation (meters above sea level) elev 
mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km) seariver 
mean distance to nearest coastline (km) coast 
mean distance to nearest inland navigable river (km) landriver 
distance from centroid of country to nearest coast (km) coastcent 
distance from centroid of country to nearest coast or sea-navigable river (km) searivercent 
Ratio of population within 100 km of ice-free coast to total population popcoast 
Ratio of population within 100 km of ice-free coast/navigable river to total population popcoastriver 
population in the geographical tropics (%) tropicpop 
% Land area within 100 km of ice-free coast areacoast 
% Land area within 100 km of ice-free coast/navigable river areacoastriver 
Typical population density experienced by an individual (persons/km2) popdens 
% Land area in geographical tropics tropicland 
  
 
Figures 1a (left) and 1b (right): Eigenvectors for physical characteristics dataset, largest eigenvalue (left) and 
second-largest eigenvalue (right) 
 
 
The average spatial correlation between the 13 variables in the dataset is modest to low 
(mean Moran coefficient of 0.04, with a standard deviation of 0.22). The maximum 
Moran coefficient observed between two variables in the dataset is 0.77. In terms of the 
Moran coefficients between the resulting summary variables (what would be called 
“scores” in regular principal components analysis), the three methods differ by rather 
much. The regular principal components analysis produces no spatial correlation at all 
(Moran coefficients -0.01 and 0.01). Wartenberg’s method produces Moran coefficients 
                                                          
7 The variable names have been retained as in the original datasets (http://www.cid.harvard.edu/-
ciddata/geographydata.htm)  
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of 0.38 and 0.78, respectively for the first and second largest eigenvalues. Interestingly, 
the Moran coefficient associated with the second-largest eigenvalue is larger than that of 
the largest eigenvalue. In other words, if one would be looking for a high degree of spa-
tial correlation, using the second eigenvector would be better than using the first eigen-
vector. For our version of spatial principal components, the Moran coefficients are 0.83 
and 0.50, respectively for the largest and second largest eigenvalue.  
The profiles of the eigenvectors in Figures 1a and 1b show clear differences between the 
three methods. For the largest eigenvalue (left figure), regular principal components 
analysis puts most emphasis (highest “loadings”) on popdens, coast, popcoast and area-
coastriver (positive loadings) and popcoastriver, areacoast, tropicland and seariver 
(negative loadings). Wartenberg’s method stresses elev, tropicland, popdens, seariver 
and coast (positive loadings) and popcoast, popcoastriver, areacoast and areacoastriver 
(negative loadings). Our method emphasizes popdens, seariver, popcoast and pop-
coastriver (positive loadings) and tropicland, coastcent, searivercent and areacoastriver 
(negative loadings). All in all, it is clear that the three methods are far from equivalent in 
terms of which variables should be weighted strongest.  
This leads to a rather different picture of which countries are behind the spatial correla-
tion that is observed in the dataset as a whole. Maps 1a and 1b provide an overview of 
these differences. The colours in the maps are an indication for the “component scores” 
(data vectors multiplied by the eigenvectors) for Wartenberg’s method and our method 
for spatial principal components. We do not document maps for any second largest ei-
genvalues, nor for regular principal components (which produces no spatial correlation).  
As could already be suspected from the loadings in Figure 1, the two maps produce 
rather different pictures. Wartenberg’s method shows high scores around the globe, but 
especially so in the two large countries that border on the North polar area (Canada and 
Russia). Large parts of Africa, the Americas and Asia also show high scores. Europe is 
the exception: here Wartenberg’s method finds mostly lower values. This is exactly 
opposite for our method, which produces very high values for a cluster of West- and 
Central-European countries, stretching into the Caspian Sea area. This method produces 
also consistently lower values around the equator (on all continents). As can be seen 
from the above maps, Map 1b is easier to categorize into sub groups of countries. For 
example, we see a clear tropical region. This gives us the advantage of a better spatial 
interpretation than is possible with results in Map 1a. Thus, we find it more advanta-
geous to use our method. 
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Map 1a (top) and 1b (bottom): Component scores for Wartenberg’s method (top) and our method (bottom), 
only largest eigenvalue. 
 
 
4.2. Spatial Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
In order to apply the spatial canonical correlation analysis, we introduce a second dataset 
from Gallup et al. (1999). This refers to agriculture, and consists of two main categories 
of variables: suitability of land (for irrigation and general soil quality) and the percentage 
of cultivated land in a particular climate zone. The variables are listed in Table 2. 
We undertake the spatial canonical correlation analysis for the physical characteristics 
dataset and the agriculture dataset. This means that we will be looking, for each of the 
two datasets, for weights that summarize the dataset in such a way that the spatial corre-
lation (Moran coefficient) with the summary variable from the other dataset is maxim-
ized. We start by looking at the loadings (eigenvectors), and concentrate only on the 
eigenvectors that belong to the highest eigenvalue. The Moran coefficient that belongs to 
this is 0.79 (i.e., the eigenvalue is the square of this value, 0.62).  
The loadings are in Figures 2a and 2b. We compare the loadings from the spatial canoni-
cal correlation analysis with those of the spatial principal components analysis (our 
method), to see whether any notable differences arise between the cases where we aim 
for maximizing spatial correlation within the dataset, or between the two datasets. For 
the spatial principal components analysis for the agriculture dataset, we do not document 
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further details of this procedure, while for the physical characteristics dataset, these are 
the results from the previous section. 
 
Table 2. Variables in the agriculture dataset 
Description Variable code 
Mean irrigation suitability, very suitable (%)  irrsuit1 
Mean irrigation suitability, moderately suitable (%) irrsuit2 
mean soil suitability 1, very suitable (%) soilsui1 
mean soil suitability 2, moderately suitable (%) soilsui2 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Af zone  cultcaf 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Am zone  cultcam 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Aw zone  cultcaw 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Bs zone  cultcbs 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Bw zone  cultcbw 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cf zone  cultccf 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cs zone  cultccs 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cw zone  cultccw 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Df zone  cultcdf 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Dw zone  cultcdw 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger E zone  cultce 
% cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger H zone  cultch 
 
For the physical characteristics dataset, we clearly see changes compared to the previous 
section. Compared to the principal components analysis, the canonical correlation analy-
sis loads much higher on coastcent, searivercent, popcoast, areacoast and areacoastriv-
er, and much lower on seariver. Note that these are all variables related to waterways. 
The differences for the other variables are less strong, but still there are differences for 
these as well (canonical correlation analysis is lower on elev, tropicland and popdens, 
but higher on tropicpop).  
The differences between spatial canonical correlation analysis and spatial principal com-
ponents seem to be somewhat less for the agriculture dataset. Here, many variables are 
remarkably close in Figure 1b, with soilsui2 as a main exception, and irrsuit1, cultcbs 
and cultcbw as more minor exceptions.  
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Figures 2a (left) and 2b (right): Eigenvectors for physical characteristics dataset (left) and agriculture dataset 
(right), largest eigenvalue only.  
  
 
 
 
Map 2a (top) and 2b (bottom): Component scores for spatial canonical correlation analysis between physical 
characteristics dataset (top) and agriculture dataset (bottom), only largest eigenvalue 
 
Next, we look at the maps for the component scores for the two datasets, again only for 
the scores belonging to the largest eigenvalue. These maps are displayed in Maps 2a and 
2b. The map at the top (2a) is for physical characteristics, and can therefore be compared 
to Map 1b above. The first thing that catches the eye in this comparison is that the cur-
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rent map (2a) is almost a mirror image of the previous one (1b). Here (before), we have 
high (low) values around the equator, and low (high) values in West- and Central-
Europe. There are small deviations from this comparison (e.g., Kazakhstan, the USA), 
but overall, this is a rather strong similarity, despite the differences in loadings in Figure 
2a. 
Naturally (because of the strong spatial correlation as indicated by the eigenvalue), the 
map for the agriculture dataset looks similar. Here, however, the areas with high (low) 
values are somewhat more concentrated within the larger area around the equator (e.g., 
the Congo and Uganda area rather than all of sub-Saharan Africa), or within Europe. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have presented a method for spatial principal components analysis that has two im-
portant advantages over the method that Wartenberg (1985) proposed, and which has 
found its place in the toolbox of computational methods for spatial analysis (e.g., the 
adegenet R package, see Jombart, undated). The first advantage is that, contrary to Wart-
enberg’s method, our method has a clear and exact interpretation: it produces a summary 
measure of a dataset that itself has maximum spatial correlation. Thus, rather than work-
ing at an intuitive level, our method specifies exactly what is the goal of the weighting 
procedure that is derived using the eigenvalue decomposition of the Moran matrix. Fur-
ther, this weighting procedure helps us see clear clusters of countries, motivated by a 
spatial narrative, one that makes empirical conclusions more exact than that of the Wart-
enberg method. 
Second, by this goal of the analysis, an easy and intuitive link can be made to canonical 
correlation analysis. Our spatial canonical correlation analysis produces summary 
measures of two datasets (e.g., each measuring a different phenomenon), and these 
summary measures produce the maximum spatial correlation between them. This pro-
vides an alternative weighting scheme as compared to spatial principal components 
analysis.  
The methods that we propose are computationally easy (with modern computers), and 
can easily be implemented in a variety of software packages. We have Matlab routines 
available on request.  
We provided example applications of the methods and showed that the spatial principal 
components analysis may produce rather different results than Wartenberg’s method. We 
also illustrated how spatial canonical correlation analysis may produce different results 
than spatial canonical correlation analysis. We hope that practitioners in the field of 
spatial statistical analysis will apply our methods to different problems, and thus show 
their usefulness.  
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Appendix 
 
Our approach of a spatial canonical correlation analysis compared to standard 
CCA 
 
We want to show in this appendix how our broad approach of maximizing equation (4) 
in the main text subject to the unitary variance of Xu and Yv relates to standard CCA. 
There is one main difference between standard CCA and our spatial variant: we intro-
duce the spatial weights matrix W, (in the maximand, not in the constraints). In order to 
show the equivalence, we will first drop the spatial weights W, and show that in this case 
our approach and CCA are identical.  
The starting point is our maximization problem, which can be written as the Lagrangean 
 
L = (Xu)TW(Yv) – λ1((Xu)T(Xu) – 1)/2 – λ2((Yv)T(Yv) – 1)/2.  (A1) 
 
The non-spatial version of our approach 
 
Dropping W from the Lagrange function above yields the following alternative La-
grangean: 
L = (Xu)T(Yv) – λ1 (uTXTXu – 1) - λ2 (vTYTYv – 1)   (A2) 
 
The maximand is Cov(Xu,Yv), where X and Y have the same number of rows but poten-
tially a different number of columns. The constraints are identical to the Lagrangean 
(A1). 
The first-order conditions are  
 
Lu = XTYv – λ1XTXu = 0,  
Lv = YTXu – λ2YTYv = 0. 
 
From the first-order conditions we get u = (XTX)-1XTYv/ λ1 and v = (YTY)-1YTXu/ λ2. Inser-
tion into the first-order conditions yields 
 
Lu = XTY(YTY)-1YTXu/ λ2 – λ1XTXu = 0, 
Lv = YTX(XTX)-1XTYv/ λ1 – λ2YTYv = 0. 
 
Multiplying through by the Lagrange multiplier and (XTX)-1 and (YTY)-1 respectively from 
the left yields 
 
Lu = (XTX)-1XTY(YTY)-1YTXu – λ2λ1u = 0, 
Lv = (YTY)-1YTX(XTX)-1XTYv – λ1λ2v = 0. 
 
For the eigenvectors belonging to the highest eigenvalues then the solution is 
 λ2λ1 = uT(XTX)-1XTY(YTY)-1YTXu = vT(YTY)-1YTX(XTX)-1XTYv. 
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Equivalence with CCA 
 
Going back to the first set of first-order conditions above, we can show that the result is 
equivalent to CCA, but the above version is much simpler because it goes more directly 
to the eigenvectors.  
 
Define e = (XTX)1/2u and f = (YTY)1/2v. Then, u = (XTX)-1/2e and v = (YTY)-1/2f.  
 
Replacing u and v in the first set of first-order conditions yields 
 
Lu = XTY(YTY)-1/2f  – λ1(XTX)1/2e = 0,  
Lv = YTX(XTX)-1/2e  – λ2(YTY)1/2f = 0. 
 
From these first-order conditions we get e = (XTX)-1/2XTY(YTY)-1/2f/ λ1 and   
f = (YTY)-1/2YTX(XTX)-1/2e/ λ2. Using these latter equations to replace f in the first and e in 
the second equation yields 
 
Lu = XTY(YTY)-1/2(YTY)-1/2YTX(XTX)-1/2e/ λ2 – λ1 (XTX)1/2e = 0, 
Lv = YTX(XTX)-1/2(XTX)-1/2XTY(YTY)-1/2f/ λ1  – λ2 (YTY)1/2f = 0. 
 
Multiplying through by the Lagrange multiplier and (XTX)-1/2 and (YTY)-1/2 respectively 
from the left yields 
 
Lu = (XTX)-1/2 XTY(YTY)-1/2(YTY)-1/2YTX(XTX)-1/2e – λ2λ1e = 0 
Lv = (YTY)-1/2 YTX(XTX)-1/2(XTX)-1/2XTY(YTY)-1/2f – λ1λ2 f = 0  
 
Multiplying with eTand fT from the left yields and solving for λ2λ1 yields:  
 
λ2λ1 = eT(XTX)-1/2XTY(YTY)-1/2(YTY)-1/2YTX(XTX)-1/2e =  
fT(YTY)-1/2YTX(XTX)-1/2(XTX)-1/2XTY(YTY)-1/2f 
 
Taking the eigenvectors and values and calculating u and v is exactly what CCA does 
(see Johnson and Wichern 2007, chap. 10), but here it has been obtained from our meth-
od. By implication, our method is equivalent to CCA if W is dropped.   
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CHAPTER 3 
The Geographic Dimensions of 
Institutions 
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Introduction 
 
Explaining uneven economic development amongst countries has been a primary con-
cern of empirical growth literature. Growth performance of countries is often explained 
in the context of convergence or divergence, given their wide-ranging ‘initial condi-
tions.’ One such strand of literature that has taken centre stage in explaining these differ-
ences is new institutional economics (NIE). According to NIE, differences in institution-
al quality and governance structures8, explain growth differentials among countries9 
(Acemoglu et al.(2001, 2002, 2004), Engerman and Sokoloff (2005), Rodrik et 
al.(2004)).  
 
Institutions refer to formal rules (constitutions, laws and regulations, political systems 
etc…) and informal rules (value systems, beliefs, social norms etc…) that humans use 
when interacting within a wide variety of repetitive and structured situations at multiple 
levels of analysis (North 2005, Ostrom 2005). Institutions are categorized into economic 
(property rights, presence of markets, regulatory structures etc…), political (constitu-
tional arrangement) and social institutions (presence of health care markets, unemploy-
ment support systems, pension provision systems, and other informal social institutions 
such as social norms, religious norms etc…) (Bennedsen et al.2005).  
 
Although there is no absolute definition for “good governance” most include the depth 
of democracy and public accountability, bureaucracy and judiciary, stability of property 
rights, corporate governance, financial institutions, social welfare and labour institutions 
(Chang 2002, Khan 2004). In other words, it is how the social and economic environ-
ment of a country is managed (World Bank 1992:1)10.  
 
Studies in this area establish that there is a definite causal link between institutions and 
economic development directly and a link between geography and economic develop-
ment via their influence on institutions (Rodrik et al.2004, Easterly and Levine 2003, 
etc.). These studies have helped establish a stylized fact that better institutions are 
strongly related to higher economic development. Most of these studies tend to use GDP 
per capita as the single most important measure of economic development. GDP per 
capita is no doubt an important indicator of economic development. However, most 
economists would agree that it does not help paint a complete picture of a country’s level 
of development. In this paper, we would like to use a broader set of indicators to meas-
ure the economic performance of a country, in order to re-examine the relationship be-
tween development, institutions and geography. 
                                                          
8 Although, institutional quality, institutions and governance do not mean the same, they are often used inter-
changeably. In this paper too, we use them interchangeably. 
9 It is understood in NIE that the ‘quality’ of institutions is determined by how strongly property rights are 
protected and how “free” markets are, i.e., stronger property rights laws and “freer markets” imply higher 
quality of institutions (Chang 2011). 
10 See Section 2.1 for the formal definition. 
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Geographic determinism and international trade as the key drivers of growth in a country 
are the other two strands of literature that stand out. The former states that geographic 
differences (environmental differences) determine development differences in a country. 
It states that geography (climate, natural resources, disease ecology, etc.) determines not 
only the capacity of food production, but also labour productivity11, and trade policies of 
a country12. The latter states that international trade is the key driver of productivity and 
thus has a direct impact on the growth of a country13. Some studies have tried to evaluate 
which of these competing hypotheses gains ‘primacy’ over the others in explaining the 
ultimate driver of growth and development14. 
 
Geography is often considered as the most exogenous factor that can be used in econo-
metric studies. Geographic determinism primarily enters literature in the form of its 
‘absolute location’. By this we mean the physical geographic characteristics of a country, 
like its climatic conditions, physical endowments etc., which determine the ability of a 
country to develop. Geography in this form is discussed as an ultimate determinant of 
economic development. In recent years however, with the emergence of literature on 
regional convergence, geography in the form of its ‘relative location’ has been gaining 
importance. ‘Relative location’ refers to the relative spatial characteristics of a country, 
namely, its neighboring countries and their influence on it (Abreu et al. 2004)15.  In this 
paper, we would like to use both these concepts. In particular, we would like to see the 
impact of physical geography and institutions on economic growth, given the relative 
location of countries and their influence on each other. We do this with the help of a 
canonical correlation analysis, which allows us to correlate one set of variables against 
another set of variables. 
 
The aim of this paper is to understand the interactions between institutions, economic 
performance, financial performance and the geography of a country from a spatial per-
spective. The analysis aims at understanding the underlying spatial patterns of institu-
tions when summarized in combination with geography, economic performance or fi-
nancial performance of countries. We do so by using a new method of spatial canonical 
correlation analysis, which is explained below.  We describe these spatial patterns at a 
cross-country level, looking specifically at what factors in the two sets of data commonly 
result in spatial clusters. Rather than entering the debate on the primacy of absolute ge-
ography or institutions as determinants of economic performance, we want to see how 
                                                          
11 The prevalence and incidence of diseases (like malaria, HIV) are much higher in tropical countries and thus 
burdensome not only in terms of costs incurred for treatment but also in  its debilitating effect on labour, often 
reducing labour productivity (Bloom and Sachs 1998, Sachs 2001, Gallup and Sachs 2001 etc) 
12 Landlocked economies tend to have lesser trade openness and higher transport costs. Countries that  have a 
coast line tend to have lower transport costs as well as policies that encourage  international trade, thus allow-
ing them more growth opportunities (Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup 1999) 
13 Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2003) etc. 
14  These include Rodrik et al.(2004), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik (2003) etc. 
15 ‘Absolute location’ and ‘relative location’ are often referred to as ‘first nature’ geography and ‘second 
nature’ geography of a country. 
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each of these phenomena interacts with the other in a broader context. This paper does 
not try to address the causality between institutions and economic development but ra-
ther provide a descriptive overview of the spatial patterns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of related 
literature. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data used. Section 4 
explains the results and the last section concludes the paper. 
 
1. Related Literature 
 
2.1. Institutions and Economic Development 
 
Literature on institutions and economic growth and development has regained popularity 
over the last two decades. The predominant discourse in this literature states that institu-
tions that ensure freer working of markets (read as the least amount of government inter-
vention) as well as strong property rights protection provide the best environment for 
economic development (Chang 2011). According to the current literature, “good institu-
tions” create an environment for providing the “right” incentives to agents in the econo-
my. These incentives lead to learning and innovation, investment in human and physical 
capital as well as capabilities. These factors lead to higher growth rates in an economy. 
An improper or a bad institutional set up, on the other hand, does not incentivize such 
activities. Instead, it leads to corruption, rent-seeking and other non-productive or 
growth repressing activities.  
There are numerous studies based on the institutions hypothesis. “Core” papers in this 
area of research include Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2005), Rodrik et al. (2004) Easterly and 
Levine (2003), Hall and Jones (1999) etc., among others. All these studies examine how 
various institutions effect economic growth and development outcomes, concluding that 
institutions matter. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), use settler mortality rates of the colonizers in 
the colonies as an instrument for institutional quality during the colonial period. They 
hypothesize that Europeans took their institutions to ‘settler colonies’, while they set up 
different ‘extractive’ institutions in colonies where the prime intention was extraction of 
wealth. Thus, colonies where they settled got better institutions and those where they had 
an extraction policy ended up with bad institutions. These historical conditions further 
influenced the quality and type of current institutions. They find a strong and significant 
influence of historical institutions from the colonial era on current institutions as well as 
of current institutions on per capita income. Hall and Jones (1999), use “distance from 
equator” and the “extent of to which Western languages are spoken in the country” as 
instruments to find a strong correlation between output per worker with respect to social 
infrastructure (which is an average of an institutions and openness of economy index). 
Kauffman et al. (1999) also use “extent of to which Western languages are spoken in the 
country” to find a positive and significant impact of the quality of institutions on growth. 
Other cross-country studies like Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and 
 33 
Kraay (2003) also support the hypothesis that institutions generate development. In fact, 
there are but a few studies that do not find any significant effect16. 
The proponents of the institutional hypothesis agree that institutions have evolved en-
dogenously, depending on the country’s geographic conditions, among other factors. 
Examples of such studies include Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik 
et al. (2004). These studies have made empirical efforts to explain the possible linkage 
between geography and institutions. Hall and Jones (1999) hypothesize that Western 
Europeans preferred to live in places that resembled their own, and thus indirectly use 
geography as an explanatory variable. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) suggest that the 
climatic conditions either ‘lent themselves’ to plantation agriculture or small farm agri-
culture. This in turn meant that the plantation economies led to less democratic power 
relations and small farms, by empowering a larger section of society led to more demo-
cratic institutions and thus to more development. Rodrik et al. (2004) and Easterly and 
Levine (2003) find that geography influences economic growth development only via its 
impact on institutions. 
Much of this literature has not been sensitive towards the individual development expe-
riences of countries. Most of these theories “have been rooted in the historical and social 
experiences of a few Western industrialized countries” (Brohman 1995). Policy prescrip-
tions of growth have thus been a set of generalized recommendations, irrespective of 
their applicability to culture or the varying historical conditions of each country (that are 
most often very different from the Western European conditions). While it is important 
to understand growth at a more general level, policies made towards encouraging growth 
and development need to be made at the country level, catering to the specific conditions 
of the economy. The failure of the Washington Consensus has further proved that we 
need to look beyond the “one size fits all” approach. 
  
2.2 Geography and Economic Development 
 
The geography hypothesis is based on the fact that not all the areas in the world are en-
dowed in the same fashion. The geography of a country determines characteristics such 
as soil quality which directly affects agricultural productivity, natural resources which 
contribute to wealth as well as provide the raw material base for industrial activity, to-
pography which contributes to costs of transportation, climate that affects the productivi-
ty of workers, and the disease environment which also directly affects the productivity of 
workers (Acemoglu 2009). No access to rivers, as well as land-locked geography, affects 
the growth of the country negatively. The proponents of this view argue that during and 
after colonization the poor countries have remained poor. There has been no reversal of 
fortunes and what has remained the same is the geographical position of these countries 
(Sachs (2001) and Bloom and Sachs (1998)). Thus, it is primarily geography, which 
determines the economic situation of the country.  
                                                          
16 For example, Dollar and Kraay (2003) find a positive and insignificant effect between “rule of law” and 
growth, while Sala-i-Martin (1997 a) finds ethno-linguistic fractionalization on growth as insignificant.  
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There have been many empirical studies carried out to determine the importance of ge-
ography as a determinant of growth. The latitude of the country is a popular variable in 
testing the geography-development hypothesis. Sala-i-Martin (1997 a, b), Bloom and 
Sachs (1998), Easterly and Levine (2001) are among some of those studies that find a 
positive and significant impact of the latitudinal position of a country on its growth lev-
els. The numbers of frost days in a year, availability of arable land, the length of the 
coastline, rainfall, and temperature have been other variables used to study the effect of 
geographical position of the country on its growth rates. Some of the papers that test 
these variables empirically are Bloom and Sachs (2003), Masters and Sachs (2001) and 
Bloom et al. (2003). All these find a positive and significant effect of the first three vari-
ables on growth, while the last two variables are found to have a negative and significant 
effect. That is to say, lesser and more unpredictable rainfalls as well as high temperatures 
directly affect the productivity as well as output negatively. Landlocked economies have 
been tested to find a negative impact on growth (Easterly and Levine (2001), Sachs and 
Gallup, (1999)). Easterly and Levine (2003), and Sachs (2003) also use measures such as 
the proportion of the population at the risk of malaria, life expectancy at birth, infant 
mortality rate etc., to find a significant and negative impact of disease ecology on 
growth. McArthur and Sachs (2001), concludes that institutions and geographically-
related variables affect the GNP per capita of countries.  
The results of the empirical studies mentioned above find that the geography does indeed 
have an impact on the country’s growth statistics. As mentioned earlier the geography-
development hypothesis is mainly based on the ‘absolute location’ of a country. That is, 
they consider those characteristics of a country’s geography which are exogenous, time-
invariant (except for some disease variables) and are not influenced by its ‘relative loca-
tion’ vis-à-vis its neighbours and their socio-political and economic conditions. 
 
2.3. Spatial econometrics and Economic Development 
 
The impact of the ‘relative location’ of a country on the quality of institutions and thus 
economic growth has been given relatively less attention. How does the institutional 
quality of a country get affected by the institutional quality of its neighbours? A large 
literature on spatial dependence in the field of economic growth can be found in the 
regional convergence literature. Regional income convergence on intra-national scale, as 
well as regional scale, has resulted in strong consensus on income convergence among 
these geographical units. The theories of technology diffusion and factor mobility have 
strong spatial components. For example, Verspagen (2010), López-Bazo et al. (1998, 
2004) study the technology diffusion and growth amongst European regions. Similarly 
Rey and Montouri (1998) study spatial patterns in income across the states of USA. 
Other studies in this literature include Rey and Montouri (1998), Quah (1997), Cheshire 
and Magrini (2009) etc.  
Spatial dependence with respect to institutions and governance has been addressed in a 
couple of studies. Ward and Gleditsch (2008) study the spatial spillover effect of democ-
racy at a cross-country level. They find southern, and western Africa, as well as India, 
are unusual situations where in democracy in their country is not explained by the situa-
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tion in their neighboring countries. Examining if the governance structures in an econo-
my are influenced by their neighboring countries could help unbundle institutions in a 
more effective way.  They find a positive impact of democracy of neighbouring coun-
tries. Leeson and Dean (2009), Sobel and Leeson (2007), etc., also study the effects of 
democracy on neighbouring countries, with a spatial or a temporal lag (Hosseini and 
Kaneko 2012). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Institutional quality, geography, economic performance and the financial structure of a 
country are all multi-dimensional in nature. Using single variables to describe these 
phenomena can bias understanding of how they influence each other. In this paper, we 
want to better understand how the geography of a country (its ‘absolute location’), its 
economic performance and its financial structure, each in turn, are related to the institu-
tional set up of a country (given its relative location). In order to understand the role of 
‘relative geography’ of countries, we introduce an alternate method of spatial principal 
component analysis and spatial canonical correlation analysis. We would like to study 
the dependence of one latent variable on the other, given the relative location of the 
observations, i.e., we would like to account for the spatial dependence of observations in 
one country on its neighbours17.  
Similar to the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), canonical correlation analysis 
(CCA) is a dimensionality reduction method. PCA transforms a set of probably correlat-
ed variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables. This is done by constructing a 
new set of latent variables that are orthogonal (uncorrelated) to each other. In other 
words, the new variables are weighted linear combinations of the original variables, 
which maximize the variance of the new latent variables in the data set, called principal 
components. While the PCA does this for one set of variables, the CCA finds the rela-
tionship between two sets of multiple variables X and Y, for which we obtain two sets of 
latent vectors. These are called canonical components. The weights are obtained in such 
a way that they not only reduce the number of variables in each data set, but also maxim-
ize the correlation between the corresponding new components in each dataset (i.e., the 
first component in data set 1 is maximally correlated to the first component in data set 2 
and so on. Each pair of components is together called a canonical function)18. The resid-
ual variance is explained by each successive canonical function that is, the first function 
explains the most amount of variance in the data and consecutive ones explain the max-
imum of residual variance. The highest number of components you can have is deter-
mined by the number of original variables in the smaller data set. 
The analysis results in following results for PCA and CCA respectively: (i) factor load-
ings (or canonical loadings) for both sets of data (X and Y), for each common pattern 
                                                          
17 For a detailed explanation on the methodology used see (Bhupatiraju et al.2013) 
18 This is different from the PCA in that the correlations are found within one set of data and not the inter-
correlations between two sets of data. 
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that exists in the two sets (for each canonical function). These weights correspond to 
each of the variables in the data sets, determining how they weigh in on the identified 
common pattern. With the factor loadings we can identify the structural pattern underly-
ing the data (Clark 1975). These loadings are obtained from the correlation matrix, by 
the means of Eigen value decomposition. (ii) Factor scores (or canonical scores) for 
each of the data sets (X and Y). These scores explain how each country fares in the 
common pattern. This, is therefore, a good indication of the spatial patterns underlying 
the data. The scores are obtained by pre-multiplying the loadings with the standardized 
raw data. (iii) Canonical correlation coefficient (Moran coefficient) is the correlation 
coefficient between the latent variables of both sets of data (for each canonical function). 
It can be understood as the Pearson r coefficient between the two latent variables. The 
spatial correlation between the two factor score vectors is equal to the square root of the 
corresponding Eigen values. 
We want to maximize the correlation coefficient obtained from the PCA and CCA to 
explain a maximized overall spatial pattern. We call this the spatial correlation coeffi-
cient. In order to do this, we introduce spatial weights (a connectivity matrix) that allow 
us to define the ‘relative location’ of the countries in the data sets19. We first calculate 
the spatial lag of one set of variables. A spatial lag of observation i of variable y (yi) is 
the linear combination of values of its neighboring countries and is given by ∑ ݓ௜௝ݕ௜௡௝ , 
where wij is the spatial weight matrix. This is the weighted average of the observation i’s 
neighbouring countries (j). In other words, a spatial lag introduces a diffusion process 
such that the variables in the data set are influenced by their neighbours. This method 
decomposes a spatially weighted matrix, in order to give it an explicit spatial perspec-
tive. Bhupatiraju et al. (2013) explains this methodology in detail. We perform a spatial 
PCA on the institutional data in order to reduce the number of institutional variables, 
which we further use for a spatial CCA along with the other data sets. 
 
In order to obtain the spatial lag, we choose a set of geographic distance weights for the 
connectivity matrix. We use an exponential decay to obtain the weights matrix, given by 
the formula, ݓ௜௝ = ݁ି଴.଴଴ଵହௗ೔ೕ where wij is the spatial weight between countries i and j, 
and dij is the bilateral distance between the centroids of the two countries. The data of 
bilateral distances are taken from the CEPII gravity dataset20. This specific distance 
decay has been chosen after having experimented with a few other weights, the details of 
which are presented in Appendix A. It is an arbitrary choice, but reflects a rapid decay of 
weights given the distance between the countries. This (nxn) matrix is row-standardized 
so as to take into account that all countries are -at some distance- neighbors of each other 
and, therefore, is not symmetric. It is also important to note that the weights are non-
stochastic and are exogenous to the model.  
                                                          
19 For a detailed explanation refer to Wartenberg (1985) 
20 Bilateral distances and common (official) language come from the CEPII distance database 
(http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm). 
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The analysis is based on four datasets, which we will briefly present. The first dataset 
Institutional Profiles Database, 2009 version (IPD)21 provides us with the data on institu-
tional characteristics of 123 countries. The IPD data is divided into four institutional 
sectors and nine institutional functions. The categories will be presented in  Appendix B. 
For our analysis we use the two-digit aggregation level which has 93 variables.  
The data on physical geographic factors of countries are taken from the Gallup, 
Mellinger and Sachs geography dataset22. The dataset contains information on infectious 
diseases, general measures of geography and agricultural measures. This particular data 
set has been divided into two different sets for our analysis, one describes the physical 
geographic characteristics of countries (GEOAREA) and the second describes the soil 
quality related variables (GEOSOIL), mainly based on the Köppen-Geiger climate 
zones. The information on infectious diseases has been dropped out of this analysis 
(since they are time-varying and are affected by policy and is not necessarily exogenous 
as noted in the previous section). 
 The data on economic variables are taken from the Penn World Table23 (PWT). We use 
a broader set of economic indicators to measure economic performance. These take into 
account not only the size of the economy (the initial level of GDP) and how fast it is 
growing (average annual growth rate of GDP per capita over the period of 2000-2007), 
but also some indicators of its expenditures which include investment, government 
spending, and consumption. We also include an indicator of the economy’s trade open-
ness as well as the log of population all using the definitions as in PWT. While GDP per 
capita is generally used as the measure of economic developmenet/performance, we feel 
that these additional variables allow us to measure different dimensions of a country's 
economic situation. By including other aspects of the economy that leads to higher levels 
of growth  in a country, the aim is to go beyond the simple measure of GDP per capita as 
a measure of economic development/performance. 
The financial data is obtained from the Financial Structure database distributed by the 
World Bank24 (FINANCE). This is a database of 31 indicators that describe the financial 
development and structure of countries. We use data for the year 2009. The variables in 
the data measure the “size, activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and mar-
kets” (Beck et al. 2000). Variables that measure the size and activity of non-bank finan-
cial institutions (insurance, private bond market and stock markets), international debt 
and remittances, as well as liquid liabilities of countries, have missing data for our set of 
countries. Due to this lack of data, we have dropped these 12 variables from the da-
taset25. We use 19 variables that give details of the banking sector across countries. The 
details of these variables are given in Appendix C. 
                                                          
21 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/institutions.htm 
22 http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/geographydata.htm 
23 We use PWT (7) of the table. 
24 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, (2000), "A New Database on Financial Development 
and Structure," World Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605. 
25 These are: other financial institutions assets / gdp (ofagdp), liquid liabilities (in mil. 2000 usd) (ll_usd), life 
insurance premium volume / gdp (inslife), non-life insurance premium volume / gdp (insnonlife), stock market 
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4. Empirical Results  
 
4.1. First stage results 
 
The IPD database contains 367 “elementary items” that are aggregated to 133 “three 
digit level” variables and further aggregated to 93 “two digit level” variables. For our 
analysis, we use the two-digit aggregation level which has 93 variables. Because there 
are very few degrees of freedom when we use the 93 variables for 118 countries, we 
would like to further aggregate these before our second step of the analysis. We use a 
pre-defined categorization (of the 4 sectors) to obtain new latent variables for each of the 
sectors. Sector A which constitutes institutional variables related to public institutions, 
and civil society contains 36 two-digit level variables. Sector B which constitutes varia-
bles related to the goods and services markets contains 28 variables. Sector C constitutes 
13 variables describing the capital market, and Sector D constitutes 16 variables describ-
ing institutional variables related to the labour market. We first do a spatial PCA on each 
of sectors of IPD. We select the new latent variables by looking at the scree plot of the 
Eigen values. Out of the components we obtain; we choose to work with 12 components 
(four from Sector A, three from Sector B, two from Sector C and three from Sector D). 
We discuss the results for some of these components before proceeding to the next step 
of the analysis.26   
We call the first PC of Sector A, A1. This component gives the highest positive weights 
to ‘Social Inclusion’ (A93), ‘democracy, legality & freedom (A10)’, and ‘political prox-
imity to an EU country’.  ‘Change and innovation’ and ‘political proximity to Japan’ 
have strong negative loadings. This component in general can be interpreted as repre-
senting a ‘socially inclusive democracy’ with political proximity to an EU country. In 
other words, we can see that countries that function similar to the non-Anglo Saxon 
Western European economies obtain a higher score than others. It is interesting to note 
the Algeria and Libya also get a high score along with Canada. These are the only coun-
tries, not in the geographical region of Western Europe, which have a high score. 
The second PC of Sector A is called A2 here. The variables that load high and positively 
in the second component are ‘Change and Innovation’, ‘Security of transactions & con-
tracts’, and ‘political proximity to Japan’. ‘Institutional capacity’, ‘domestic public secu-
rity & control of violence’ and ‘emulation of neighboring countries’ are some other 
variables that have relatively high weights. ‘Governance of public administration & the 
justice system’27, ‘government capacity to reform’, ‘autonomy in operation & creation of 
                                                                                                                                               
capitalization / gdp (stmktcap), stock market total value traded / gdp (stvaltraded), stock market turnover ratio 
(stturnover), no. of listed companies per 10k population (listco_pc), private bond market capitaliza-
tion/gdp(prbond), public bond market capitalization / gdp (pubond), international debt issues/gdp (intldebt), 
loans from non-resident banks (net) / gdp (intldebtnet), remittance inflows / gdp, (remit). 
26 The loadings for the first-stage are given in the Appendix D. 
27 Defined as the efficient public administration (which includes transparency in public accounts, economic 
policy and public procurement contracts, effective control of corruption) and an independent justice system 
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organizations’ and ‘decentralization’ have strong negative loadings. The eastern part of 
the world has the highest scores in this component, along with Northern European coun-
tries. Africa and Latin America have the lowest scores along with Mediterranean Europe. 
This component can be interpreted as one that stresses on ‘society’s responsiveness to 
change and innovation’.  
The third PC of Sector A (A3) has high and positive loadings on ‘change & innovation’, 
‘governance of public administration & the justice system’, ‘domestic public security & 
control of violence’, ‘traditional solidarity’, ‘political proximity to China’, ‘social inclu-
sion’, and ‘cooperative behavior in society’. It has negative loadings on ‘government 
capacity to reform’ (which has the strongest loading), ‘national cohesion’, ‘decentraliza-
tion’, ‘subsidies on commodities’ and ‘democracy, legality & freedom’. This component 
could be interpreted as stressing on the “strong presence of the government”. 
The last component that we consider from Sector A is A4. This constitutes of ‘security 
of transactions & contract’, ‘capacity of state to co-ordinate stakeholders’, ‘institutional 
capacity’, ‘autonomy in creation and operation of organizations’, and ‘decentralization’ 
which have positive loadings. Those variables that load negatively include ‘social inclu-
sion’, ‘political proximity to an EU country’, ‘governance of public administration & the 
justice system’, ‘control of state violence by NGO’s’, ‘strategic capacities’ as well as 
‘subsidies on commodities’. While ‘government capacity to reform is the strongest nega-
tive  loading on A3, ‘political proximity to an EU country’ along with ‘social inclusion’ 
is the strongest  negative loadings in A4 and ‘security of transactions’ has the highest 
positive loading in A4. Although it is hard to give a straight forward meaning to the 
fourth component, it gives the highest scores to economies that guarantee a security of 
transactions but are not necessarily socially inclusive. We notice a strong Mediterranean 
cluster. This component could be interpreted as stressing on the ‘security of contracts’.   
From Sector B, that has variables representing the goods and services market, we take 
three components. The first one, B1 loads positive on variables such as ‘land tenure- 
security of ownership’, ‘joint ventures’, ‘technical environment’, ‘privatizations’, ‘na-
tionalizations’ and ‘land tenure- demand for land’. It loads strongly negative on ‘non-
national access to land’, ‘rural land tenure- traditional property rights’, ‘consideration of 
public interest in government- business relationships’ as well as ‘government recognition 
of various land tenure rights systems’. From this, it is obvious that the most important 
aspect of the goods & services market pertains to ‘security and enforcement of property 
rights laws’ in a country. From the scores, we find that the developed countries have the 
highest scores.  Kazakhstan and Turkey also obtain a high score and countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa get the lowest scores.  
In the second component of Sector B, B2, the ‘importance of economic zones’, ‘tech-
nical environment’, ‘land tenure- security of ownership’, ‘considerations of public inter-
est in government-business relations’, ‘shareholder weights – weight of the government’ 
and ‘openness to business’ have positive weights. ‘Non-national access to land’, ‘infor-
                                                                                                                                               
(this includes the effectiveness of the fiscal system, justice system and of urban governance.) (de Crombrug-
ghe, Farla, Meisel, de Neubourg, Ould Aoudia, Szirmai (2009)  
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mation on shareholders’, ‘ease of starting a business’, ‘density of sub-contracting rela-
tions’, ‘public aid for R&D’, ‘rural land tenure- traditional property’ and ‘land tenure- 
development policies’ load negatively. From the variables that load high -either positive-
ly or negatively- we see that the most important functions in this component are those 
pertaining to ‘strong presence of government regulation and active economic policies’ 
(in the goods and services market). This component could be understood as representing 
strong regulation by the government and having active economic policies pertaining to 
economic zones. Countries that score high on this factor include the Middle East, Central 
and South Asia as well a few African countries. 
The last component of Sector B, B3, loads high and positive on ‘privatizations’, ‘infor-
mation on share-holders’, ‘land tenure- demand for land’, ‘free movement of people and 
information’, ‘shareholders- weight of government’ and ‘land tenure- security of owner-
ship’. Variables that load negatively on the component include ‘competition on the good 
& services market’, ‘importance of economic zones’, ‘governance of natural resources’, 
‘rural land tenure- public property’ as well as ‘consideration of public interest in gov-
ernment-business relations’. Although it is hard to label this component based on the 
loadings, we find that the Americas along with Southern Africa and China get the lowest 
scores. Thus we label this component ‘strong competition in the goods market’  
We choose to retain only two components from Sector C. C1 constitutes variables like 
‘regulation of competition in banking’, ‘importance of venture capital’, ‘monitoring and 
auditing in banking’, ‘financial openness’, ‘nationalization of the financial sector’ as 
well as ‘freedom in allocation of loans’ which load positively. ‘Micro lending’, ‘finan-
cial information’, ‘sovereign wealth fund policy’ and ‘competition within the banking 
system’ have a negative weight on the component. This component stresses on a ‘well 
developed free and open financial sector’. 
C2, the second component of Sector C, is almost a mirror image of the first component28. 
Of those variables that load positively in C1, ‘regulation of competition in banking’, 
‘importance of venture capital’, ‘financial openness’ and ‘freedom of allocation of loans’ 
load negatively in C2. Of those variables that load negatively in C1, we find that ‘micro 
lending’, ‘sovereign wealth fund policy’ and ‘competition within the banking system’ 
show up positively in C2, along with ‘competence of bank executives’. This component 
stresses on a financial sector that is more or less controlled and regulated by the govern-
ment, yet has a well-developed structure. We refer to this component as ‘government 
regulated financial sector’. While the first factor emphasizes openness of the financial 
sector, the second one emphasizes strong government control over the financial sector. It 
is interesting to note that in both factors most of Africa gets low scores while Australia 
and Canada get high scores. While ‘monitoring and auditing in banking’ influences the 
first component, competence of bank executives influence the second.  
From Sector D, we retain three components. The first one, D1, loads positively high on 
‘freedom of association & trade union pluralism’, and ‘distribution of income’ and nega-
tively on ‘low incidence of child labour’, ‘social mobility’, ‘management of labour’, 
                                                          
28 Since the two latent variables have to be orthogonal. 
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‘weak employment contract rigidity’ as well as ‘retraining and re-skilling measures’. 
Lack of social mobility and incidence of child labour clearly dominate this factor. This 
component stresses on a ‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ where there is discrimi-
nation based on gender, ethnicity etc., and one in which social mobility is based on con-
nections rather than on merit. We find that most African countries, along with Peru, 
Bolivia, Paraguay, India and Nepal score the highest. 
The second component D2 loads positively on ‘low incidence of child labour’, ‘weak 
employment contract rigidity’, ‘social mobility: young higher education graduates’, 
‘quality of the supply of public goods’, ‘strikes and wage bargaining at the individual 
level’. It loads negatively on ‘freedom of association & trade union pluralism’, ‘flexibil-
ity of the labour market’, ‘adaptive education system’ and ‘management of labour’. This 
component stresses on a ‘flexible and adaptive labour market’.  
The last component from this sector, D3 loads high and positive on ‘low incidence of 
child labour’, ‘strikes’, ‘management of labour’, ‘weak segmentation of the labour mar-
ket’, and ‘freedom of association & trade union pluralism’ and negatively on ‘quality of 
supply of public goods’, ‘social mobility’, ‘distribution of income’ and ‘social mobility: 
young higher education graduates’. This component stresses on a ‘weakly segmented 
labour market’. 
Looking at these factor loadings and factor scores, we find that among the first compo-
nents, A1, B1 and C1 move it the same direction with very similar scores for each coun-
try while D1 moves in the opposite direction. Using these 12 components from the IPD 
data set which we use as indicators of institutional quality, we now perform the spatial 
canonical correlation analysis along with a set of 7 economic variables (PWT). In the 
analysis that follows these 12 components will be called the IPD variables. 
 
Table 1: Labels for the first stage IPD components29 
Description Variable code 
‘socially inclusive democracy’ (with political proximity to an EU country) A1 
‘society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with political proximity to Japan) A2 
‘strong presence of the government’ A3 
‘security of contracts’  A4 
‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ B1 
‘strong government regulation and active economic policies’ (in the goods and services market) B2 
‘strong competition in the good market’ B3 
‘well developed free and open financial sector’ C1 
‘government regulated financial sector’ C2 
‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ D1 
‘flexible and adaptive labour market’ D2 
‘weakly segmented labour market’ D3 
 
                                                          
29 These labels are used to refer to each of the components. It should be noted however that these labels are not 
all encompassing in describing the details of the components. The reader might want to look at the details of 
the loadings provided in the Appendix. 
 42
Below we look the resulting correlations of IPD with the other data sets of economic 
variables (PWT), financial variables (FINANCE), and geographic variables of physical 
factors (GEOAREA) and soil quality (GEOSOIL). We start by looking at the correla-
tions between institutional variables and the economic variables (IPD-PWT). 
 
A. Institutions and Economic Development (IPD-PWT): 
 
We extract three components and analyze them here. The scores of the first canonical 
component from IPD and PWT are plotted in Figure 1a. The spatial correlation is 0.77. 
There are clear clusters of African countries, most of which are in the third quadrant, 
scoring low on both institutional and economic development variables. We also find 
most of the Asian countries around the origin, along with the Middle Eastern countries. 
In the first quadrant and close to the origin we find the Latin American countries and 
further up, scoring high on both institutional and economic variables we find the devel-
oped countries.  
 
 
Figure 1a: Spatial correlation between institutions and economic performance (factor 1) 
 
  
4.2. Second stage results 
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We can use the loadings to understand characteristics underlying the factors. On the IPD 
side, we find that ‘socially inclusive democracy’ (A1), ‘Society’s responsiveness to 
change and innovation’ (A2) and ‘enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1) load posi-
tively while ‘strong presence of the government’ (A3) and ‘non-meritocratic weak la-
bour market’ (D1) load strongly negative. For the PWT data the first component loads 
positively on all variables except population growth rate which loads strongly negative. 
It loads strongly positive on the initial level of GDP, as well as on consumption. Growth 
rates, openness of the economy and investment load positive but low. This component 
can be interpreted as representing the level of economic development of countries. It 
captures rich countries which have a high level of initial GDP, high level of consumption 
and positive but not high growth rates. 
The first canonical function thus emphasizes the relationship between proper functioning 
of political institutions, relatively high level of freedom and public rights, legality and 
legitimacy, the State’s capacity to bring about a convergence of interests, authorities’ 
strategic vision and high capacity to absorb new technology and  high initial level of 
GDP, as well as high consumption in a country. The first components seem to capture 
the well-known and widely accepted correlation between institutions and level of GDP 
per capita. The relative position of the country clearly has an impact on its score. 
Figure 1b shows the factor scores of institutional quality for the 118 countries. In gen-
eral, there is a high level of clustering. The cluster with the highest scores is the devel-
oped country cluster. The cluster with the second highest set of scores is Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and Russia as well as some countries in North Africa (which could be 
due to their loadings on the variable ‘political proximity to the EU’). The next cluster 
constitutes the Middle East, South and South East Asia and four Latin American coun-
tries. The least institutional scores are given to Sub-Saharan Africa. From a strictly spa-
tial perspective, Australia and New Zealand are the outliers. Figure 1c shows the scores 
of economic performance which more or less corresponds to the institutional variable 
scores. The maps show that countries like Australia, New Zealand, the Indian sub-
continent and Northern Africa have better institutions relative to their economic perfor-
mance. Countries like Japan and South Africa have a better economic performance given 
relative to their institutional set up. In other words, the institutional scores capture the 
western European model of institutions for this function. 
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Figure 1b: IPD scores Factor 1 (IPD-PWT) 
 
 
Figure 1c: PWT scores Factor 1 (IPD_PWT) 
 
The spatial correlation for the second canonical function (0.48) is significantly smaller 
than the first. On the IPD side, ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), 
‘strong government regulation and active economic policies’ (B2) and ‘flexible and 
adaptive labour market’ (D2) are among those that load positively and ‘socially inclu-
sive democracy’ (A1) loads strongly negative. The PWT data loads strongly positive on 
growth rate and investment. It loads negatively on the initial level of GDP, consumption 
and government spending. Openness is positive but with a relatively low weight. Initial 
level of GDP has a negative weight along with government spending. We can say that 
this component identifies “catching-up” countries, with a market steering government. 
Figure 2a shows the scatter plot of the scores for 2nd function. We see that there are spa-
tial clusters but not as strong and clear as in the first factor. We find countries like Qatar, 
China, Oman, etc., at the higher end of the plot and most African countries, Haiti and 
Cuba at the lower end.  
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Figure 2a: Spatial correlation between institutions and economic performance (factor 2) 
 
Figure 2b maps the institutional scores and Figure 2c maps the scores of economic per-
formance. From the two maps, we can see that there is very close spatial correspondence 
between the two sets of scores in the Eastern part of the world. This is not the case 
among African, Western European and Latin American countries between the two sets 
of scores.  
 
Figure 2b: IPD scores Factor 2 (IPD-PWT) 
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Figure 2c: PWT scores Factor 2 (IPD-PWT) 
 
The variables that have high positive loadings in the third loadings vector of IPD are 
‘security of contracts’ (A4), ‘strong presence of the government’ (A3) and ‘weakly seg-
mented labour market’ (D3). The variables that have high negative loadings include 
‘strong competition in the goods market’ (B3), ‘well developed free and open financial 
sector’ (C1) and ‘government regulated financial sector’ (C2). It is the political institu-
tions and the financial institutions that are the most important ones in this factor. The 
only PWT variables that load positively but low are openness and investment. The high-
est negative loadings are on the initial level of GDP and population growth rate. The 
spatial correlation for the third component is 0.33. Zimbabwe is clearly an outlier here. 
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Figure 3a: Spatial correlation between institutions and economic performance (factor 3) 
 
 
Figure 3b: IPD scores Factor 3 (IPD-PWT) 
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Figure 3c: PWT scores Factor 3 (IPD-PWT) 
 
 
B. Institutions and Geography 
 
The absolute geographic location and the endowments that countries have, are often used 
in studies as an ultimate source of growth. While some studies incorporate variables such 
as the latitude of the country as having a direct impact on growth, others use variables 
such as the number of frost days in a year (which are essential for creating a rich top soil, 
thus making it more agriculturally productive) as an indirect source. The absolute geog-
raphy variables that are used for both types of studies are a large and varied set. Rather 
than picking out one single variable, we divide the Gallup et al. (1999) data set into three 
different groups namely, (i) soil quality  and climate zones, which contains – indicators 
referred to as GEOSOIL (ii)  attributes of physical geography, which  contains – indica-
tors referred to as GEOAREA and (iii) the disease ecology of countries. In this study, we 
use only variables of GEOSOIL and GEOAREA since these are the invariable over time.  
 
IPD-GEOAREA 
 
The IPD variables that load high in the first factor are ‘socially inclusive democracy’ 
(with political proximity to an EU country) (A1) ‘security and enforcement of property 
rights laws’ (B1), and ‘society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with politi-
cal proximity to Japan) (A2). It is again the political institutions and a positive market 
attitude that are important here. The geography variables that load high and positive are 
the latitude of country centroid, mean distance to the nearest coastline (km), and per-
centage of land area within 100 km of ice-free coast, while mean distance to nearest 
coastline or sea-navigable river (km), percentage of land area within 100 km of ice-free 
coast and percentage of land area in geographical tropics load negatively on the factor. 
The correlation we obtain here is 0.84.  From the loadings, we can see that the most 
important features are the latitude of the country, easy access to ice-free coasts and easy 
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access to coastline or sea-navigable river (km). The scores of the factor are plotted in 
Figure 4a. Here again, we find most African countries have the lowest scores and Euro-
pean countries along with Canada and Australia score among the highest. Figure 4b 
maps the institutional scores and Figure 4c maps the GEOAREA variables. The GE-
OAREA clusters are tighter than clusters of institutional scores. Central and South Afri-
ca has the largest cluster, scoring the lowest, while Northwestern and Eastern Europe 
have the highest scores. USA and New Zealand are outliers.  The institutional clusters 
are much smaller and more scattered. 
 
 
Figure 4a: Spatial correlation between institutions and physical geography (factor 1) 
 
This canonical function captures the geography hypothesis that institutional development 
is highly correlated to a certain set of geographic conditions (often proxied by latitude 
and access to waterways and coastline) which are considered favorable for economic 
development. What we see is that the geography scores clearly set apart Sub-Saharan 
Africa whereas the institutional scores are more varied. Similarly, we see that Western 
European institutional scores are slightly more varying than the geography clusters for 
the same region. Spain, for example, has an institutional score closer to the other Euro-
pean countries, but has a geography score closer to North Africa. Similarly the Neo-
European countries have institutional score closer to the European ones than their geo-
graphic scores.    
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Figure 4b: IPD scores Factor 1 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
 
Figure 4c: GEOAREA scores Factor 1 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
The second canonical component has a spatial correlation is 0.60. The second factor 
loads positively on ‘strong competition in the good market’ (B3), ‘government regulated 
financial sector’ (C1), and ‘weakly segmented labour market’ (D3) and strongly nega-
tively on ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), and ‘security of con-
tracts’ (A4). This factor stresses on the functioning of the Goods & Services market 
sector. The geographic variables that load strongly positive are mean distance to nearest 
coastline or sea-navigable river (km) and latitude of country centroid, and negatively on 
mean distance to nearest coastline (km) and percentage of land area within 100 km of 
ice-free coast.  This shows that availability of water transport matter the most, as in the 
first factor. Figure 5a shows the factor scores of this canonical function. 
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Figure 5a: Spatial correlation between institutions and physical geography (factor 2) 
 
Figure 5b and 5c map the scores for institutions and geography respectively, for the 
second canonical function. Here we find that the institutional clusters are larger than the 
geography clusters. Here we find no clear differentiation between developed and devel-
oping countries. Rather we find that large countries have the least institutional as well as 
geography scores, excepting those in the African continent and Russia.  
 
 
Figure 5b: IPD scores Factor 2 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
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Figure 5c: GEOAREA scores Factor 2 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
The third canonical component has a spatial correlation is 0.37. This factor loads posi-
tively on ‘socially inclusive democracy’ (with political proximity to an EU country) 
(A1), and ‘society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with political proximity 
to Japan) (A2). It loads strongly negative on ‘strong government regulation and active 
economic policies’ (B2), ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), and 
‘strong presence of government’ (A3). The geographic variables that load strongly posi-
tive are distance from centroid of country to nearest coast (km) and to the nearest sea-
navigable river and percentage of land area within 100 km of ice-free coast. It loads 
negatively on mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km). On the 
institutional side, we see that countries that have a strong presence of government have 
the lowest scores. Here again, we see that the institutional clusters are quite different 
from the geographical clusters. 
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Figure 6a: Spatial correlation between institutions and physical geography (factor 3) 
 
 
Figure 6b: IPD scores on factor 3 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
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Figure 6c: GEOAREA scores on factor 3 (IPD-GEOAREA) 
 
IPD-GEOSOIL 
 
The first canonical function of IPD-GEOSOIL has a correlation of 0.83.  The most sig-
nificant loadings are given to ‘socially inclusive democracy’ (with political proximity to 
an EU country) (A1) and ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1) both of 
which are strongly negative while ‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ (D1) loads 
moderately positive. On the geography side, we find that percentage of land cultivated in 
the Köppen Geiger zones of humid temperate, cold climate with moist winter and warm 
climate with dry summers load strongly negative. Very suitable-mean soil suitability 
(soilsui1) also loads moderately negative. Steppe climate, savanna climate, and moder-
ately suitable-mean irrigation suitability (irrsuit2) load moderately positively.  Figure 7a 
shows clear clusters of countries, with Africa and South & South East Asia on the one 
hand and Western Europe, North America, North Africa and Australia on the other. We 
see that this component again captures the emerging consensus that institutional devel-
opment has been shaped by geography. This stylized fact has been popularized by econ-
omists such as Jeffery Sachs, Jared Diamond, etc.   
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Figure 7a: Spatial correlation between institutions and soil (factor 1) 
 
From the spatial maps in Figure 7b and 7c we can see that those climatic conditions 
found in Western Europe that are considered good for overall economic development, 
which is in turn related to institutional development are also the ones that are most em-
phasized in the literature. Japan and New Zealand are the only other countries that score 
similar to Western Europe in Figure 7c. What is interesting to note here is that in Figure 
7b we see that China scores low on institutions while Australia scores high. However, in 
Figure 7c, we see that both countries have similar geographic conditions. 
 
Figure 7b: IPD scores Factor 1 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
(1.7504,2.3739]
(1.4742,1.7504]
(1.1233,1.4742]
(.91,1.1233]
(.5612,.91]
(.0675,.5612]
(-.7127,.0675]
(-.9198,-.7127]
(-1.7357,-.9198]
(-2.3048,-1.7357]
[-3.2549,-2.3048]
No data
 56
 
 
Figure 7c: GEOSOIL scores Factor 1 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
 
In the second factor, ‘society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with political 
proximity to Japan) (A2) has the largest loading which is strongly negative. ‘Strong 
presence of government in the goods and services market’ (B2) and ‘security and en-
forcement of property rights laws’ (B1) also load negative, while ’strong presence of the 
government’ (A3) loads positively. The geography variables that load high and positive 
include the percentage of land cultivated in the Köppen- Geiger zones of warm temper-
ate climate with a dry summer, steppe climate, tropical savannah with dry winter and 
snow climate-fully humid and moderately suitable-mean soil solubility (soilsui2).  The 
spatial correlation for this canonical function is 0.63. Figure 8a shows the scatter plot of 
the factor scores.  
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Figure 8a: Spatial correlation between institutions and soil (factor 2) 
 
Here again, like in the second Figures 6b and 6c, we find that the institutional clusters 
are larger than the geography clusters, especially for Europe and Africa. These second 
factors show that geography is not necessarily destiny. 
 
 
Figure 8b: IPD scores Factor 2 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
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Figure 8c: GEOSOIL scores Factor 2 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
 
In case of the third factor, we find that ‘security of contracts’ (A4) has the strongest 
positive loading followed by ’society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with 
political proximity to Japan) (A2) and ‘socially inclusive democracy’ (with political 
proximity to an EU country) (A1). The geography variables that load positive and high 
are the percentage of cultivated lands in warm temperate fully humid climate, tropical 
savannah, warm temperate climate with dry winter, steppe climate, snow fully humid 
climate and tropical rain forest. This factor has a spatial correlation of 0.6. This canoni-
cal function stresses on the political institutions only. East Asia has the highest institu-
tional scores, as seen in figure 9b. The rest of Asia has the lowest scores along with 
North Africa and Central America. The geographical clusters are larger here. Like in the 
first function, here we find larger geographical clusters than institutional clusters. 
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Figure 9a: Spatial correlation between institutions and soil (factor 3) 
 
Figure 9b: IPD scores Factor 3 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
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Figure 9c: GEOSOIL scores on factor 3 (IPD-GEOSOIL) 
 
C. Institutions and Financial Development (IPD-FINANCE): 
 
Finally, we have a look at the interactions between institutional variables and finance 
variables. Figure 10a shows the scatter plot of the first set of scores from IPD and FI-
NANCE plotted against each other. The spatial correlation here is 0.70. For the IPD data, 
we find that the first component loads positively high on ‘government controlled finan-
cial sector’ (C2) and ‘non-meritocratic weak labour market’ (D1) and negatively on 
’society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (A2), ’strong presence of the gov-
ernment’ (A3), ‘enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1) and ‘competition in the good 
market’ (B3). It is interesting to note that the political institutional environment that was 
very important in determining the economic environment of the country is not as im-
portant a determinant for the first factor.  
The FINANCE data loads positively high on the ratio of bank deposits to GDP (bdgdp) 
and private credit by deposit money banks / gdp (pcrdbgdp). The ratio of deposit money 
bank assets (dbagdp) and ratio of financial system deposits to GDP (fdgdp) load strongly 
negative. Fdgdp and bdgdp measure the absolute size of the financial sector (Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt 2009). While fdgdp measures the lending activities of the entire finan-
cial sector, bdgdp measures deposits of deposit monetary institutions. Since they are 
perfectly correlated, we find that if one variable loads positively, the other has to and 
does load negatively. Dbagdp and pcrdbgdp measure financial depth in the economy. 
King and Levine (1993) and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000)  find that countries where 
deposit money banks or commercial banks play a bigger role in financial intermediation 
than central banks, there is a higher level of financial development. This is captured by 
the first component. Fdgdp is stock indicator of resources available to the financial sec-
tor for its lending activities, which is one indication of the size of the financial system. 
From the first component we see that those countries with a higher level of income have 
a higher fdgdp ratio. Those countries which have a low ratio of private credit from both 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP, lower ratio of bank depos-
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its to GDP and ratio of overhead costs to GDP are mainly low income countries. From 
the first component we see that the size of the banking and financial sector in the econ-
omy as well as the magnitude of private financial sector is what matters for develop-
ment. The other variables have relatively negligible weights in all the factors.  
Figure 10b maps the IPD scores of the first factor. From the figure we see clear clusters 
in the Americas and Asia (except for the Indian subcontinent). In Europe and Africa we 
find more variation. Figure 10c maps the Finance scores, from which we find smaller 
clusters, more varied across the map. 
 
 
Figure 10a: Spatial correlation between institutions and financial development (factor 1) 
 
Figure 10b: IPD scores Factor 1 (IPD-FINANCE) 
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Figure 10c: FINANCE scores Factor 1 (IPD-FINANCE) 
 
The spatial correlation of the second set of factors for the IPD-FINANCE data is 0.64. 
From the IPD data we see that ’strong presence of the government’ (A3) and ‘non-
meritocratic weak labour market’ (D1) load positively while ‘socially inclusive democ-
racy’ (A1) highly negative (-0.8402) and the fourth factor of sector A (A4) has a weight 
of -0.2284. We see that in this factor ‘Public institutions and civil society’ is the most 
important sector of institutions. However the variable ‘socially inclusive democracy’ has 
the largest loading. The loadings on the financial structure variables show that the ratio 
of financial system deposits to gdp (fdgdp) and the ratio of private credit by deposit 
money banks to gdp (pcrdbgdp) are positive and the ratio of bank deposits to GDP 
(bdgdp) are negative. No financial variables from the IPD are captured in this compo-
nent, unlike in the case of the first factor.  
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Figure 11a: Spatial correlation between institutions and financial development (factor 2) 
 
The map of the IPD scores, Figure 11b shows a cluster of North and South America 
along with Western Europe. Australia and New Zealand also belong to this cluster and 
are geographically outliers.  We find small clusters in Africa and Asia as well. The map 
of finance scores shows more variety in South America as against the IPD scores. Africa 
and Asia however have larger clusters. With respect to the IPD-Finance analysis, we find 
that a larger financial sector goes hand-in-hand with a higher level of GDP in a country 
and that a more open financial sector leads to higher growth. We also find that countries 
with a lower level of democracy are also those which have a lower financial depth.  
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Figure 11b: IPD scores Factor 2 (IPD-FINANCE) 
 
Figure 11c: FINANCE scores Factor 2 (IPD-FINANCE) 
 
The spatial correlations for the third set of factors is relatively lower (0.44). The institu-
tional variables that load high and positive are ’strong presence of the government’ (A3) 
and ‘competition in the good market’ (B3). Those that load strongly negative include 
’society’s responsiveness to change and innovation’ (with political proximity to Japan) 
(A2), ‘security and enforcement of property rights laws’ (B1), and ‘non-meritocratic 
weak labour market’ (D1). From this we see that the goods and services market sector of 
IPD is relatively more important in this factor. We don’t see the financial sector of the 
IPD having any impact on the factor. The finance variables that load high and positive 
are the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP, and bank deposits to GDP.  The ratio 
of financial system deposits to GDP has a strong negative loading. Here again a competi-
tive and open financial sector, which is relatively privatized is what seems to determine a 
high score for countries. Here too, the institutional clusters are stronger. 
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Figure 12a: Spatial correlation between institutions and financial development (factor 3) 
 
 
Figure 12b: IPD scores Factor 3 (IPD-FINANCE) 
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Figure 12c: FINANCE scores Factor 1 (IPD-FINANCE) 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes institutional quality and economic performance through the lens of a 
spatial PCA and a spatial CCA. From the first canonical components of each spatial 
CCA we find results that conform to current literature. First, our analysis reiterates the 
institutional hypothesis that institutional quality of a country is strongly related to its 
level of GDP per capita. The more developed a country is, the better its institutional 
quality and vice versa, characterized by a high level of democracy, strong enforcement 
of property rights etc (as seen in Figure 1b and 1c). We also get results that are con-
sistent with the geography hypothesis. We find that higher institutional quality is strong-
ly related to ‘favorable’ geographic conditions, both in the case of physical geographic 
conditions and soil quality conditions in a country (Figure 4b, 4c, 7b and 7c). Further, 
we find that a larger financial sector is strongly correlated to a higher level of GDP in 
particular and a higher level of economic performance in general (Figure 10b and 
10c).  These results show that the influence of institutions varies across the levels of 
economic performance and financial performance. 
Looking at the second canonical functions (Factor 2), we find other stylized facts. First-
ly, we find that catching up based growth is related to market steering (Figure 2b and 
2c). Secondly, we find that geography does not necessarily define the institutional struc-
ture of countries. We find that relative influences of neighbouring countries matters and 
need not be directly related to similar geographic conditions (Figure 5b, 5c, 8b and 8c). 
In other words, geography is not destiny. Thus unlike what most studies on the relation-
ship between geography and economic performance say, countries do have a choice in 
developing and fostering any kind of institutional set up, though they are likely to be 
influenced by their neighbours to an extent. Both relative location as well as common 
historical backgrounds could define the institutional set up of countries. For example, 
Australia and New Zealand are often in the same cluster as Western Europe when look-
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ing at institutional quality, but not necessarily when we consider their economic perfor-
mance, and especially when we consider geographic similarities. 
In this study, the causality of these relationships is not touched upon. This is one appar-
ent disadvantage of the canonical correlation analysis. Further, the validity of these con-
clusions is based on the quality of the data resulting from a survey. It is important to 
keep in mind that biases are inherent to perceptions indices. However, one can still con-
clude, given the above correlations, that there is no single/global solution to address 
under-development and growth. The role of institutions in the economic performance of 
a country needs to be addressed at regional and country specific levels. Another draw-
back of this study is that it uses a cross-section of data. Institutions evolve over long 
periods of time, and are highly dependent on the historical socio-political and economic 
events of a country. To analyze the quality of institutions at a single point in time can be 
limiting. For example, the under-development of certain parts of the world in the process 
of the development of Europe in the colonial era cannot be discounted in understanding 
growth processes today. However, the lack of time-series data limits us to looking at a 
snap-shot picture of the current institutional set up across countries. 
 
These results show us that we need to first understand the multi-dimensional nature of 
institutions before understanding their impact on or by the other factors discussed above. 
We find that similar geographic environment can lead to different institutional environ-
ment and also to different economic performance. Furthermore, there is a need to under-
stand them in a spatial context as seen from the above results. While there is a lot of 
empirical work in the area, there is also a need for more theoretical understanding of this 
multi-dimensionality of institutions. Most theoretical attempts until now have been based 
in a very Europe-centric framework. In order to fully understand economic growth and 
development in the context of institutional quality, we need to look beyond theories that 
explain the development of the now developed countries. Our results show that spatial 
clusters are not always based on the level of economic development of countries. This is 
one major drawback which hinders current policy effectiveness.  
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Appendix A: Weights matrix 
 
We choose a set of geographic distance weights for the connectivity matrix. We use an 
exponential distance decay function to obtain the weights matrix, given by the formula, 
ݓ௜௝ = ݁ି଴.଴଴ଵହௗ೔ೕ	where wij is the spatial weight between countries i and j, and dij is the 
bilateral distance between the centroids of the two countries i and j. The choice of the 
connectivity matrix has implications on the results obtained from the empirical analysis 
(Ward and Gleditsch 2007). Other types of connectivity matrices include binary contigu-
ity matrices, bilateral trade matrices etc30.   
We describe our choice using the Example of India. India’s immediate neighbours (those 
that share a border with it) include: Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myan-
mar (Burma), Sri Lanka and Afghanistan (in the disputed area). Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Iran, Vietnam etc are further away. The question then becomes one of how much weight 
should Thailand and Vietnam get, to depict the influence they exert on India. We choose 
that distance decay measure that gives importance to immediate neighbours. The weights 
given to Vietnam are significantly lower and those give to Australia get an insignificant 
weight. Figure (i) shows the decay in graphical terms for India with respect to Pakistan, 
Vietnam and Australia. The steeper the fall of the curve, the higher is the decay, i.e., 
relatively closer countries also exert lesser influence on the given country. In our case, 
we find that the nearest neighbours already have a fairly low weight. Since we consider 
distance between centroids of countries we note that larger countries tend to give lower 
weights to neighbours than smaller countries. Figure (ii) shows the effect of each of 
these distance decay values have on the summary statistics on the spatial lag, and in turn 
on the spatial correlation of a row-standardized weights matrix.  
  
                                                          
30 For more details on connectivity matrices and their effects on weight matrices and in turn on the empirical 
results can be found in Ward and Gleditsch 2007. 
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Appendix B- IPD categories 
 
 
 
 
A. Public Institutions & Civil 
Society
B. Goods and Services 
Markets C. Capital Markets
D. Labour Markets & 
Labour Relations
Democracy, Legality and Freedom a10 Freedom of association and 
trade union pluralism
d10
Political stability and Legitimacy a11
Decentralization a12
Domestic public security and 
Control of violence
a20
Control of State violence by NGOs a21
External security a22
Governance of public 
administration and the justice 
a30 Ease of starting a business b30
Autonomy of public policies a31 Importance of the Economic b31
Donors' influence a32 Consideration of public 
interest in government-
b32
Autonomy in operation and 
creation of organizations
a33 Governance of natural 
resources
b33
Government capacity to reform a34
Fiscal exemptions a35
Privatizations b40 Privatizations in the financial 
sector
c40 Flexibility in the labour market d40
Nationalizations b41 Nationalizations in the financial 
sector
c41 Retraining and reskilling 
measures
d41
Governance of privatizations b42 Freedom in the allocation of 
loans
c42
Performance of public 
organizations
b43
Freedom of prices b44
Single exchange rate b45
Capacity of the State to 
coordinate stakeholders
a50 Technological environment b50 Competence of bank 
executives
c50 Adaptive education system d50
Strategic capacities a51 Public aid for R&D b51 Importance of venture capital c51
Government's arbitration capacity a52 Density of sub-contracting 
relations
b52 Sovereign wealth fund policy c52
Institutional capacity a53
Government political capacity a54
Change, Innovation a55
Cooperative behaviour in society a56
Outlook of young people a57
Security of transactions and a60 Information on G&S markets b60 Financial information c60 Respect for workers' rights d60
Government respect for contracts a61 Rural land tenure: traditional 
property
b61 Weak employment contrat 
rigidity
d61
Frequency of bankruptcy a62 Rural land tenure: public b62
Enforcement of bankruptcy law a63 Diversity of land tenure rights 
systems
b63
Government recognition of 
diversity of land tenure rights 
b64
Land tenure: security of b65
Land tenure: demand for land b66
Land tenure and large b67
Competition on G&S markets b70 Competition within the banking 
system
c70 Wage bargaining at the 
individual level
d70
Shareholders: weight of the 
government
b71 Regulation of competition in 
banking
c71 Strikes d71
Information on shareholders b72 Monitoring and auditing in 
banking
c72 Management of labour d72
Land tenure: development b73 Reform of financial regulations c73
Free movement of people and 
information
a80 Openness to business b80 Financial openness c80 Openness to employment of 
non-nationals
d80
Political proximity with big Joint Ventures b81
Emulation with neighboring a82 Non-national access to land b82
National sense of identity a90 Micro lending c90 Quality of the supply of public 
goods
d90
National cohesion a91 Weak segmentation of the 
labour market
d91
Strenghening of middle classes a92 Low incidence of child labour d92
Social inclusion a93 Social mobility d93
Traditional solidarity a94 Social mobility: young higher 
education graduates
d94
Subsidies on commodities a95f Distribution of income d95
6 - Security of 
Transactions and 
Contracts
7 -Market regulation, 
Social Dialogue
8 - Openess to the 
Outside World
9 - Social Cohesion
1- Political Institutions
2 - Security, Law and 
Order
3 - Functioning of Public 
Administrations
4 - Free Operation of 
Markets
5 - Coordination of 
Stakeholders and 
Strategic visions
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Appendix C: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description Dataset 
LY00 GDP per capita, 2000, in intl. dollars PWT 
GR GDP per capita, annual average growth rate 2000-2007 PWT 
I Investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita PWT 
G Government expenditure share of PPP converted GDP per capita PWT 
OP Net exports share of PPP converted GDP per capita PWT 
LPOP Population, average over the period 2000-2009 PWT 
C consumption share of PPP converted GDP per capita PWT 
areakm2 land area (km2) GEOAREA 
cen_lat latitude of country centroid GEOAREA 
elev mean elevation (meters above sea level) GEOAREA 
distcr mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (km) GEOAREA 
distc mean distance to nearest coastline (km) GEOAREA 
distr mean distance to nearest inland navigable river (km) GEOAREA 
cen_c distance from centroid of country to nearest coast (km) GEOAREA 
cen_cr distance from centroid of country to nearest coast or sea-navigable river km) GEOAREA 
lc100km % Land area within 100 km of ice-free coast GEOAREA 
lcr100km % Land area within 100 km of ice-free coast (or navigable river) GEOAREA 
tropicar % Land area in geographical tropics GEOAREA 
soilsui1 mean soil suitability 1, very suitable (%) GEOAREA 
soilsui2 mean soil suitability 2, moderately suitable (%) GEOAREA 
irrsuit1 Mean irrigation suitability, very suitable (%)  GEOAREA 
irrsuit2 Mean irrigation suitability, moderately suitable (%) GEOAREA 
cultmaf % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Af zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmam % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Am zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmaw % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Aw zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmbs % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Bs zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmbw % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Bw zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmcf % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cf zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmcs % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cs zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmcw % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Cw zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmdf % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Df zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmdw % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger Dw zone  GEOSOIL 
cultme % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger E zone  GEOSOIL 
cultmh % cultivated land in Köppen-Geiger H zone  GEOSOIL 
dbacba Deposit Money Bank Assets / (Deposit Money + Central) Bank Assets FINANCE 
llgdp Liquid Liabilities / GDP FINANCE 
cbagdp Central Bank Assets / GDP FINANCE 
dbagdp Deposit Money Bank Assets / GDP FINANCE 
pcrdbgdp Private Credit By Deposit Money Banks / GDP FINANCE 
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Variable Description Dataset 
pcrdbofgdp Private Credit By Deposit Money Banks And Other Financial Institutions / 
GDP 
FINANCE 
bdgdp Bank Deposits / GDP FINANCE 
fdgdp Financial System Deposits / GDP FINANCE 
bcbd Bank Credit / Bank Deposits FINANCE 
overhead Bank Overhead Costs / Total Assets FINANCE 
netintmargin Net Interest Margin FINANCE 
concentration Bank Concentration FINANCE 
roa Bank ROA FINANCE 
roe Bank ROE FINANCE 
costinc Bank Cost-Income Ratio FINANCE 
zscore Bank Z-Score FINANCE 
nrbloan Loans From Non-Resident Banks (Amt Outstanding) / GDP FINANCE 
offdep Offshore Bank Deposits / Domestic Bank Deposits FINANCE 
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Appendix D: Factor Loadings on IPD variables (First Stage) 
 
Sector A 
  Variable Description A_mspc1 A_mspc2 A_mspc3 A_mspc4 
A10 Democracy, Legality and Freedom 0.3152 -0.044 -0.2097 0.0212 
A11 Political stability and Legitimacy -0.1679 0.1504 -0.0952 0.0314 
A12 Decentralization 0.1112 -0.1891 -0.2707 0.1913 
A20 Domestic public security and Control of violence -0.028 0.1732 0.2465 0.1358 
A21 Control of State violence by NGOs 0.023 0.0969 0.051 -0.2903 
A22 External security -0.0576 -0.1279 0.0236 0.0985 
A30 Governance of public administration and the justice system 0.1334 -0.3579 0.2562 -0.2996 
A31 Autonomy of public policies -0.0692 0.1265 0.1068 -0.0114 
A32 Donors' influence 0.0365 -0.0311 0.0169 0.0915 
A33 Autonomy in operation and creation of organizations -0.0644 -0.2088 0.1485 0.1997 
A34 Government capacity to reform 0.1149 -0.2476 -0.4647 -0.1155 
A35 Fiscal exemptions 0.0893 0.0013 -0.0245 0.0402 
A50 Capacity of the State to coordinate stakeholders 0.0764 0.0946 0.1469 0.2406 
A51 Strategic capacities -0.1537 -0.1231 -0.0242 -0.223 
A52 Government's arbitration capacity -0.0538 0.0861 0.0775 0.0947 
A53 Institutional capacity 0.037 0.1769 0.1357 0.2138 
A54 Government political capacity 0.0443 -0.0729 -0.0072 -0.118 
A55 Change, Innovation -0.2244 0.4501 0.2883 0.1008 
A56 Cooperative behaviour in society -0.0932 0.0186 0.1724 -0.0716 
A57 Outlook of young people -0.0432 0.0061 0.1432 0.1307 
A60 Security of transactions and contracts -0.1139 0.2703 -0.0983 0.3528 
A61 Government respect for contracts 0.0136 -0.0536 -0.0899 0.0086 
A62 Frequency of bankruptcy 0.0502 -0.1086 -0.052 0.0425 
A63 Enforcement of bankruptcy law 0.0277 -0.0805 0.0141 -0.0074 
A80 Free movement of people and information -0.0589 0.0358 -0.0988 0.1371 
A8010 Political proximity with  USA 0.0104 0.1287 0.0758 -0.0382 
A8011 Political proximity with  an EU country 0.3398 -0.3352 0.0075 -0.3613 
A8012 Political proximity with  Japan -0.1893 0.2258 0.0432 0.0569 
A8013 Political proximity with  China -0.0872 0.0055 0.2162 0.1288 
A82 Emulation with neighboring countries 0.0206 0.1615 -0.0019 -0.0139 
A90 National sense of identity -0.0189 0.0857 -0.0563 0.125 
A91 National cohesion -0.0543 -0.111 -0.2794 -0.0754 
A92 Strengthening of middle classes 0.0381 -0.0169 0.1111 0.003 
A93 Social inclusion 0.6866 0.0348 0.1784 -0.3662 
A94 Traditional solidarity -0.1157 0.0572 0.2386 -0.0754 
A95f Subsidies on commodities 0.2017 -0.1924 -0.2161 -0.1719 
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Sector B 
IPD 
Variable 
Variable Description B1 B2 B3 
B30 Ease of starting a business 0.1493 -0.2875 0.134 
B31 Importance of the Economic zones -0.0581 0.3448 -0.291 
B32 Consideration of public interest in government-business relations -0.1657 0.2344 -0.1635 
B33 Governance of natural resources 0.0596 -0.0041 -0.1982 
B40 Privatizations 0.2403 -0.1203 0.2834 
B41 Nationalizations 0.2046 -0.1175 0.0058 
B42 Governance of privatizations -0.0012 -0.1228 0.1439 
B43 Performance of public organizations 0.1198 0.0989 0.0031 
B44 Freedom of prices 0.0926 -0.1119 -0.0488 
B45 Single exchange rate -0.0281 -0.0955 0.1305 
B50 Technological environment 0.249 0.3117 0.0456 
B51 Public aid for R&D -0.0651 -0.2377 0.1204 
B52 Density of sub-contracting relations 0.1326 -0.2395 0.0017 
B60 Information on G&S markets 0.2 0.031 0.1038 
B61 Rural land tenure: traditional property -0.3423 -0.2251 0.0548 
B62 Rural land tenure: public property -0.1466 -0.0065 -0.1727 
B63 Diversity of land tenure rights systems 0.1445 0.0081 -0.061 
B64 Government recognition of diversity of land tenure rights systems -0.1606 -0.0675 -0.1109 
B65 Land tenure: security of ownership 0.3153 0.2348 0.1814 
B66 Land tenure: demand for land 0.1838 -0.0004 0.2013 
B67 Land tenure and large investors -0.0805 0.1109 -0.0997 
B70 Competition on G&S markets -0.132 0.0535 -0.6298 
B71 Shareholders: weight of the government 0.0345 0.2188 0.1918 
B72 Information on shareholders 0.0755 -0.3091 0.2116 
B73 Land tenure: development policies 0.1072 -0.1641 0.1125 
B80 Openness to business -0.0083 0.1836 0.2 
B81 Joint Ventures 0.306 0.1094 -0.0458 
B82 Non-national access to land -0.4915 -0.3394 -0.1356 
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Sector C 
IPD Variable Variable Description C1 C2 
C40 Privatizations in the financial sector 0.0595 -0.0467 
C41 Nationalizations in the financial sector 0.1985 -0.0939 
C42 Freedom in the allocation of loans 0.1531 -0.3117 
C50 Competence of bank executives 0.1356 0.2854 
C51 Importance of venture capital 0.368 -0.3331 
C52 Sovereign wealth fund policy -0.1862 0.5076 
C60 Financial information -0.3638 -0.0751 
C70 Competition within the banking system -0.1536 -0.0024 
C71 Regulation of competition in banking 0.4207 0.2234 
C72 Monitoring and auditing in banking 0.3515 0.3023 
C73 Reform of financial regulations 0.0707 -0.0965 
C80 Financial openness 0.3052 0.2545 
C90 Micro lending -0.4364 0.4699 
 
 
Sector D 
IPD Variable Variable Description D1 D2 D3 
D10 Freedom of association and trade union pluralism 0.2443 -0.4614 0.1625 
D40 Flexibility in the labour market -0.0765 -0.3393 -0.0836 
D41 Retraining and reskilling measures -0.1675 -0.003 -0.0593 
D50 Adaptive education system 0.0027 -0.2803 0.0394 
D60 Respect for workers' rights -0.0871 0.0819 0.0529 
D61 Weak employment contrat rigidity -0.1747 0.3401 -0.0011 
D70 Wage bargaining at the individual level 0.0235 0.2155 -0.1371 
D71 Strikes -0.0806 0.2255 0.3431 
D72 Management of labour -0.2551 -0.1942 0.2904 
D80 Openness to employment of non-nationals -0.1283 -0.1238 -0.1059 
D90 Quality of the supply of public goods 0.0617 0.226 -0.3641 
D91 Weak segmentation of the labour market -0.1874 -0.1019 0.2309 
D92 Low incidence of child labour -0.6413 0.4341 0.4832 
D93 Social mobility -0.5463 0.0561 -0.3529 
D94 Social mobility: young higher education graduates 0.0135 0.2443 -0.2891 
D95 Distribution of income 0.1754 0.0892 -0.3149 
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CHAPTER 4 
Economic Growth, Institutions 
and Geography31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
31 This chapter has also been published as a UNU-MERIT working paper 2013-056 (Bhupatiraju and 
Verspagen 2013b) 
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1. Introduction 
Much of the empirical growth literature has focused on examining the causes of differ-
ences in growth across countries. Many theories have been put forth in this regard and in 
the recent decades interest in explaining and testing these differences has surged. One 
answer that has (re)gained popularity is that the “institutional setting for technological 
change”32 determines growth in a country. In this context, the “institutional setting” (or, 
institutions) refers to formal rules (constitutions, laws and regulations, political systems, 
etc.) and informal rules (value systems, beliefs, social norms, etc.) that humans use when 
interacting within a wide variety of repetitive and structured situations at multiple levels 
of analysis (e.g., North, 2005; Ostrom, 2005). Differences in the types and quality of 
institutions ultimately result in different growth patterns (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, 
2004; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Rodrik et al, 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2003; and 
Bardhan, 2005). 
A second influential and not so new theory, which draws on the works of Montesquieu 
and Weber33 among others, states that these differences are due to an exogenously given 
set of geographic factors which are conducive for growth. Thus factors such as soil qual-
ity, weather conditions, and natural resource availability affect productivity and attitudes 
directly (Diamond, 1997; Gallup et al.1998; Sachs, 2001; McArthur and Sachs, 2001; 
Masters and McMillan, 2001). A third account sees differences in economic growth 
arising due to a country’s openness to trade, rather than as a result of its resource en-
dowments or institutions. This stream of literature suggests that countries that follow 
open trade policies gain more in terms of growth performance (Frankel and Romer, 
1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
These three approaches have been identified in the literature as the “deep determinants” 
of growth, as opposed to more “proximate determinants” such as capital resource accu-
mulation and technological change (Rodrik et al, 2004). For most part, these three 
strands of literature have evolved independent of each other. More recently, studies have 
attempted to determine which of these three factors are most important (or “primary”) in 
accounting for economic growth and its difference among countries (Rodrik et al, 2004; 
Basu, 2008; Easterly and Levine, 2003).  
In this paper, we attempt to re-examine the impact of institutions, trade and geography 
on economic growth and development using the Rodrik et al.(2004) framework. Our 
contribution is to use more comprehensive measures for economic growth, for institu-
tions, and for geography, along with the more commonly used measure of trade open-
ness. Economic growth (or development), institutions and geography are all multi-
faceted phenomena, and to capture them in a single indicator, as is often done in the 
empirical literature that we referred to above, is problematic. For example, economic 
growth is often captured by the level of GDP per capita, rather than the growth rate of 
that variable, and other aspects of growth, such as investment or structural change, re-
main poorly represented. Institutions are often captured by a single indicator, such as a 
                                                          
32 Darwin, J., (2008) “After Tamerlane”, Bloomsbury Press. Pg 190-191 
33 Montesquieu C de S, (1748), “The Spirit of the Laws”, Paris 
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measure for “rule of law”. However, we know that the institutional setting has many 
more dimensions, and works on the factors that cause economic growth in many differ-
ent subtle ways. The same holds for geography. This is often captured by a single varia-
ble such as distance from the equator, but there are obviously many more and different 
aspects to geography. Our aim is to capture these multi-faceted phenomena in a more 
comprehensive way, and see whether, in this way, we can confirm the causal links be-
tween them that have been found in the existing literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews related literature 
outlining the inter-relationship between institutions, trade and geography. Section 3 
describes the econometric methodology and Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 
presents the results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
2.1. “Institutions matter” 
 
The quality of institutions as a determinant of economic growth and development is not a 
new theory. The revival of interest in this area of research is often attributed to Douglass 
North, whose definition of “institutions” is often the benchmark for what constitutes 
them. 34 Building on the theoretical literature, there have been numerous empirical stud-
ies using institutions as an explanatory variable in the past two decades. Among the 
many reasons that have boosted interest in this area of research is the development of 
various econometric methods that have enabled us to deal with problems such as en-
dogeneity, reverse causality etc., which are often encountered in economic research35, 
namely the 2SLS-IV methods and those that followed it. 
One such influential paper that highlights the importance of institutions in studying eco-
nomic growth, while correcting for endogeneity problems, is Acemoglu et al.(2001). 
They make a case for differences in economic institutions as the “fundamental cause of 
different patterns of economic growth”. They introduce ‘settler mortality’36 as an instru-
ment variable to deal with the issue of endogeneity. Their results showed that institutions 
in fact, had a large impact on economic growth while geography did not matter (at least 
not in a direct way). An important critique of this paper is that the instrument they used 
is not universally applicable because not all poor countries were colonized. 
Hall and Jones (1999) use the percentage of population speaking English (ENGFRAC), 
and percentage of population speaking a European language (EURFRAC) as instruments 
for institutions that are in turn measured by the ICRG survey indicators. They use dis-
tance from the equator to capture geographic characteristics. They conclude that differ-
ences in social infrastructure had a large impact on cross-country differences in income 
                                                          
34 There have been many different propositions on measuring institutions. Among the more common ones 
include measures of corruption and democracy by various organizations. 
35 Vieira, F. V., and Damasceno, A. O. (2009). 
36 Settler mortality uses data of mortality rates of soldiers, sailors, priests/bishops (European-settlers) in their 
colonies per 1000 settlers. 
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per capita. Other studies which use some measure of ‘Western European influence’ as an 
instrument for institutions include La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999) Mauro (1995). La 
Porta et al. use legal origin as a proxy for institutions and find that common law coun-
tries perform best, and civil law countries perform worst. Mauro uses ethno-linguistic 
divisions as a proxy for corruption and finds that corruption lowers investment and 
thereby growth in countries.  
Easterly and Levine (2003) estimate a 2SLS-IV model using settler mortality as an in-
strument for institutions and distance from the equator, other geographic dummy varia-
bles such as landlockedness, crops, minerals etc to capture geography. They find that 
geography has an indirect effect on income differences via institutions. In their words 
institutions “seem to be a sufficient statistic” to account for economic growth. They do 
not find any direct impact of trade openness either. 
Concluding, we can summarize that institutions are seen as an important determinant of 
economic growth, but also that they are themselves endogenous. Most of the instruments 
that have been proposed for institutions are somehow related to geography, which points 
to the fact that geography and institutions are themselves related. This means that one 
must indeed revert to econometric methods such as instrumental variables in order to 
separate the impact of these two long-run determinants of economic growth. 
 
2.2. “Geography and Economic development” 
 
The view that the geography of a country determines its economic prosperity dates back 
at least to Montesquieu.37 There are two key versions of this hypothesis. The first states 
that productivity of technologies of the temperate climate zones are higher compared to 
technologies of the tropics.38 A second view states that the disease environment is a 
burden to the country, and therefore, is directly linked to the poverty that is prevailing in 
it. This view states that due to the high disease prone climate in a country, productivity 
of workers in that economy will be low. For example, the occurrence of frost kills pests 
and other disease causing insects or bacteria. Many tropical countries do not have many 
days of frost in a year. Also, the temperatures soar high enough to not allow workers to 
work in agricultural fields in some seasons. All this affects growth in an economy. This 
outlook has become popular over the past decade and has been treated in empirical stud-
ies such as Sachs (2001) and Gallup and Sachs (2001).  
While this view seems more plausible than the previous one, the causality of poverty in 
the wake of the disease environment and economic development is not very clear. McAr-
thur and Sachs (2001) conclude that institutions and geographically-related variables 
affect the GNP per capita of countries. However, if this were the main cause of growth 
or poverty in countries, then there would be no escape from being poor, and this contra-
                                                          
37 Montesquieu, C de S., “The Spirit of the Laws”. 
38 Myrdal, Gunnar (1968) Asian Drama – An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations.  Vol.3 (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin). 
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dicts the fact that some countries with “bad geography” have in fact developed to high 
income levels.  
Like in the case of institutions, the empirical literature has examined the importance of 
geography as a determinant of growth. Some of the variables used to study this hypothe-
sis include the latitude of the country (Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, b; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; 
Rodrik et al, 2004), and this usually results in a positive and significant impact of the 
latitudinal position of a country on its growth levels. Using disease ecology as the inde-
pendent variable measured by proportion of population at risk of malaria transmission, 
life expectancy at birth, and infant mortality rate, a negative and significant relationship 
between a geographically based health measure and GNP per capita is also found (East-
erly and Levine, 2003; and Sachs, 2003). The number of frost days in a year, availability 
of arable land, the length of the coastline, rainfall, and temperature are other variables 
that have been used to study the effect of geography of the country on its growth rates 
(Bloom and Sachs, 2003; Masters and Sachs, 2001; and Bloom et al, 2003). Here, a 
positive and significant effect of the first three variables on growth is found, while the 
last two variables are found to have a negative and significant effect. Landlocked econ-
omies have been found to have lower growth (Easterly and Levine, 2001; Sachs and 
Gallup, 1999). 
 
2.3. “Trade promotes growth” 
 
International trade openness has often been cited as increasing productivity, more so in 
less developed countries, allowing them to catch-up or converge towards the income 
level of richer nations. Policy recommendations usually involve adoption of more open 
or liberal trade policies in order to boost growth. However, like institutions, openness 
may be an endogenous variable, and hence a proper test for the impact of openness on 
growth must account for this.  
Frankel and Romer (1999) use a gravity model to propose a new instrument for overall 
trade share of countries as a function of geographical distance from its partners. They 
use this instrument in a 2SLS-IV estimation to test the relationship between trade and 
income level of a country. They find that overall trade of a country has a large and posi-
tive impact on income, but their result is “only moderately significant”. 
Sachs and Warner (1995) find that those countries that have robust trade policies con-
verge, but add that this is not a sufficient condition for growth, as overall macroeconom-
ic policies should accompany the trade policies. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) find alter-
native evidence, however, claiming that there is no significant relationship between open 
trade policies and economic growth. They further question the methodology used in 
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Edwards (1998), among others claiming that the measure 
of openness used tends to give a biased positive and significant relationship, and fur-
thermore is open to different interpretations.  
Dollar and Kraay (2001) test and find “that trade has a strong positive effect on growth”. 
However, Easterly and Levine (2003) do not find any direct impact of trade on growth 
once they control for institutions.  Rodrik et al.(2004) come to a similar conclusion re-
garding the impact of trade on growth.  
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From the empirical evidence and counter-evidence provided, it is clear that we do not 
have a clear winner in the “primacy” contest. Institutions, geography and trade openness 
all have their own supporters as the primal factor causing growth. Most of the empirical 
studies however, use a uni-dimensional measure of GDP per capita or growth rates to 
test for the above mentioned relationships. In this paper we test the hypothesis using a 
different measure of growth to see if the significance of institutions, trade or geography 
still holds. 
 
3. Econometric Approach 
 
Rodrik, et al.(2004) set out to estimate a regression model that encompasses all three 
“primal” factors behind economic growth, as we briefly surveyed them in the previous 
section. By including all three factors in one model, they aim to determine which of the 
three factors dominates over the other39. Following their framework, we start with the 
following equation: 
log yi =α + β1 INSi + β2OPENCi+ β3GEOSOILi + εi    (1) 
where log yi is the log of GDP per capita (in the year 2009, in international dollars) of 
country i, and INSi, INTi and GEOSOILi are the measures of institutional quality, trade 
share and soil quality conditions of the country i, respectively, and εi  is the usual random 
error term. 
Our brief survey of the literature has already emphasized that institutions and trade 
openness are both likely to be endogenous variables, and hence we need to account for 
this in the estimations. Cross-section growth regressions have often used the two stage 
least squares, or instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) estimation technique to study differ-
ences in income across countries. This method is one way of dealing with endogeneity. 
Rodrik et al.(2004) also use the 2SLS-IV approach with instrumental variables (IV) for 
institutions and trade. 
This approach amounts to first estimate the following regression equations:  
INSi = µ + β5SMi + β 6 FRi + β 7 GEOAREAi + β 8 GEOSOILi + εINSi    (2) 
OPENCi = γ + β 9SMi + β 10 FRi + β 11 GEOAREAi + β 12 GEOSOILi + εOPENCi    (3) 
where SMi is settler mortality and FRi  is the constructed Frankel Romer instrument for 
trade share below. GEOAREA is a geographical variable that is related to the physical 
characteristics of countries. This variable will be presented and discussed below. Equa-
tion (2) estimates the institutional quality variable as a function of settler mortality, as 
well as the specific geography variables in our equation (1), and the Frankel-Romer 
instrument for trade. Equation (2) does the same for the trade openness. The predicted 
values from equations (2) and (3) can then be used instead of the INS and INT variables 
(respectively) in the estimation of equation (1).40  
                                                          
39 This is our preferred model, since it takes into account all three hypothesis. We retain the IV approach due to 
the fact that it accounts for the endogenous nature of institutions with respect to the independent variables 
40 We also experimented with GEOAREA as an additional exogenous variable in equation (1), i.e., not as an 
instrument. This yields broadly the same results as we report below, although the instruments are somewhat 
weaker in this case. 
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As already briefly mentioned above, SM is available only for a limited group of coun-
tries (those that were colonized). Therefore, instead of using SM as an instrument, we 
also use two language variables, ENGFRAC (fraction of population speaking English) 
and EURFRAC (fraction of population speaking other European languages). This yields 
the following two equations for the first stage estimations: 
INSi = µ + ߚସENGFRACi + ߚହEURFRACi + ߚ଺ FRi + ߚ଻ GEOAREAi + ߚ଼ GEOSOILi + 
εINSi  (2a) 
OPENCi = γ + ߚଽENGFRACi + ߚଵ଴EURFRACi + ߚଵଵ FRi + ߚଵଶGEOAREAi + ߚଵଷ GE-
OSOILi + εOPENCi  (3a) 
In order to estimate equations (1) to (3), or (1) to (3a), we first have to construct the FR 
instrument of trade openness as a share of GDP for the year 2006, as the data used for 
Frankel & Romer (1999) use data for the year 1985. We start by estimating the Frankel 
and Romer (1999) gravity equation where bilateral trade between countries i and j is 
determined by the geographical distance between the two countries, their respective 
areas and populations, pairwise country landlockedness, a dummy variable for whether a 
common border between the countries exists, as well as some interaction terms with the 
common border dummy. The FR instrument thus tries to obtain a measure of the “geo-
graphic component of countries’ trade”. The equation estimated to obtain FR is as fol-
lows:  
Log(τij/GDPi) = a0 +a1ln Dij + a2 ln Ni + a3 ln Ai +a4 ln Nj + a5 ln Aj + a6 ln (Li+Lj) + a7 ln 
Bij + a8 Bijln Dij+ a9 Bijln Ni+ a10 Bijln Ai+ a11 Bijln Nj+ a12 Bijln Aj+ a13 Bij(Li+Lj)+ eij.  
  (4) 
 
Where τij is the bilateral trade between countries i and j (measured as exports plus im-
ports), GDPi is the nominal GDP of the country, Dij is the bilateral distance between the 
country pairs i and j, A is the area of the country, N is the population of the country, L is 
the dummy for landlockedness of the country, Bij is the dummy for a common border 
between countries i and j, and eij is the random error term. Results of this estimation are 
discussed in Section 5A. 
 
4. Data 
 
4.1. Construction of the variables 
 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), and 
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) are a few among the many dif-
ferent indicators available that measure institutional quality. The WGI have the ad-
vantage that they cover a wide range of institutional factors. They consist of six aggre-
gated indicators, for six different aspects of governance and institutions. In this study, we 
use the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD)41, which offers us 367 elementary variables 
which are then aggregated into three-digit (133 variables) and two-digit (93 variables) 
                                                          
41 Freely available at  http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/institutions.htm 
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levels. This database allows us to capture the multi-dimensionality of institutions, and 
does not require us to work with a fixed weighting scheme for the underlying indicators 
as in the WGI.42 Using this multi-dimensional approach is our key contribution. Rather 
than relying on a single measure of institutions (and growth, and geography), as Rodrik 
et al. (2004) do, we will test the growth – institutions relationship taking a broader per-
spective than just one aspect of institutions. 
We start from the 2-digit level IPD data43, but since we have 118 observations (coun-
tries) and 93 variables, this would leave us very few degrees of freedom. We thus further 
aggregate these 93 variables, first to 12 new variables, and then we aggregate these 12 
variables to two variables that are, each, ultimately used in the regressions as the INS 
variable from equation (1). This 2-stage aggregation of the IPD variables relies on (a 
spatial variant of) principal components analysis. In the first stage of this procedure, we 
start from the four “sectors” that the IPD database covers: (i) public institutions and civil 
society, (ii) goods and services markets, (iii) capital markets, and (iv) labour markets and 
labour relations. Each of the 93 aggregated variables falls into one of these sectors. For 
each of the sectors, we apply our spatial principal components analysis (SPCA), and 
produce a number of summary measures for each sector. This yields 12 new indicators. 
In the second stage, these 12 indicators are again summarized by SPCA, or by (regular) 
PCA. In the second stage, we maintain two components each for the PCA and the SPCA 
version, which gives us four summary variables for the institutions variable in total. 
The reason we use this 2-stage procedure is that the sectors have an unequal number of 
variables in them, and without the two stages, the (S)PCA results would be influenced 
stronger by the sectors with more variables. The 2 stage procedure has already been 
applied to IPD by Verspagen (2012), but only for regular PCA (not SPCA). The meth-
odology of the spatial version of PCA is described in Bhupatiraju et al. (2013). It differs 
from regular PCA in terms of the objective that it sets when producing the summary 
variables (components). In regular PCA, the objective is to maintain a maximum fit 
between the summary component and the original variables. Mathematically, this is 
achieved by looking at the correlation matrix of the original variables. The eigenvector 
that is associated with the largest eigenvalue of this matrix can be used as weights to 
construct the “best” summary measure (component). 
In the spatial version of PCA (SPCA, Bhupatiraju et al, 2013), the objective is to pro-
duce a summary measure that produces maximum spatial correlation with itself. Spatial 
correlation is measured by the Moran coefficient, and is essentially a measure of how 
spatially concentrated the underlying phenomenon is. High spatial correlation means that 
a country with high values of a variable tends to be surrounded by other countries with 
high values of that variable. SPCA also works by taking eigenvalues and eigenvectors, 
but in this case the matrix on which this is performed is not a simple correlation matrix, 
                                                          
42 Verspagen (2012) discusses the correlations between the WGI and IPD databases. 
43 For a detailed explanation of the database for 2009 see: Crombrugghe, D de., Farla, K., Meisel, N., Neu-
bourg, C de., Ould Aoudia, J., Szirmai, A., (2009),  “Institutional Profiles Database III: Presentation of the 
Institutional Profiles Database 2009 (IPD 2009)” Les Cahiers de la DGTPE – n° 2009-14. 
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but instead some more complicated matrix product involving, among other things, the 
matrix of Moran coefficients between the original variables. We will discuss the differ-
ences between regular PCA and SPCA in more detail when we look at maps displaying 
the institutions variables below.  
Rodrik et al. (2004) use distance from the equator as their preferred measure of geogra-
phy. As in the case of institutions, this is a very partial indicator. The archipelago of 
Indonesia embraces the equator, and in that sense it is similar to a country like Congo, 
but obviously the two countries are a world of difference when it comes to geography 
and climatic characteristics. Therefore, we use a much wider range of variables that 
describe the physical geographic characteristics and the soil related characteristics of the 
economy.  
The raw data for the geography variables are taken from Gallup et al. (1998). Their da-
taset contains many variables, related to physical characteristics such as access to wa-
terways, soil quality, climate zone, etc. We use SPCA to summarize these data into two 
summary variables: one for the physical characteristics of a country (based on 15 under-
lying variables), and one for the soil quality (based on 16 variables). In the regressions, 
both variables are included, and denoted as GEOAREA and GEOSOIL, respectively. 
It is not only on the institutions or geography side that we would like to extend the 
measurement horizon. Rodrik et al.(2004), as many others in the literature, proxy 
“growth” by the level of GDP per capita. This is justified by the long-run nature of the 
analysis. If growth rates are different between countries for a long enough period, the 
countries with high growth rates will also be(come) the ones with higher levels of in-
come per capita. In practice, however, growth rates are variable over time, and there is 
no strong correlation at all between growth and the level of income. Therefore, in a strict 
sense, the regressions of Rodrik et al. (2004) have very little to say about growth, but 
instead tell us something about the correlation between income levels on the one hand 
and institutions, trade and geography on the other hand.   
Therefore, we will extend our horizon with respect to the dependent variable in the re-
gressions (equation 1) to include also a number of other variables related to economic 
growth and development. We include annual growth rates of GPD per capita, average of 
consumption, investment and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, an indi-
cator of openness measured as exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP and popula-
tion growth rates. All these variables are taken over the period of 2000-2009. Like be-
fore, we will use SPCA to summarize these data into two summary variables, and both 
of these will be used as dependent variable in the estimation of equation (1). 
Since we use cross-section data for the year 2009, we have to construct the Frankel 
Romer instrument (FR) for 2006 using equation 4. In order to construct this, we use the 
“square” gravity data set from Head et al.(2008) for bilateral distances, area and popula-
tion and landlockedness data.44 This data set contains bilateral trade flows obtained from 
the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS), as well as dis-
tance and size data. Bilateral distance between countries is measured using the great 
                                                          
44 Freely available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm. 
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circle formula, between the biggest cities of the two countries. The data on area (meas-
ured in square kilometers), population, and dummies for landlockedness, as well as 
common borders, are also taken from the CEPII gravity data set compiled by Head et al. 
(2006).  
The other instrument that we use is settler mortality (SM), as first used by Acemoglu et 
al.(2001), from which source we also obtain these data. Using the above mentioned data 
we perform the 2SLS-IV regressions, the results of which are presented below. In order 
to include non- colonized countries in the analysis, we also use the Hall and Jones (1999) 
suggested ENGFRAC (fraction of population speaking English) and EURFRAC (frac-
tion of population speaking other European languages) variables as a substitute instru-
ment for MS. 
 
4.2. Mapping the data 
 
The summary variables for institutions, geography (both independent variables) and 
economic development (dependent variable) bring out the salient differences between 
countries in the underlying datasets that have many more variables. The SPCA proce-
dure that we use to construct these summary variables is designed to interpret differences 
and similarities between countries in these underlying variables in a spatial (geograph-
ical) way. We opted for the SPCA (instead of the regular PCA) method because geogra-
phy seems to play a large role in institutions. In the standard literature (summarized in 
Section 2 above), this is reflected in the fact that the instruments that are used for institu-
tions almost always have a geographical nature. Settler mortality (one of the most used 
instruments) is very specific to particular environments, and depends on climate, diseas-
es, etc. Language (another popular instrument) also has a clear geographical nature. 
Rather than just depending on the instruments to bring out the geographical correlation 
of institutions, we bring in geography in the construction of the variables, by means of 
the SPCA procedure. 
We perform the SPCA analysis as detailed in Chapter 3, and we provide maps that illus-
trate the patterns for the main variables in the analysis. We start, in Map 1a and 1b, with 
the institutions variable.  
These maps clearly bring out the spatial concentration of institutions. The first compo-
nent is a clearly a measure of “Western” institutions, where we use “Western” for de-
scribing Europe and its offshoots (North America, Australia and New Zealand). All these 
areas are darkly colored (high values), with the exception of the USA, which scores 
somewhat lower. This first component broadly measures the institutional side which 
Verspagen (2012) has dubbed as the first stylized fact of the institutions – development 
relation, i.e., that developed nations tend to have the type of institutions that are highly 
valued in the “Western World”, such as democracy, civil rights, transparent justice sys-
tems and free markets. From our SPCA exercise, it appears that these kind(s) of institu-
tions are strongly spatially concentrated at a global scale. 
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Map 1a. Institutions from the IPD database, 2009, first component (INS1-SPCA) 
 
Map 1b. Institutions from the IPD database, 2009, second component (INS2-SPCA) 
 
In Map 1b, we display the second component for institutions. This is again clearly spa-
tially concentrated, but now the spatial pattern points to high values in the Eastern hemi-
sphere, as well as in some parts of Europe. Broadly speaking, the kind of institutional 
features that are stressed in this second component are those that are associated to a 
stronger role of the government in social and economic life. Africa is an interesting area 
for this indicator, as it shows a broad East-West division in itself (similar to the global 
pattern). Summarizing, the two maps (indicators), give us two rather distinct views on 
institutions at a global level, and it will be interesting to see how these are correlated to 
growth in the estimation of equation (1).  
Map 2 displays the first component for the physical characteristics dataset (GEOAREA). 
Here, the high values are concentrated on the northern hemisphere, which is because 
latitude has a high weight in the fact. On the Northern hemisphere, Europe scores partic-
ularly high and this is mainly due to the relatively high weight of access to waterways 
and the small size of a country. 
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Map 2. Physical geographical characteristics, first component 
 
In Map 3, the soil characteristics summary variable is displayed. This is the other geog-
raphy related variable (GEOSOIL) that we include in the regressions as an independent 
variable. This variable is clearly also related latitude, but less so than the GEOAREA 
variable. However, latitude does not enter in this component, and the impression that 
latitude affects this component stems from the influence of climate. The climate zones 
that are weighted strongly negative are savannah climates, dry climates, humid subtropi-
cal climates, and Mediterranean climates. 
 
 
Map 3. Soil characteristics, first component 
 
Finally, Maps 4a and 4b show the results of the SPCA procedure on the economic devel-
opment variables. With the first factor here, in Map 4a, we capture the general develop-
ment level. This variable is mostly influenced by the initial level of GDP per capita (in 
2000), but also by the share of consumption in GDP and, negatively, by population 
growth. All of these phenomena (low population growth, high income and high con-
sumption) are characteristics of developed countries. Therefore, this component captures 
the economic side of the stylized fact that was already referred to above, i.e., that devel-
oped countries tend to have developed institutions.  
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Map 4a. Economic development, first component 
 
 
Map 4b. Economic development, second component 
 
 Map 4b shows the second factor from the economic development dataset. This captures 
economic growth in a much more direct way, but in combination with some of the other 
indicators. We see high values in Asia, South-Eastern Europe and Central/Southern 
Africa. What characterizes these areas, is a relatively low initial (2000) GDP per capita 
level, combined with a relatively high growth rate, high openness to trade, a high in-
vestment rate and low population growth. Clearly, the indicator captures an overall 
growth or development strategy, rather than just the growth rate of GDP per capita. 
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Empirical Results  
  
A. Construction of the Frankel and Romer instrument 
 
Following Helpman et al. (2008), we estimate a tobit model to take into account the 
missing and zero trade observations among the countries, rather than dropping those 
observations which have either no trade or missing trade values as in Frankel and Romer 
(1999). The estimated tobit equation yields broadly the same results as the OLS esti-
mates.  Table 1 shows the results of the estimated bilateral trade gravity coefficients. 
 
Table 1: Bilateral Trade Equation (Tobit) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES logTij_GDPi logTij_GDPi sigma 
Dij -1.054*** -1.054***  
 (0.0251) (0.0250)  
Ni -0.0958*** -0.0959***  
 (0.0161) (0.0161)  
Ai -0.00741 -0.00736  
 (0.0146) (0.0146)  
Nj 0.803*** 0.803***  
 (0.0162) (0.0162)  
Aj -0.170*** -0.170***  
 (0.0144) (0.0144)  
Lij -0.681*** -0.681***  
 (0.0318) (0.0318)  
B 1.033 1.032  
 (1.182) (1.181)  
BDij 0.316 0.316  
 (0.215) (0.215)  
BNi 0.131 0.131  
 (0.108) (0.108)  
BAi -0.320*** -0.320***  
 (0.117) (0.117)  
BNj 0.0688 0.0687  
 (0.107) (0.107)  
BAj 0.0753 0.0754  
 (0.117) (0.117)  
BLij 0.690*** 0.689***  
 (0.165) (0.165)  
Constant 6.575*** 6.576*** 1.922*** 
 (0.286) (0.285) (0.0121) 
    
Observations 12,644 12,644 12,644 
R-squared 0.339   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is log (Tij/GDPi). 
Column (1) gives the results of the OLS estimation, while Columns (2) and (3) report the Tobit estimation. 
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The results are slightly different from those of Frankel & Romer (1999), especially for 
those that involve the interaction terms. We find that distance has a large, negative and 
significant impact on bilateral trade as expected. Bilateral trade is strongly increasing in 
j’s population and decreasing in j’s area and i’s population, at a lower magnitude. Coun-
try i’s area is the only non-significant variable among these. These results show that 
country i would trade more with countries that are closer to it, and those that have a large 
population but smaller areas.45 The results also show that if either country is landlocked, 
trade between them is strongly negatively affected and this is significant. Sharing a bor-
der has a large effect on trade; however this estimate is not significant. This is in agree-
ment with what Frankel and Romer (1999) find. According to them a possible explana-
tion for this insignificance is because “only a small fraction of country pairs share a 
border”, and therefore are imprecisely estimated. Taking into account a common border 
between trading partners gives us different results. However, only two of the interaction 
terms are statistically significant. Country i’s area across a shared border is negatively 
significant -0.32 as opposed to -0.007 when the common border is not taken into ac-
count, while landlockedness of either country across a shared border is positively signif-
icant at 0.69 as opposed to -0.681 when a common border is not taken into account, 
showing that geography determines trade partially. Out of the 12644 observations only 
one observation is left censored at -10.67.  
Using these estimated results, we obtain the fitted values of Tij ( ෠ܶ௜௝). We aggregate these 
values over j to get our instrument ෠ܶ௜. This is the “geographic component” of country i’s 
total trade. It should be noted here that correlation between the actual and the construct-
ed trade share is 0.58 after controlling for size, which is a rather moderate correlation. 
This could be due to the imputed values of the geographically constructed bilateral trade 
data for which values are either missing or zero.46 Since the imputation is based on the 
available geography data, Taiwan’s trade share is not estimated due to missing GDP 
values. 
 
B. Estimation of the RST model 
 
Along with the above constructed FR instrument ( ෠ܶ௜) we also use the settler mortality 
instrument (SM), ENGFRAC and EURFRAC for the estimation of equation (1). As 
mentioned above, the IPD database has 118 countries that are used as the basis for the 
analysis. We perform the estimations on two sub-sets of these 118 countries. The smaller 
set has 52 countries for which the SM data is available, and the larger set has 104 coun-
tries for which ENGFRAC and EURFRAC data are available. We estimate and present 
the OLS as well as the 2SLS-IV estimations. 
Table 2 below shows the results of these estimations. Columns (1) and (2) give the re-
sults of the OLS estimation of Equation 1, using the two institutional components in 
separate equations. We find that GDP per capita is positively and significantly related to 
                                                          
45 The results are interpreted as elasticities since they are log-transformed values. 
46 Noguer and Siscart (2005). 
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GEOSOIL, and to both institutions variables. Columns (3) to (6) show the results of the 
2SLS-IV estimation, with settler mortality as an instrument in column (3) and fraction of 
English and European languages as instruments in columns (4) to (6). The regression 
with settler mortality as an instrument has fewer observations (due to missing data for 
countries that were not colonized), and generally show less significant results. In column 
(3) none of the variables is significant. The 2SLS-IV estimates in columns (4) to (6) 
always yield a significant impact of institutions. The first component for institutions has 
a positive and significant impact in GDP per capita, the second component is negative, 
but only significant if it is entered in an equation without the first institutions compo-
nent. OPENC and GEOSOIL also enter significantly in some of the equations, but these 
effects are not robust across the equations. OPENC has a negative and significant sign in 
equation (4), which is against expectations. INS1-SPCA and INS2-SPCA are the first 
and second institutional components of an SPCA of the IPD 2009 data. 
 
Table 2. Regression results with GDP per capita (2009) as dependent variable, Institutions with SPCA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logy (OLS) logy (OLS) logy (IV-1) logy (IV-2) logy (IV-2) logy (IV-2) 
GEOSOIL 6.402*** 10.44*** 33.14 -8.156 15.15*** -4.335 
 (1.976) (1.074) (24.78) (7.576) (1.826) (5.149) 
OPENC 0.00132 0.00211 -0.0284 -0.0306** 0.0168 -0.0159 
 (0.00253) (0.00239) (0.0411) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0124) 
INS1-SPCA 0.323***  -3.137 1.364***  1.222*** 
 (0.0977)  (2.869) (0.476)  (0.309) 
INS2-SPCA  0.167**   -0.508** -0.314 
  (0.0779)   (0.233) (0.209) 
Constant 8.865*** 8.798*** 9.452*** 11.51*** 7.547*** 10.27*** 
 (0.228) (0.225) (2.807) (1.080) (1.128) (1.056) 
       
Observations 118 118 52 104 104 104 
Underid. test (reject H0)   N Y Y N 
Weak instruments   Y Y Y Y 
Hansen J statistic (reject H0)   N N Y N 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns labeled OLS are OLS 
regressions, columns labeled IV-1 use settler mortality as instruments, and columns labeled IV-2 use ENG-
FRAC and EURFRAC as instruments. The row “Underid. test (reject H0)” reports results of Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM test, a N indicates that under-identification is an issue. The row “Weak instruments” reports results of 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test, Y indicates that the instruments are weak. The row “Hansen J-statistic (reject 
H0)” reports results of the Hansen J test for over-identification. A Y indicates that over-identification is an 
issue. 
 
The results for the first stage regressions for Table 2 and further tables are given in the 
Appendix. We did perform tests for under-identification, over-identification and weak 
instruments. These results are reported at the bottom of the table. We used a 10% cut-off 
value for deciding on these tests. In these tests, we generally (also for the estimations 
below) find that the instruments are weak. This is a common problem with IV estima-
tions, and was also reported as an issue in the original Rodrik et al. (2004) paper. Our 
tests do indicate that institutions and trade openness are endogenous variables hence we 
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cannot go on the OLS results alone. However, finding strong enough instruments for 
these variables is a problem that the literature still needs to address.  
In terms of under- or over-identification, equation (4) in Table 2 performs best. It passes 
both tests (but the test for weak instruments), while equations (3) and (6) do not pass the 
under-identification test, and equation (6) does not pass the over-identification test. 
Thus, equation (4) provides the best model for the general development level in Table 2. 
What does this table suggest in terms of the primacy of institutions in terms of explain-
ing the level of GDP per capita? Certainly, the results in the table point to an important 
role of institutions in explaining the development level (GDP per capita). The two insti-
tutional variables are the only ones that are systematically significant in the 2SLS-IV 
regressions. The results for trade and geography are sometimes significant, which would 
point to an independent role of geography and/or trade, but this does not seem to be 
robust. We also find evidence that there are multiple sides to institutions, as both the first 
and the second component that we derived from the SPCA are significant. The first 
component seems to dominate (column 6), and the sign of the second component is neg-
ative, which leads us to conclude that what is related to the development level of a coun-
try is the degree to which institutions are of the “Western” type.  
 
Table 3. Regression results with GDP per capita (2009) as dependent variable, Institutions with regular 
PCA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES logy (OLS) logy (OLS) logy (IV-1) logy (IV-2) logy (IV-2) logy (IV-2) 
       
GEOSOIL 11.54*** 11.40*** 8.000 13.79*** 11.99*** 14.48*** 
 (1.067) (1.066) (5.657) (2.247) (1.579) (3.347) 
OPENC 0.00316 0.00335 -0.0186 -0.0132 -0.00150 -0.0160 
 (0.00247) (0.00251) (0.0250) (0.0102) (0.00838) (0.0137) 
INS1-PCA 0.330  -7.425 5.265*  6.341 
 (0.346)  (9.845) (2.824)  (4.406) 
INS2-PCA  -0.124   -2.347 2.149 
  (0.294)   (2.295) (5.679) 
Constant 8.709*** 8.693*** 10.43*** 9.936*** 9.065*** 10.17*** 
 (0.228) (0.229) (1.548) (0.834) (0.702) (1.140) 
       
Observations 118 118 52 104 104 104 
Underid. test  (reject H0)   N N N N 
Weak instruments   Y Y Y Y 
Hansen J statistic (reject H0)   N N Y N 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns labeled OLS are OLS 
regressions, columns labeled IV-1 use settler mortality as instruments, and columns labeled IV-2 use ENG-
FRAC and EURFRAC as instruments. The row “Underid. test (reject H0)” reports results of Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM test, a N indicates that under-identification is an issue. The row “Weak instruments” reports results of 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test, Y indicates that the instruments are weak. The row “Hansen J-statistic (reject 
H0)” reports results of the Hansen J test for over-identification. A Y indicates that over-identification is an 
issue. 
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We now proceed to see whether and how these results change if we use a regular PCA 
method (instead of the spatial PCA) to summarize the institutions variables (INS1-PCA 
and INS2)-PCA. These results are in Table 3. The main difference as compared to Table 
2 is that the significance of the institutions variables is now much weaker. This holds for 
both the OLS and 2SLS-IV results. In fact, the only time that one of the institutions 
variables is significant, is in column (4), and this is only weakly significant (10%). Simi-
larly, OPENC is never significant in Table 3. However, GEOSOIL is significant in all 
columns but equation (3).  
All of the columns (3) to (6) in Table 3 suffer from under-identification. This can be 
interpreted as saying that the instruments are not good enough. With institutions that are 
not summarized in a geographical way, finding good instruments seems even more of a 
problem than in Table 2. In addition, equation (5) also seems to suffer from over-
identification.  
The conclusion seems to be that it makes a difference whether we weight the underlying 
institutional variables from IPD in a spatial way, or without spatial weights. Non-
spatially weighted institutions are difficult to instrument, and (therefore) do not seem to 
have a robust impact on the development level, while spatially weighted institutions do 
have such an impact. This could be because insturments themselves have an underlying 
spatial narrative. For example, settler mortality is avaiable for those countries that were 
colonized. These colonized countries are mostly clustered in small groups in some parts 
of the world. As a preliminary conclusion, it seems fair to that institutions indeed are a 
(the) primal factor behind economic development, but only if we take into account that 
institutions themselves are strongly geographically concentrated.  
In order to test the effect of institutions on the broader aspects of development, including 
the growth rate of GDP per capita itself, we also estimate the regression models with a 
different dependent variable. For this purpose, we used the first and second components 
of the broad economic development dataset as displayed in Maps 4a and 4b above. The 
results for the first factor were very similar to Tables 2 and 3, and therefore, we do not 
document these results. This is because the first component (Map 4a) mainly captures 
the development level, and hence is not too different from GDP per capita itself. Table 4 
documents the results for the second factor (“growth”), using institutions with SPCA as 
the independent variable. 
In the OLS regressions (columns 1 and 2), only the first institutions component enters 
significantly, but with a negative sign. OPENC also enters significantly twice, and GE-
OSOIL significant and negative once. Now, trade openness is significant in the 2SLS-IV 
results with settler mortality, but none of the other variables are significant (column 3). 
In the 2SLS-IV results with language instruments (columns 4 to 6), the second institu-
tions component is never significant, but the first component remains significant and 
negative. GEOSOIL (twice positive and once negative) and OPENC (twice positive) are 
also significant. Thus, these results suggest that in terms of the more dynamic aspects of 
economic development, institutions are not the only “primal” factor that contributes. 
Geography and trade also contribute. Moreover, “Western” institutions seem to contrib-
ute negatively to development in these regressions.  
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Like before, the instruments are weak, and all columns except (4) seem to suffer from 
either over- or under-identification. Thus, equation (4) is the preferred specification in 
Table 4, and it points to a negative impact of institutions, a positive impact of trade 
openness and a positive impact of GEOSOIL. Institutions no longer trump the other 
factors when we consider a more dynamic picture of economic development. 
 
Table 4. Regression results with second economic development component (growth) as dependent varia-
ble, Institutions with SPCA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES dev2 (OLS) dev2 (OLS) dev2 (IV-1) dev2 (IV-2) dev2 (IV-2) dev2 (IV-2) 
       
GEOSOIL 0.125 -1.508** -1.262 7.446* -2.528*** 7.142** 
 (1.074) (0.684) (6.180) (3.804) (0.806) (3.318) 
OPENC 0.00730*** 0.00661*** 0.0239** 0.0193*** 0.00191 0.0181** 
 (0.00171) (0.00156) (0.0116) (0.00709) (0.00578) (0.00755) 
INS1-SPCA -0.102*  0.225 -0.618**  -0.606*** 
 (0.0588)  (0.711) (0.240)  (0.214) 
INS2-SPCA  0.00820   0.121 0.0250 
  (0.0504)   (0.0957) (0.127) 
Constant -0.618*** -0.559*** -1.692** -1.689*** -0.238 -1.590** 
 (0.135) (0.131) (0.798) (0.577) (0.494) (0.625) 
       
Observations 118 118 52 104 104 104 
Underid. test  (reject H0)   N Y Y N 
Weak instruments   Y Y Y Y 
Hansen J statistic (reject H0)   N N Y N 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns labeled OLS are OLS 
regressions, columns labeled IV-1 use settler mortality as instruments, and columns labeled IV-2 use ENGFRAC 
and EURFRAC as instruments. The row “Underid. test (reject H0)” reports results of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test, 
a N indicates that under-identification is an issue. The row “Weak instruments” reports results of Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F test, Y indicates that the instruments are weak. The row “Hansen J-statistic (reject H0)” reports results of 
the Hansen J test for over-identification. A Y indicates that over-identification is an issue. 
 
In Table 5, we repeat the estimations of table 4, but with using the regular PCA method 
to construct the institutions components. As in Table 3, the results seem to suffer from 
under-identification (all columns 3 – 6). We have only one significant result for institu-
tions in the table, in column (4), i.e., the 2SLS-IV results. As in Table 4, the sign of 
institutions is negative. In column (4), we also have a significant and positive effect of 
trade openness, but GEOSOIL, which was significant and positive in Table 4, is now 
significant and negative.  
Thus, for the broad development indicator that includes growth, we find some similar, 
and some different results as compared to just using GDP per capita. What is similar is 
that we have stronger results for institutions when we weight institutions in a spatial 
way. What is different is, first, the sign of the institutions variable, and, second, whether or 
not (some of) the other primal factors still matter. Our analysis of the broader development 
variable both stresses that institutions as they are usually measured have an adverse effect 
on development, and that, besides institutions, geography and trade also matter. 
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Table 5. Regression results with second economic development component (growth) as dependent varia-
ble, Institutions with regular PCA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES dev2 (OLS) dev2 (OLS) dev2 (IV-1) dev2 (IV-2) dev2 (IV-2) dev2 (IV-2) 
       
GEOSOIL -1.536** -1.434** 1.136 -2.657** -1.615* -3.042 
 (0.613) (0.620) (2.335) (1.213) (0.853) (1.878) 
OPENC 0.00678*** 0.00663*** 0.0250** 0.0128** 0.00607 0.0144* 
 (0.00156) (0.00159) (0.0115) (0.00542) (0.00469) (0.00744) 
INS1-PCA -0.220  -0.712 -3.040**  -3.637 
 (0.196)  (3.236) (1.471)  (2.408) 
INS2-PCA  0.131   1.385 -1.194 
  (0.172)   (1.343) (3.075) 
Constant -0.573*** -0.561*** -1.813** -1.076** -0.572 -1.206** 
 (0.129) (0.130) (0.718) (0.439) (0.383) (0.613) 
       
Observations 118 118 52 104 104 104 
Underid. test  (reject H0)   N N N N 
Weak instruments   Y Y Y Y 
Hansen J statistic (reject H0)   N N Y N 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns labeled OLS are OLS 
regressions, columns labeled IV-1 use settler mortality as instruments, and columns labeled IV-2 use ENG-
FRAC and EURFRAC as instruments. The row “Underid. test (reject H0)” reports results of Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM test, a N indicates that under-identification is an issue. The row “Weak instruments” reports results of 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test, Y indicates that the instruments are weak. The row “Hansen J-statistic (reject 
H0)” reports results of the Hansen J test for over-identification. A Y indicates that over-identification is an 
issue. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we test the Rodrik et al.(2014) framework to explain differences in devel-
opment levels across countries by using a broader set of definitions for institutions, ge-
ography and economic variables. We use constructed indices for institutions, geography 
(divided into physical and soil quality) and economic variables (which take into account 
the variance in a set of seven variables related to the level of economic develop-
ment/growth of countries).  
We find from our analysis that institutions do play a primary role in explaining cross-
country differences in income per capita. This part of our analysis largely confirms the 
Rodrik et al. (2004) results. We do find, however, that it matters how a summary varia-
ble is created from our underlying multi-dimensional institutions dataset. The results are 
reasonably strong if we summarize institutions in a spatial way (i.e., create a summary 
measure that is spatially correlated). When we summarize institutions without taking into 
account space or geography, the results are much weaker. This suggests that institutions 
are indeed strongly spatially correlated, and that it matters to acknowledge this in the 
Rodrik et al.-type regressions. Institutions may trump the other factors (trade and geog-
raphy), but they are themselves strongly geographically influenced. In other words, even 
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if we do not see a direct impact of geography on GDP per capita, we should keep in 
mind that the institutions variables are spatially weighted and so ‘space’ does matter, 
thus we can conclude that spatial influence of neighbours has an impact on the economic 
performance of the economy. 
We also estimated models in which we use a broader development variable. This is a 
composite index, produced by the spatial principal components analysis (SPCA) that was 
used to construct the institutions proxies. This broader economic development level 
captures growth in a more direct way, as it has high values for relatively under-
developed, but fast-growing economies that are relatively open. With this variable as the 
dependent variable, we find that institutions, geography and openness all matter in the 
final equation. Institutions are no longer the only primal factor, geography and trade also 
matter. In addition, we find that the institutions proxy that we use has a negative influ-
ence. In other words, institutions as we usually measure them do not seem to contribute 
to growth of a dynamic development pattern in general.  
The role of institutions in explaining the current level of income in various countries has 
been tested by various studies earlier. Untangling the historical and geographic reasons 
for the differences in growth is not an easy task. Our analysis shows that there is a need 
to analyze these differences using carefully constructed indices. For this line of research 
to go forward, we need to look at a wider choice of instruments which may prove to be 
better than those currently in vogue. For example the FR instrument is widely used as a 
proxy for trade share (as also in this paper), but the correlation between the constructed 
trade share and the actual trade share is only as much as 0.6. Settler mortality on the 
other hand tries to bring in a historical aspect into the explanation of the quality of insti-
tutions, but is restrictive in the sense that only colonized countries can be tested and as 
seen by many earlier studies and by this one, is a weak instrument, much like EUR-
FRAC and ENGFRAC. 
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Appendix 
 
Variable description for Tables 1-5. 
Variable description Variable code 
Distance between countries i and j Dij 
Area of country i or j  Ai, Aj 
Population of country i , j  Ni, Nj 
Dummy for landlockedness of country i and j taken together. Lij 
Dummy for a common border between country i and j B 
Interaction term of a shared border and bilateral distance (Dij) BDij 
Interaction term of a shared border and Population in i BNi 
Interaction term of a shared border and Area in i BAi 
Interaction term of a shared border and Population in j BNj 
Interaction term of a shared border and Area in j BAj 
Interaction term of a shared border and landlockedness dummy  BLij 
GDP per capita (in the year 2009, in international dollars) logy 
Measure of institutional quality (factor 1) using SPCA INS1_SPCA 
Measure of institutional quality (factor 2) using SPCA INS2_SPCA 
Measure of institutional quality (factor 1) using PCA INS1_PCA 
Measure of institutional quality (factor 2) using PCA INS2_PCA 
Alternative measure of economic development (Factor 2) dev2 
Measure of agricultural productivity conducive for growth GEOSOIL 
Measure of physical geographic factors conducive for growth GEOAREA 
Trade openness OPENC 
Instrument for trade openness (FR instrument) logTij_GDPi 
Fraction of population speaking English  ENGFRAC 
Fraction of population speaking an European language EURFRAC 
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First stage results for IV regressions: 
 
(i) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (3) of Table 2 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES inst1 openc 
   
soil1 9.340*** -111.6 
 (1.895) (90.11) 
settlermortality 0.000163 0.000287 
 (0.000217) (0.0103) 
logeTijhat 0.0170 28.52** 
 (0.276) (13.11) 
area1 0.0738 -5.660 
 (0.149) (7.076) 
Constant -0.412 -5.888 
 (0.727) (34.59) 
   
Observations 52 52 
R-squared 0.378 0.167 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(ii) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (4) of Table 2 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES inst1 openc 
   
soil1 11.69*** -8.732 
 (1.567) (64.62) 
engfrac 0.701 5.534 
 (0.464) (19.13) 
eurfrac 0.391 -4.297 
 (0.248) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.648*** 29.76*** 
 (0.219) (9.017) 
area1 0.223* -1.278 
 (0.131) (5.394) 
Constant -1.923*** 0.635 
 (0.632) (26.06) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.725 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(iii) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (5) of Table 2 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES inst2 openc 
   
soil1 5.052** -8.732 
 (1.999) (64.62) 
engfrac 1.641*** 5.534 
 (0.592) (19.13) 
eurfrac -1.458*** -4.297 
 (0.316) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.719** 29.76*** 
 (0.279) (9.017) 
area1 0.0783 -1.278 
 (0.167) (5.394) 
Constant -1.809** 0.635 
 (0.806) (26.06) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.436 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(iv) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (6) of Table 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES inst1 inst2 openc 
    
soil1 11.69*** 5.052** -8.732 
 (1.567) (1.999) (64.62) 
engfrac 0.701 1.641*** 5.534 
 (0.464) (0.592) (19.13) 
eurfrac 0.391 -1.458*** -4.297 
 (0.248) (0.316) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.648*** 0.719** 29.76*** 
 (0.219) (0.279) (9.017) 
area1 0.223* 0.0783 -1.278 
 (0.131) (0.167) (5.394) 
Constant -1.923*** -1.809** 0.635 
 (0.632) (0.806) (26.06) 
    
Observations 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.725 0.436 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ins_1 Openc 
   
soil1 0.308 -111.6 
 (0.612) (90.11) 
settlermortality 1.20e-05 0.000287 
 (7.00e-05) (0.0103) 
logeTijhat 0.0365 28.52** 
 (0.0891) (13.11) 
area1 0.0221 -5.660 
 (0.0481) (7.076) 
Constant -0.0206 -5.888 
 (0.235) (34.59) 
   
Observations 52 52 
R-squared 0.019 0.167 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(vi) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (4) of Table 3 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ins_1 openc 
   
soil1 -0.495 -8.732 
 (0.471) (64.62) 
engfrac 0.256* 5.534 
 (0.139) (19.13) 
eurfrac 0.0332 -4.297 
 (0.0745) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.119* 29.76*** 
 (0.0657) (9.017) 
area1 -0.0125 -1.278 
 (0.0393) (5.394) 
Constant -0.328* 0.635 
 (0.190) (26.06) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.062 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
(v) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (3) of Table 3 
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(vii) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (5) of Table 3 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ins_2 openc 
   
soil1 -0.504 -8.732 
 (0.574) (64.62) 
engfrac -0.0776 5.534 
 (0.170) (19.13) 
eurfrac -0.0381 -4.297 
 (0.0908) (10.22) 
logeTijhat -0.0693 29.76*** 
 (0.0801) (9.017) 
area1 0.0593 -1.278 
 (0.0479) (5.394) 
Constant 0.197 0.635 
 (0.232) (26.06) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.024 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
(viii) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (6) of Table 3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ins_1 ins_2 openc 
    
soil1 -0.495 -0.504 -8.732 
 (0.471) (0.574) (64.62) 
engfrac 0.256* -0.0776 5.534 
 (0.139) (0.170) (19.13) 
Eurfrac 0.0332 -0.0381 -4.297 
 (0.0745) (0.0908) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.119* -0.0693 29.76*** 
 (0.0657) (0.0801) (9.017) 
area1 -0.0125 0.0593 -1.278 
 (0.0393) (0.0479) (5.394) 
Constant -0.328* 0.197 0.635 
 (0.190) (0.232) (26.06) 
    
Observations 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.062 0.024 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(ix) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (3) of Table 4 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES inst1 openc 
   
soil1 9.340*** -111.6 
 (1.895) (90.11) 
settlermortality 0.000163 0.000287 
 (0.000217) (0.0103) 
logeTijhat 0.0170 28.52** 
 (0.276) (13.11) 
area1 0.0738 -5.660 
 (0.149) (7.076) 
Constant -0.412 -5.888 
 (0.727) (34.59) 
   
Observations 52 52 
R-squared 0.378 0.167 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(x) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (4) of Table 4 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES inst1 openc 
   
soil1 11.69*** -8.732 
 (1.567) (64.62) 
engfrac 0.701 5.534 
 (0.464) (19.13) 
eurfrac 0.391 -4.297 
 (0.248) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.648*** 29.76*** 
 (0.219) (9.017) 
area1 0.223* -1.278 
 (0.131) (5.394) 
Constant -1.923*** 0.635 
 (0.632) (26.06) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.725 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(xi) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (5) of Table 4 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES inst2 openc 
   
soil1 5.052** -8.732 
 (1.999) (64.62) 
engfrac 1.641*** 5.534 
 (0.592) (19.13) 
eurfrac -1.458*** -4.297 
 (0.316) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.719** 29.76*** 
 (0.279) (9.017) 
area1 0.0783 -1.278 
 (0.167) (5.394) 
Constant -1.809** 0.635 
 (0.806) (26.06) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.436 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(xii) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (6) of Table 4 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES inst1 inst2 openc 
    
soil1 11.69*** 5.052** -8.732 
 (1.567) (1.999) (64.62) 
engfrac 0.701 1.641*** 5.534 
 (0.464) (0.592) (19.13) 
eurfrac 0.391 -1.458*** -4.297 
 (0.248) (0.316) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.648*** 0.719** 29.76*** 
 (0.219) (0.279) (9.017) 
area1 0.223* 0.0783 -1.278 
 (0.131) (0.167) (5.394) 
Constant -1.923*** -1.809** 0.635 
 (0.632) (0.806) (26.06) 
    
Observations 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.725 0.436 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(xiii) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (3) of Table 5 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ins_1 openc 
   
soil1 0.308 -111.6 
 (0.612) (90.11) 
settlermortality 1.20e-05 0.000287 
 (7.00e-05) (0.0103) 
logeTijhat 0.0365 28.52** 
 (0.0891) (13.11) 
area1 0.0221 -5.660 
 (0.0481) (7.076) 
Constant -0.0206 -5.888 
 (0.235) (34.59) 
   
Observations 52 52 
R-squared 0.019 0.167 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(xiv) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (4) of Table 5 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ins_1 openc 
   
soil1 -0.495 -8.732 
 (0.471) (64.62) 
engfrac 0.256* 5.534 
 (0.139) (19.13) 
eurfrac 0.0332 -4.297 
 (0.0745) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.119* 29.76*** 
 (0.0657) (9.017) 
area1 -0.0125 -1.278 
 (0.0393) (5.394) 
Constant -0.328* 0.635 
 (0.190) (26.06) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.062 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(xv) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (5) of Table 5 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ins_2 openc 
   
soil1 -0.504 -8.732 
 (0.574) (64.62) 
engfrac -0.0776 5.534 
 (0.170) (19.13) 
eurfrac -0.0381 -4.297 
 (0.0908) (10.22) 
logeTijhat -0.0693 29.76*** 
 (0.0801) (9.017) 
area1 0.0593 -1.278 
 (0.0479) (5.394) 
Constant 0.197 0.635 
 (0.232) (26.06) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.024 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(xvi) First stage IV regression results for Estimation (6) of Table 5 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ins_1 ins_2 openc 
    
soil1 -0.495 -0.504 -8.732 
 (0.471) (0.574) (64.62) 
engfrac 0.256* -0.0776 5.534 
 (0.139) (0.170) (19.13) 
eurfrac 0.0332 -0.0381 -4.297 
 (0.0745) (0.0908) (10.22) 
logeTijhat 0.119* -0.0693 29.76*** 
 (0.0657) (0.0801) (9.017) 
area1 -0.0125 0.0593 -1.278 
 (0.0393) (0.0479) (5.394) 
Constant -0.328* 0.197 0.635 
 (0.190) (0.232) (26.06) 
    
Observations 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.062 0.024 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1. Introduction 
 
The influence of firm idiosyncratic characteristics on their decision to enter foreign mar-
kets has been dealt with in much detail in both theoretical and empirical literature. There 
are a host of empirical studies that analyze firm level determinants of FDI decisions as 
well as their modes of entry. Most often, these studies analyze firm specific advantages 
such as technological intensity, innovation capacity, product and process differentiation 
from domestic firms, capital intensity, R&D activities, advertising (marketing and distri-
bution skills) etc to explain the entry of Multinational Enterprises (MNE’s) into host 
countries (Blonigen 2005, Lee and Rugman 2012). The above mentioned variables de-
scribe the advantages that certain firms tend to have over others.  
When analyzing why some countries are better able to attract more FDI than others, 
studies look at the prevailing macroeconomic situation in the country, as well as how 
conducive the institutional set up is, for entering and doing business in that country. 
Exchange rate fluctuations, inflation variation, the availability or the lack of skilled la-
bour and unskilled labour at lower wages, tax rates on corporate profits, etc are among 
some of the aspects that are considered under the macroeconomic stability of host coun-
tries that influence MNE entry decisions. A second set of factors that are considered are 
the bureaucratic, judicial and the political situation of a country. A country with a weak 
legal protection of property rights is unlikely to attract MNE, considering the high risk of 
appropriation that would prevail. An excessive amount of bureaucratic hurdles will also 
discourage new entrants, since it would increase the cost of setting up a business. These 
costs are further hiked if the bureaucracy is coupled with higher levels of corruption. 
Thus the institutional quality of a country and its credibility are often are taken as im-
portant considerations for an MNE to enter a new market (Naude and Krugell 2007, 
Sharma and Bandara 2010, Seyoum 2011). Rule of law, democracy, low levels of cor-
ruption and flexible labour institutions are all said to be important country characteristics 
that most attract FDI inflows (Stein and Daude 2002, Daude and Stein 2007, Delbecque 
et al.2008, Pajunen 2008). The historical and current institutional set up of a country also 
influences its view on adopting foreign investment friendly policies. For example, while 
post-colonial Brazil welcomed and encouraged FDI to play an important role in its in-
dustrialization and development, a newly independent India restricted entry of foreign 
capital and preferred to look inwards, rather than looking towards FDI related growth 
and development policies, due to the differences in the colonial institutions of the two 
countries. (Baer and Sirohi 2013).  
The impact of the quality of institutions on MNE decisions seems arguably simple and 
quite straight forward, but there is no clear consensus on how much and how relevant 
institutional quality actually impedes FDI inflows. Studies such as Wei (2000), Daude 
and Stein (2007), Dollar et al.(2005, 2006) and Kinda (2010) conclude that a weak insti-
tutional set up discourages FDI inflows into countries. On the other hand, studies such as 
Wheeler and Mody (1992), Singh and Jun (1995) do not find any significant evidence to 
conclude the same.  
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Dunning (1988, 2001) along with other studies (Rugman 1980, 1981) has emphasized 
that MNE’s have firm-specific advantages that go hand-in-hand with host country condi-
tions in encouraging FDI. FDI decisions are neither made solely based on firm character-
istics, nor are they based entirely on host country conduciveness for business. Both these 
levels, independently and interactively form a certain environment that firms decide to 
take advantage of. In order to get a better understanding on what drives FDI inflows into 
countries, we need to analyze these hierarchical interactions in a more through fashion. 
Econometric studies that analyze what drives FDI inflows have either studied firm-level 
characteristics or have studied host country characteristics. To account for country level 
characteristics, these studies often used country dummies. In their paper "What matters 
to African firms?" Gleb et al.(2007) use the Enterprise Surveys to do a firm level analy-
sis on firm perceptions of constraints as a function of firm characteristics, using sector 
and country fixed effects. They find that the constraints reported by firms strongly reflect 
country characteristics and their levels of income. Kinda (2010) analyzes the impact of 
infrastructure problems using firm level data and country fixed effects to find that they 
strongly discourage FDI inflows. Smarzynska and Wei (2000) use firm-level data and 
test if corruption in host countries has an impact on inward US FDI. They find that it 
does indeed discourage US firms from investing in countries with a higher level of cor-
ruption. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) using data from firm-level surveys, find that firms 
that bribe more, face more bureaucracy rather than less. 
Some country level studies that analyze the determinants of FDI include: Al-Sadig 
(2009) who uses country level panel data to estimate the effects of corruption on the 
location of FDI using fixed effects to control for country specific effects on corruption. 
He finds that controlling for institutional quality, the level of corruption in the country 
does not have a strong impact in reducing FDI inflows. Anghel (2005) analyzes the ef-
fects of institutions on FDI inflows using cross-section data. They find that poor institu-
tional quality significantly affects FDI inflows. Wernick et al. (2009) also find that FDI 
inflows into emerging and developing nations are dependent on strong institutions and 
business friendly macroeconomic policies and in turn influence economic growth. Sey-
oum (2009) also analyzes the impact of the quality of formal institutions in a country on 
inward FDI. He finds that they strongly influence inward FDI. Seyoum (2011) finds that 
the existing informal institutions in countries also have an indirect effect on attracting/ 
discouraging inward FDI. Aristotelous and Fountas (1996) use pooled country level data 
to analyze macroeconomic determinants of FDI inflows into EU. They find that market 
size, and real exchange rate and tariff have a significant effect on inward FDI. Walsh and 
Yu (2010) use a GMM dynamic estimation on aggregate FDI inflows into developing 
countries as dependent on various macroeconomic, developmental and institutional vari-
ables. They find that inward FDI into the primary sectors are not as much affected by the 
various determinants, as are the secondary and tertiary sectors.  
Very often, there is a tendency to extrapolate results found at the micro-level to a macro-
level (Meentemeyer 1989). Results of macro-level or micro-level studies that study the 
various determinants of FDI tend to generalize their results across the hierarchical levels. 
For example Busse and Hefeker (2007) perform a cross-country analysis and find that 
the stability of governments and their democratic accountability, the presence of reli-
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gious tensions, corruption and excessive bureaucracy, among others impact (total) in-
ward FDI volumes. They conclude that “political risk and institutional indicators matter 
the most when multinational corporations confront decisions about where to invest in 
developing countries”. While aggregated FDI flows are at a macro level, firm decisions 
are much more micro-level phenomena, that are influenced by other micro-level as well 
as macro-level variables.  
In order to see if indeed such generalizations could be made, we perform a multi-level 
analysis that takes into account determinants of FDI at both the macro-level and the 
micro-level, and the inter and intra level interactions. Farla (2013) uses a multilevel 
model estimate the impact of foreign equity ownership and institutional quality on a 
firm's investment decisions. The author finds that firms with 100% foreign equity do not 
invest in fixed capital, and also that marcoeconomic and institutional variables do not 
influence firm level decisions. The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze these mul-
tilevel interactions between firm-level advantages and host country characteristics that 
determine the amount of inward FDI in countries using multilevel model.  In order to do 
this, we use the firm-level data from the Enterprise Surveys, which survey numerous 
developing countries, along with some macro-level variables collected from various 
sources, explained later in the paper. We specify a multilevel logit model to identify 
those firm-characteristics and host-country characteristics that raise the probability of 
inward FDI. The main results show that while firm-level perceptions of infrastructure 
and financial constraints affect FDI decisions, institutional quality measured at the coun-
try level does not have any significant impact on the same. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used. Section 3 
outlines the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the results and the last section 
concludes the paper. 
 
1. Data 
 
1.1.  Micro data 
 
The analysis is based on the Enterprise Surveys data, collected and standardized in vari-
ous developing countries over the years 2006-2011 by the World Bank. This comprehen-
sive data set provides us a rich source of information on firm characteristics such as their 
size, ownership structure, firm perceptions of obstacles they face, such as corruption, 
telecommunications, electricity etc., as well as their sales and other production and fi-
nance variables. Compiled using country surveys during the period of 2006-2011, these 
data are a stratified random sample based on firm size, region and sector they belong to.  
The dataset analyzes 103 developing countries, with 20 countries surveyed twice during 
the time period 2006-2011. After omitting observations that have missing or incomplete 
data, we have 43,403 firms, of which about 5,010 firms have some level of FDI. Our 
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dependent variable for this analysis is foreign ownership (FDI)47.  We use a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if a firm has FDI and 0 otherwise. Approximately 12-13 per-
cent of the firms surveyed had 10-100% of foreign ownership. 
The independent variables of interest include firm structural characteristics and other 
characteristics. SIZE refers to the size of a firm measured by the number of employees a 
firm hires. It is a categorical variable ranging from small firms with 0-20 employees, 
medium firms with 20-99 employees to large firms with 100 or more employees. We 
take size dummies MEDIUM for (20-99 employees) and LARGE for 100 or more em-
ployees, with SMALL being the base. LNAGE accounts for the age of the firm in logs of 
the number of years a firm has been established at the time of the survey.  
 
Figure 1: Share (%) of firms by size 
 
 
We construct index variables by performing Principle Component Analysis (PCA). The 
aim of doing a PCA is to reduce a number of correlated variables to a smaller number of 
latent variables that explain most of the variance in the data.  
The survey captures the degrees of obstacles faced by firms, based on their perceptions. 
PHYSICAL 1 and PHYSICAL 2 are index variables capturing physical infrastructure 
obstacles faced by firms. These variables include constraints faced by firms with respect 
to (i) transportation of goods, supplies and inputs, (ii) electricity to current operations, 
and if they are accessible to clients and suppliers, using (iii) email and (iv) website. 
Transportation and electricity obstacles are categorical variables that take five values, 
namely, no major obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate obstacle, major obstacle or very 
severe obstacle. Email and web are dummy variables that account for firms either using 
or not using these facilities to communicate with clients and suppliers. They account for 
the lack of telecommunication infrastructure within a country48. In order to keep in line 
with the way the other obstacles have been defined, we define the email and web dum-
                                                          
47 To qualify as FDI, a firm should have at least 10% of their capital owned by foreign persons or organiza-
tions, as per the standard IMF definition.  
48 Of those firms which use emails to communicate with their clients and suppliers only 60 % of them also use 
a website as well, and of those firms which do not use emails about 3.3 % use a website. 
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mies such that if firms use email and web they are 0. PHYSICAL 1 captures the lack of 
internet facilities as a channel of communication between firms and their clients and 
suppliers, while PHYSICAL 2 captures transportation and electricity obstacles. Together 
these two components explain 72% of the variance in the data. We expect PHYSICAL 1 
and PHYSICAL 2 to have a negative sign. 
INFRA 1 and INFRA2 are index variables that capture the firm's perception on obstacles 
to both physical and financial obstacles all taken together. In other words, we perform a 
PCA using email, web, transportation, electricity and financial access (FINANCIAL). 
FINANCIAL is a categorical variable that measures how much of an obstacle access to 
finance is taking five values, namely, no major obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate obsta-
cle, major obstacle or very severe obstacle. We expect obstacles to financial access to 
have a negative impact on FDI. We do this to see how all obstacles taken together affect 
the results. We begin the analysis using INFRA 1 and INFRA 2. We then proceed to 
using PHYSICAL 1, PHYSICAL 2 and FINANCIAL separately to assess their impact 
on FDI. Table 1a shows the results of the PCA's all index variables. INFRA 1 has a first 
component which explains 32% of the variance. All the variables in INFRA 1 have high 
and similar weights, thus representing an overall lack of infrastructural facilities that 
pose a hindrance to businesses. INFRA 2 explains 29.59% of the remaining variance. 
We expect INFRA 1 and INFRA 2 to have a negative sign as well. 
INS is another index variable that captures the institutional obstacles firms face. This 
variable includes (i) corruption as an obstacle to current operations, (ii) crime, theft and 
disorder as an obstacle and (iii) property rights i.e., if the firm considers the court system 
as fair, impartial and uncorrupted. Here again, obstacles to corruption and crime are 
categorical variables taking five values ranging from no obstacle to severe obstacle. 
Property rights on the other hand is a categorical variable taking four values, namely, 
strongly disagree, tend to disagree, tend to agree and strongly agree. For INS we find 
that the first component explains about 51% of the variance. We use only the first com-
ponent and this captures the quality of the institutional set up in which firms operate. We 
expect a negative coefficient on this variable. 
 
  
 113 
Table 1a: Principal Components of all index variables 
VARIABLES INFRA 1 INFRA 2 PHYSICAL 1 PHYSICAL 2 INS 
Email 0.5064 -0.4756 0.7024 -0.0002   
Web 0.5162 -0.4634 0.7008 0.0109   
Electricity 0.433 0.4212 0.0825 0.7078   
Transportation 0.3239 0.5527 -0.0932 0.7063   
Financial 0.4299 0.276       
Corruption         0.6496 
Crime         0.5698 
Proprights         -0.5034 
Eigen Value 1.60265 1.47968 1.52976 1.35277 1.54971 
Explained % 0.3205 0.2959 0.3824 0.3382 0.5166 
 
SKILL refers to the degree of obstacle firms face due to lack of skilled labour i.e., inad-
equately educated workforce49. This is a categorical variable with the same scale of five 
values ranging from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. This seems particularly im-
portant when we study FDI into developing countries. Although it is likely that foreign 
firms enter less developed countries for their cheap labour, inadequate education would 
pose a problem for firms. We therefore expect a negative relationship between SKILL 
and FDI. AGLOM measures the attractiveness of a sector-region for foreign firms to 
invest. This is constructed by taking the number of foreign firms present in a given sec-
tor in a given region. The Enterprise Surveys classify the region from within a country 
that the firm belongs to. For example, in Chile firms from the regions of Antofagasta, 
Bío Bío, Los Lagos, Santiago, Valparaíso are included in the survey. Similarly in Af-
ghanistan firms from six regions, namely Hirat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar and 
5 Smaller Cities (Bamyan, Ghazni, Khost, Kunduz, Pul-E-Khumri) taken together are 
surveyed. AGLOM thus measures the attractiveness of these sector-regions to foreign 
firms. Table (A) in the Appendix gives the variable descriptions. 
There are 15 broad sectors under which each firm has been classified in the data. In this 
chapter we re-classify these into 8 sectors as follows:  1) Textiles, Leather and Gar-
ments; 2) Food; 3) Metals and machinery, Auto and Auto parts; 4) Chemicals and Phar-
maceuticals; 5) Electronics, Wood and furniture, Non-metallic and plastic materials and 
Other manufacturing; 6) retail and wholesale trade; 7) Hotels and restaurants and Other 
services and 8) Construction, transportation etc. The reclassification is done to avoid 
having too few observations in region-sector averages which will be discussed below.  
 
1.2.  Macro data 
 
Some countries are able to attract more FDI than others. These cross country differences 
in FDI inflows come from differences in their macroeconomic and institutional condi-
                                                          
49 For some firms, the questions on the degree of obstacles do not apply. For these firms, it has been assumed 
that that particular obstacle is not an obstacle. 
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tions. When considering macroeconomic differences between countries, an obvious first 
choice is GDP per capita (we use the log of current USD prices taken from the World 
Bank database (2012)) which we refer to as LGDPPC50. As we study FDI inflows into 
developing countries, we are interested in the impact the general level of development 
has on the dependent variable. We thus take GDP per capita as an indicator of the level 
of development of a country. The level of GDP per capita reflects investment opportuni-
ties. Asiedu (2002) explains that GDP per capita and the risk of investment are inversely 
related, implying that the returns have to be increased in order to compensate this higher 
rate of risk. Since we use mainly developing countries we expect the sign to be negative. 
TAXRATE refers to the total tax rate as a percentage of commercial profits. This varia-
ble is taken from the World Bank database (2012). This tax rate measures the "amount of 
taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses after accounting for allowable 
deductions and exemptions as a share of commercial profits". Personal income tax, sales 
taxes, value added taxes and goods and services taxes are excluded. Host countries try to 
attract FDI by providing various incentives for firms to encourage investments in their 
economies. One such way of promoting FDI has been to reduce corporate tax rates. 
Studies such as Hartman 1984, 1985 find that transfer FDI51 is not sensitive to tax rates, 
while Sato (2012), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) etc, find a significant negative impact of 
the same on FDI. Devereux and Freeman (1995) on the other hand find that the country 
context tax influences FDI. Studies like those mentioned above, tend to take country or 
industry level tax rates to understand firm level decisions (Blonigen 2005).  
Host country attractiveness is further enhanced by macroeconomic stability in markets. 
High inflation tends to increase uncertainty and is assumed to discourage FDI in general. 
Furthermore this uncertainty limits a firm’s price setting plans in the long run (Sato 
2012, Buckley et al.2007). INFLATION is measured by the growth rate of the GDP 
deflator, showing the rate of price changes in a year, taken from the World Bank data-
base (2012). We expect a negative relationship between the two. 
OPENK accounts for openness to trade measured by net exports as a percentage of GDP, 
taken from the Penn World Table 7.1 (Heston et al.2012). Trade openness measures the 
level of trade protection of a country. One expects openness to be positively correlated to 
FDI (Orts & Alguacil 2004, and Alguacil et al.2010). We use the financial openness 
indicator (KAOPEN) developed by Chinn and Ito (2008). KAOPEN measures the “ex-
tent and intensity” of capital controls of countries. Adams (2009) and Alfaro et al.(2010) 
among others argue that when host country financial markets are open, they allow for 
more efficient movement of foreign capital. Both these measures of openness are ex-
pected to have a positive effect on FDI. Additionally we control for LABOURPARTIC-
IPATION, which is the labour participation measured by the proportion of working age 
population which is economically active (aged 15 years or older). Higher labour partici-
pation rates imply more willing workers, and thus a higher labour supply. A higher la-
                                                          
50 GDP per capita are taken according to the country-year of the Enterprise Surveys. 
51 Blonigen (2005) refers to FDI through new capital transferred to host countries as transfer FDI as opposed to 
FDI financed by retained earnings. 
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bour supply leads to wage competition effects that foreign firms then would want to take 
advantage of. We thus expect a positive relationship between labour participation and 
FDI inflows. 
Institutional quality, especially in developing countries is likely to be an important de-
terminant of FDI inflows. Good institutions tend to reduce transaction costs, by eliminat-
ing corruption, providing guaranteed property rights, ensuring justice etc. To capture the 
institutional conditions in a country, we use legal rights and business days. LEGAL-
RIGHTS measures the degree of protection given to lenders and borrowers, given the 
country’s bankruptcy laws. BIZDAYS measures the number of calendar days required to 
start a business (even if it requires additional costs, the fastest number of days are taken). 
We expect that a better institutional environment in a country increases its attractiveness 
as a destination for FDI. 
We also use the World Governance Indicators (WGI) to account for institutional quality 
at the country level as an indicator of the country institutional quality. The WGI include 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption52. Since these variables are 
highly correlated to each other, we do a PCA on the 6 world governance indicators. The 
first latent component of this PCA explains 79% of the variance. Table 1b shows the 
weights of each of the six variables in the first Eigen vector. This variable we call WGI. 
We can see that all the variables have similar weights, contributing almost equally to the 
scores.  
 
Table 1b: Variables of the WGI indicator 
Variable WGI 
Voice 0.409 
Stability 0.341 
effectiveness 0.423 
Regquality 0.403 
Ruleoflaw 0.437 
corruption 0.43 
Eigen Value 4.733 
Expl. Proportion 0.79 
 
 
  
                                                          
52 The definitions for each of the variables are in Table (B) the appendix. 
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2. Empirical Methodology 
 
Our aim in this paper is to determine which characteristics influence if a firm invests in 
foreign markets or not. We also want to find out if these characteristics are conditional 
on the host country characteristics, i.e., why is one country able to attract more FDI than 
another country. A multi-level analysis is required when we know that a hierarchical 
structure exists in the data. As is apparent, firms are nested within countries and there-
fore firm-level decisions are usually not independent of country characteristics, be it 
policy/law related or just dependent on the current macro-economic situation in the 
country, which is the assumption of single level models (Goldstein 2003, Goedhuys and 
Srholec 2010, Srholec 2010). We therefore use a multi-level model53 with firms at level-
1 and country characteristics at level-2. This allows us to explain a part of the total vari-
ance by country context, with more accurate standard errors. 
Since our dependent variable is a dummy variable, we have to account for this by using a 
multi-level logit model:  
 
ܧ(ܨܦܫ௜௝ = 1หߚ௝൯ = ߮௜௝                      (1) 
ܮ݋݃[ ఝ೔ೕ(ଵିఝ೔ೕ)] = ߚ଴௝ + ߚଵ ௜ܺ௝ + ߚଶ ௝ܼ + ݑ௝ + ݁௜௝       (2) 
 
for firm i and country j, where ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ௜ܺ௝ + ߚଶ ௝ܼ is the deterministic part of the model 
and ݑ௝ + ݁௜௝ is the random part. Further, ݑ௝ ~ N(0, ߪ௨ଶ); and  ݁௜௝ ~ N(0, ߪ௘ଶ). From equa-
tion (2) we obtain different average outcomes for each group (country).  
FDI is the binary dependent variable (that is always at the lowest level, i.e., firms). The 
level-1 predictors which are firm level variables given by Xij include LNAGE, SIZE 
(MEDIUM, LARGE), AGLOM, INFRA, PHYSICAL, FINANCIAL, INS and SKILL. 
Level-2 predictors which are country level variables given by Zj, include LGDPPC, 
TAXRATE, LABOURPARTICIPATION, INFLATION, OPENK, KAOPEN, LEGAL-
RIGHTS, BIZDAYS and WGI.  
The reasons for using a multi-level model as opposed to a regular fixed-effects model are 
also evident. If we use a non-hierarchical model, the statistical significance of level-1 
variables is overestimated. Further, the standard errors of level-2 or group level variables 
will also be affected (Goldstein 2003). Unlike in the fixed-effects model where the 
groups are taken into account by taking dummies for each group, a multi-level model 
allows us to distinguish between observed and unobserved group characteristics (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).  
Perceptions of firms tend to be endogenous, i.e. identical conditions can be perceived 
differently by different firms based on their size, ownership etc., (Kinda 2010). Gleb et 
al.2007 find that larger firms tended to complain more about physical infrastructure 
constraints, whereas smaller firms cited financial obstacles more frequently. In order to 
overcome this endogeneity (since the data is collected based on the perceptions of firms), 
                                                          
53 These models are also known as random-coefficient or mixed effects models. 
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infrastructural obstacles are thus are instrumented by sector-region averages of these 
variables. Based on Dollar et al.2005, Aterido et al.2007 and Kinda 2010, these sector-
region averages tend to be exogenous by default, since only 12% of our firms are FDI 
firms. 
 
3. Results  
 
We begin by analyzing the firm level determinants of FDI flows. Estimation (1) of Table 
2 shows the 'null' or the 'empty' model. This model estimates: ܨܦܫ௜௝ = ߚ଴௝ + ݑ௝ + ݁௜௝ 
where ߚ଴௝ represents the average over country fixed effects, and ݑ௝	and	݁௜௝ are the ran-
dom effects at the country and firm level respectively. The purpose of this model is to 
investigate, without specifying any particular variables yet, how much of the FDI in-
flows can be attributed to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the firms themselves, and 
how much can be attributed to the country into which these investments flow. The 'ran-
dom' part of the model, gives us these details. We can calculate the share of each level as 
a percentage of total variance. The variance partition coefficients (VPC's) measure the 
proportion of variation that lies at each level. When there are only two levels, the VPC's 
are the same as the inter class correlation coefficients (ICC's) which explain the correla-
tion of observations within groups (countries), given by ߩ. For a two level model the 
VPC and ICC at the firm level are given by ܫܥܥ௘ = ܸܲܥ௘ = ఙ೐
మ
(ఙ೐మାఙೠమ)
  and the country 
level VPC and ICC are given by ܫܥܥ௨ = ܸܲܥ௨ = ఙೠ
మ
(ఙ೐మାఙೠమ)
 where ߪ௘ଶ is the firm level 
variance of ݁௜௝ and ߪ௨ଶ is the variance of ݑ௝. These ICC's allow us to see how much of the 
variance of FDI decisions can be attributed to country level variables as well as to the 
sectors. 
Estimation (1) gives us an intra-class correlation of (ߩ = 0.12) to represent the variance 
attributed to differences between countries in receiving FDI inflows, i.e., the country 
context explains about 12% of FDI inflows. Although this is a relatively small part of the 
variance, it is not negligible and is significant at the 1% level. This implies that there are 
significant contextual differences between countries. We proceed further by introducing 
firm level explanatory variables in the remaining estimations of Table 2. 
Following Kinda (2010) we first estimate the impact of INFRA on FDI prospects (esti-
mation (2) in Table 2, and then estimate the impact of PHYSICAL and FINANCIAL 
infrastructure constraints separately in estimation (3). In Table 2 we do not instrument 
any of the variables. Estimation (2) shows the results of a fixed effects logit regression. 
As we can see, all the covariates are highly significant. We find that the age of the firm 
(LNAGE) has a negative effect, indicating that older firms are less likely to be foreign 
owned (partly or wholly). SIZE of the firm has a positive impact, meaning that larger 
firms are more likely to be foreign owned. AGLOM is strongly significant, implying that 
presence of other firms in the same sector in the region has a positive effect on attracting 
further FDI. This result is different from what Kinda (2010) finds in all regressions. This 
could be due to the fact that we use different sector categorizations. Further, INFRA 1 
(infrastructure constraints) has a highly significant negative impact, implying that the 
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lack of email and web (internet) infrastructural constraints are not likely to discourage 
FDI inflows. This could be because firms which do not have email and web do not need 
it for their operations. While 86% of firms with FDI use email and 60% use websites. 
However, obstacles of electricity and transportation seem to have an unexpected positive 
sign. The coefficients on this variable are small (0.06). Among the firms that have FDI, 
about 24% of them think transportation is a major to severe obstacle and 37% think 
electricity is a severe obstacle. The positive coefficient on this variable may be interpret-
ed as follows: the lack of infrastructure is dependent upon the level of overall develop-
ment in a country. The rate of return on investment in countries with a lower level of 
development could be higher than in those countries. Estimation (3) shows the estima-
tions of a fixed effects logit regression when the obstacles are divided into PHYSICAL 
(PHYSICAL 1 and PHYSICAL 2) and FINANCIAL infrastructure constraints also show 
similar effects. Obstacles to both PHYSICAL 1 and FINANCIAL infrastructure have a 
significantly negative effect on FDI ownership. The coefficient on PHYSICAL 1 shows 
that the availability of internet resources increases FDI, while the lack of financial access 
decreases FDI. PHYSICAL 2 again has a small but positive coefficient and is highly 
significant. 
To check the robustness of the fixed effects results, we have random effects estimations 
in (4) and (5), which have results similar to (2) and (3) respectively. The interclass corre-
lations for both the estimations is approximately 20% (ρ=0.20). This is higher than be-
fore (in estimation 1) because now a part of the firm-level variance in equation (1) is 
captured by firm-level variables, and hence the firm-level variance due to unobserved 
firm-level variables is reduced. However, still the firm-level variance is much higher 
than country level variance, in turn showing that firm characteristics are more relevant 
than country characteristics in explaining inward FDI decisions of firms. However, we 
cannot disregard country effects in explaining FDI, showing that multi-level interactions 
should indeed be taken into account, while analyzing the determinants of FDI.   
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Table 2: Estimations of firm level variables with out INS and SKILL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
VARIABLES   fixed  
effects 
fixed  
effects 
random  
effects 
random  
effects 
            
LNAGE  -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
MEDIUM  0.7*** 0.7*** 0.7*** 0.7*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
LARGE  1.71*** 1.69*** 1.7*** 1.69*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
AGLOM  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
INFRA 1  -0.36***  -0.35***  
  (0.017)  (0.017)  
INFRA 2  0.254***  0.251***  
  (0.016)  (0.016)  
PHYSICAL 1   -0.40***  -0.39*** 
   (0.018)  (0.018) 
PHYSICAL 2   0.06***  0.063*** 
   (0.015)  (0.015) 
FINANCIAL   -0.18***  -0.18*** 
   (0.013)  (0.013) 
Constant -1.91***   -2.34*** -2.03*** 
 (0.07)   (0.12) (0.122) 
ρ 0.12   0.20 0.19 
LR Chi2 1644.21   1969.04 1956.48 
LR df(1) ***   *** *** 
# of firms 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 
# of countries 103 103 103 103 103 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All estimations include Sector dummies. 
 
The Hausman test results in our case show that fixed effects models are preferred to 
random effects models (as is typically the case in cross-country yearly data). Since we 
want to fit a multi-level model with both firm and country level variables fitting a fixed 
effects model is not possible. The Enterprise Surveys measure obstacles faced by firms 
based on their perceptions. When using these subjective measures to account for the 
investment climate in a country, we are bound to encounter endogeneity issues. Endoge-
neity arises due to the reason that firms may assess the same investment climate differ-
ently, based on their own performance or efficiency. For example, more efficient firms 
are likely to find a way around obstacles of financial access while those that are not as 
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efficient may face more problems in obtaining finance.  Dollar et al. (2005) use sector-
region averages as instrument. They reason that these sector-region averages would 
allow us to capture the investment climate that is relevant to all firms in a particular 
sector, located in that particular region. Lall and Mengistae (2005) argue that location 
decisions of small and medium firms are more or less exogenous and thus this would be 
a valid instrument. Since our dataset consists mainly of small and medium size firms, we 
also use the same method of instrumenting. We ensure that there are at least four firms in 
each sector-region. This way of instrumenting has also been used by Kinda (2010) and 
Aterido et al. (2007) among others. 
Using this method of instrumenting for INFRA 1, INFRA 2, PHYSICAL 1, PHYSICAL 
2, and  FINANCIAL, we estimate the random effects model. Estimations (6) onwards, in 
Table 3 give the results of the iv-logit estimations. While the results remain similar in 
terms of direction and significance the coefficients on INFRA1 and INFRA 2 in estima-
tion (6) are larger. In the case of INFRA 2 it makes a particularly large difference. Simi-
larly, in estimation (7), the coefficients on PHYSICAL 2 when instrumented for, are 
larger, than in the case of PHYSICAL 1 and FINANCIAL.  
We add other firm level variables, namely, INS and SKILL to the firm level explanatory 
variables (instrumented by their sector-region averages). Estimation (8) and (9) shows 
these results. We again find that the coefficients on INFRA 2 and PHYSICAL 2 are 
higher when we take into account the two new variables. INS has an unexpected positive 
sign but is not significant in the estimations (8) and (9). On the other hand SKILL is 
highly significant at a 1% level, but has a negative coefficient showing that FDI inflows 
find lack of education an obstacle. The unexplained variance given by ρ is between 0.2 
and 0.19 as in earlier estimations. The LR tests are significant and thus show that a mul-
ti-level understanding of the dependent variable is necessary. 
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Table 3: Estimations of firm level variables without INS and SKILL 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
VARIABLES iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit 
            
LNAGE -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
MEDIUM 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
LARGE 2.03*** 2.03*** 2.04*** 2.04*** 2.03*** 2.04*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
AGLOM 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INFRA 1 -0.38***  -0.39***  -0.38*** -0.39*** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
INFRA 2 0.37***  0.45***  0.38*** 0.45*** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.048) (0.05) 
PHYSICAL 1  -0.48***  -0.54***   
  (0.05)  (0.05)   
PHYSICAL 2  0.18***  0.22***   
  (0.06)  (0.06)   
FINANCIAL  -0.26***  -0.2***   
  (0.05)  (0.05)   
INS   0.02 0.027 -0.04  
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)  
SKILL   -0.21*** -0.2***  -0.21*** 
   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) 
Constant -2.56*** -2.13*** -2.19*** -1.835*** -2.47*** -2.136*** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.188) (0.12) (0.146) 
ρ 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 
LR Chi2 1656.07 1669.54 1552.97 1565.04 1650.35 1555.42 
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** *** 
# of firms 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 
# of countries 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All estimations include Sector dummies. 
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Table 4 shows the correlations between the explanatory variables. To see if these corre-
lations affect the results we drop INS (in estimation 10) and SKILL (in estimation 11)54. 
We find that the results are robust to these changes. We further check the variance infla-
tion factor and find that it is at an acceptable level55.  
 
Table 4: Correlations between explanatory variables 
a) for estimations (6) and (8) 
 INFRA 1 INFRA 2 INS SKILL 
INFRA 1 1.00    
INFRA 2 -0.23 1.00   
INS 0.03 0.49 1.00  
SKILL -0.26 0.64 0.54 1.00 
 
b) for estimations (7) and (9) 
 PHYSICAL 1 PHYSICAL 2 INS SKILL FINANCIAL 
PHYSICAL 1 1.00     
PHYSICAL 2 0.15 1.00    
INS -0.25 0.38 1.00   
SKILL -0.55 0.23 0.54 1.00  
FINANCIAL 0.25 0.58 0.27 0.20 1.00 
 
So far we find that all the firm level variables that we include have a significant impact 
on the dependent variable. Further, we find that the (remaining) variance at the firm level 
is much larger than the variance at the country-level in explaining FDI inflows. Howev-
er, we find that the estimated values of ρ  indicates a country level dependence of about 
0.2 which is consistently significant (as given by the LR tests) and thus indicate the 
presence of country level effects that cannot be ignored when analyzing FDI inflows.  
 
In order to take into account these country level effects in a more explicit way, and fur-
ther analyze which specific aspects of the country context are important in understanding 
these FDI inflows in Table 5, we introduce country level explanatory variables. As ex-
plained in the previous section, these variables include LGDPPC, WGI, BIZDAYS, 
INFLATION, LABOURPARTICIPATION, LEGALRIGHTS, TAXRATE, KAOPEN, 
and OPENK. We first introduce the macroeconomic variables in estimations (12) and 
(15).  
In the estimations that include country variables, we first note that the coefficients on the 
firm level variables remain more or less the same as in previous estimations. Among the 
macro level variables, the GDP per capita of the host country (LGDPPC) has a negative 
and strongly significant impact. GDP per capita reflects the overall development of a 
                                                          
54 We show the results for the estimations with INFRA 1 and INFRA 2; the results are similar for estimations 
with PHYSICAL 1 and PHYSICAL 2 and FINANCIAL as well and hence have not been included here. 
55 The general rule of thumb says that a VIF>10 is harmful. 
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country; we find that FDI is attracted to countries with a lower level of development as it 
might imply higher economic profitability. This is in line with our finding that lack of 
proper infrastructural facilities of transportation and electricity lead to higher FDI own-
ership. This is perhaps substituting for trade. LABOURPARTICIPATION is significant 
at a 5% level and has the expected sign. TAXRATE has a positive but a very small coef-
ficient. It does not have the expected sign across the estimations and is not stable across 
all specifications. INFLATION has a negative impact, suggesting that macroeconomic 
stability discourages FDI. This variable is significant across all the specifications as well. 
Both these variables are significant at the 5% level. In (11) and (14) we exclude 
LGDPPC and include the institutional variables. WGI is negative and significant at the 
5% level, implying that low institutional quality at the country level is detrimental to 
FDI flows as we had expected. This is interesting since the institutional variables at the 
firm level were never significant. LEGAL RIGHTS and BIZDAYS are also negative but 
insignificant. When we include both LGDPPC and the institutional variables, (as in 
estimations 14 and 17) we find that WGI loses significant. This is expected since 
LGDPPC and WGI are correlated56. Further the interaction terms of the size of the firm 
and WGI shows that while large firms are not affected by the country’s institutional set 
up, it is the medium sized firms that are impacted negatively as compared to small firms. 
This could be because larger firms can “grease” their way through and small firms aim 
to establish themselves in foreign countries for much smaller profit margins. It is the 
medium sized firms that do not profit from paying their way through, and yet cannot 
discount possible institutional hurdles that might arise after entry. OPENK is positive 
and significant at a 5% level implying that the more trade openness a country has, the 
greater the FDI, implying vertical FDI. However, the coefficients are rather small in this 
case.  
Looking at the inter class correlations, we find that the values of ߩ in estimations (10) 
and (15) drop down to 0.22 to around 0.15 - 0.16 when we include country level deter-
minants. This means that although the country characteristics that were introduced 
through the new variables are significant, there is still a sizable country variation that is 
unobserved. Comparing to ρ = 0.124 of estimation (1), we also note that the firm-level 
variables that introduced captured a larger part of firm-variation than the country-level 
variables did for country variation. While the country level variables don't exhaustively 
explain the country variance, LGDPPC and LABOURPARTICIPATION are the strong-
est results. We find that the LR tests are significant. 
 
  
                                                          
56 The correlation between WGI and LGDPPC is nearly 0.68. 
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Table 5: Estimations of firm and country level variables without INS and SKILL 
  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
LNAGE -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
MEDIUM 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
LARGE 2.026*** 2.018*** 2.024*** 2.025*** 2.017*** 2.023*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
AGLOM 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INFRA 1 -0.43*** -0.41*** -0.43*** 
 (0.049) (0.05) (0.05) 
INFRA 2 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
PHYSICAL 1    -0.52*** -0.5*** -0.52*** 
    (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) 
PHYSICAL 2    0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
    (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
FINANCIAL    -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
LGDPPC -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.24*** 
 (0.065) (0.078) (0.065) (0.077) 
WGI -0.07* 0.008 -0.062 0.013 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.04) (0.046) 
WGI*MEDIUM -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
WGI*LARGE -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
BIZDAYS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INFLATION -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.016** -0.016** -0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.02** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.021** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LEGALRIGHTS -0.029 -0.03 -0.03 -0.032 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
TAX RATE 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 0.0024 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
KAOPEN -0.054 -0.045 -0.058 -0.058 -0.051 -0.064 
 (0.048) (0.05) (0.049) (0.048) (0.05) (0.049) 
OPENK 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 
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  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -2.49*** -4.51*** -2.08** -2.25** -4.11*** -1.79* 
 (0.883) (0.660) (1.002) (0.884) (0.662) (1.004) 
ρ 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
LR Chi2 1318.53 1318.00 1306.16 1332.83 1331.82 1320.51 
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** *** 
# of firms 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 
# of countries 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All estimations include Sector dummies. 
 
In Table 6 we include INS and SKILL at the firm level along with the country level 
variables. Like in the case of estimations (6) to (9) we find that institutional obstacles at 
the firm level have no significant impact on FDI decisions. On the other hand, SKILL is 
highly significant and negative. The remaining firm level variables do not change much 
from the previous estimations. We reiterate that firms entering developing country mar-
kets are attracted by profits but are dissuaded if they do not have the required skill in 
production of goods. Firms may enter developing country markets which have the re-
quired skill and also have relatively cheap labour as compared to their country of origin, 
which can be seen from the significant LABOUR PARITICIPATION variable at the 
country level.  
For the remaining country level variables, the results are very similar to those discussed 
in Table 4 above. For these estimations, the inter class correlations are 0.14 - 0.15. 
Hence we again find that the overall development of a country and its macroeconomic 
situation are more important than the institutional quality at the country level. Recogniz-
ing that WGI and LGDPPC are correlated, we still find that the LGDPPC has a greater 
significance than WGI and thus we conclude that LGDPPC has a bigger influence on 
FDI than WGI. Here again we find that medium sized firms are strongly affected by the 
country institutional set up as compared to small firms. Large firms on the other hand are 
not significantly affected57. 
 
  
                                                          
57 Including WGI as a geographically weighted measure (taking into account spatial influence of neighbouring 
countries in a country's institutions -as discussed in Chapters 3 & 4) we find that the results are not influenced 
in anyway . The reason for this could be that the scaling effect at the country level is lost on firm-level deci-
sions. That is, the influence of the institutional quality of neighbouring countries on a country's own institu-
tions has no bearing  a firm's decision to enter a country. Further, the model's parsimony might be lost in 
including such scaling effects when we attempt to understand firm-level decisions given a country's macroeco-
nomic and institutional structure, 
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Table 6: Estimations of firm and country level variables with INS and SKILL 
  (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
 FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
VARIABLES iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit 
  
LNAGE -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
MEDIUM 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
LARGE 2.03*** 2.02*** 2.03*** 2.03*** 2.02*** 2.03*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
AGLOM 0.03*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INFRA 1 -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.44*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
INFRA 2 0.44*** 0.444*** 0.443*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
PHYSICAL 1 -0.57*** -0.56*** -0.57*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
PHYSICAL 2 0.19*** 0.2*** 0.186*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.06) 
FINANCIAL -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
INS 0.027 0.018 0.027 0.031 0.024 0.033 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
SKILL -0.2*** -0.22*** -0.2*** -0.19*** -0.2*** -0.19*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
LGDPPC -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.12*** -0.21*** 
 (0.065) (0.078) (0.065) (0.078) 
WGI -0.066* 0.009 -0.058 0.007 
 (0.04) (0.047) (0.04) (0.047) 
WGI*MEDIUM -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
(0.018) (0.02) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
WGI*LARGE -0.025 -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
BIZDAYS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INFLATION -0.014** -0.015** -0.016** -0.014** -0.015** -0.015** 
 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
LABOUR PARTICIPATION 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.021** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.021** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LEGAL RIGHTS -0.028 -0.03 -0.03 -0.031 
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  (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
 FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
VARIABLES iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit iv-logit 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
TAX RATE 0.003* 0.003** 0.003 0.003* 0.003** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
KAOPEN -0.063 -0.055 -0.066 -0.066 -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.048) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
OPENK 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -2.48*** -4.19*** -2.134** -2.265** -3.86*** -1.86* 
 (0.88) (0.65) (0.99) (0.88) (0.66) (1.00) 
ρ 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 
LR Chi2 1237.5 1222.48 1226.21 1248.48 1234.81 1237.56 
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** *** 
# of firms 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 43,403 
# of countries 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All estimations include Sector dummies. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Attracting FDI inflows has been argued to help developing countries induce economic 
growth in them. While many policies are made by these countries to attract MNE's to 
invest  in their markets, firm decisions on entering new markets are based both on their 
own idiosyncratic characteristics as well as host country characteristics. Using firm and 
country data in a multilevel framework, we analyze how obstacles faced by firms both at 
the operational level and the macroeconomic and institutional situation in a country 
affect FDI inflows into developing countries. We find from our analysis that a firm’s age 
and size are strongly statistically significant in all the regressions. We consider con-
straints that are divided into physical infrastructure and financial access constraints, skill 
and institutional constraints. When considering a micro level analysis we find that inter-
net availability problems are detrimental to FDI decisions. The lack of physical infra-
structure facilities such as electricity and transportation on the other hand are found to be 
encouraging inward FDI. Lack of skilled labour is found to be detrimental to FDI while 
institutional obstacles such as corruption and crime are not seen as an important deter-
minant.  
As emphasized by Dunning (2001) and Rugman (1980, 1981) we can say that FDI in-
flows, while largely explained by firm specific idiosyncrasies, do go hand in hand with 
host country conditions. Host country conduciveness does play a small but significant 
role in explaining the attractiveness of FDI inflows. We find that the macroeconomic 
variables such as LGDPPC, LABOUR PARTICIPATION, and to a smaller extent IN-
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FLATION, OPENK and TAXRATES affect FDI decisions on FDI inflows. Institutions 
measured as WGI at the country level are never significant except when considered 
without accounting for overall development. Since the overall development of a country 
has a bearing on the institutional quality of the country this is expected. This is con-
sistent across all specifications. 
While many macro studies such as Al-Sadig (2009), Seyoum (2009) and Anghel (2005) 
among others have found institutions to be an important element in attracting FDI, we 
find that this is not the case here, when we take both firm level and country level varia-
bles into account in a multilevel regression. One reason being that overall development 
of a country already captures the country institutional set up. Further, country level per-
ceptions measures of institutions are often biased by the macroeconomic situation of the 
country. At the firm level however, firms might not be as biased towards their percep-
tions of crime. Their perception on crime and corruption are based on based on day to 
day activities of businesses. This creates a disparity between the levels of importance 
given to institutions at both levels. Secondly, profitability of MNE’s is dependent on 
how they can overcome these problems at the least possible cost in the host country. It is 
likely that certain business costs, even if large, are worth incurring, if long term profits 
are anticipated. This is further confirmed by the fact that while foreign firms are more 
likely to be larger firms, these costs do not deter them from entering a country with a bad 
institutional set up, if the profitability is high.  
We could conclude from this that FDI inflows into a country are largely influenced by 
firm idiosyncratic factors and partially on the general macroeconomic conditions and 
hardly so on the institutional environment of host countries. As economic fundamentals 
tend to increase returns to investment, a certain level of uncertainty of crime, corruption 
and expropriation of wealth seem to be unimportant. FDI decisions are thus neither made 
solely based on firm characteristics, nor are they based entirely on host country condu-
civeness for business. We find that the constraints reported by firms do reflect country 
characteristics and their levels of income and overall development, which are small yet 
significant. Hence we conclude that it is necessary to look at firm level activities such as 
FDI in a multi-level manner rather than at single levels. 
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Appendix 
 
Table (A): Variable descriptions 
Spatial Level/ Scale Variable Variable description 
Firm-level dependent 
variable 
FDI Dummy variable:  
0= domestic firms 
1= at least 10% of their capital owned by foreign persons or 
organizations 
Firm-level independent 
variables 
Lnage Age of the firm  
Size 1 = < 20 employees (base) 
2= medium(20-99) 
3= large(>100) 
Infra Overall infrastructural obstacles firms face 
Obtained from the scores of Component 1 of PCA (electricity, 
transportation, email, web, financial) 
Physical Physical infrastructure obstacles firms face 
Obtained from the scores of Component 1 of PCA (electricity, 
transportation, email, web) 
Financial Obstacles to financial access 
Ins Institutional quality. Obtained from the scores of Component 1 
of PCA (corruption, crime and proprights) 
Skill Obstacle due to lack of skilled labour. 
Aglom number of foreign firms present in a sector-region 
Country-level 
independent variables 
Lgdppc GDP per capita (log of current USD prices) 
WGI Measure of Governance Obtained from the scores of Compo-
nent 1 of PCA of the 6 World Governance Indicators 
Bizdays number of calendar days required to start a business 
Legal rights degree of protection given to lenders and borrowers, given the 
country’s bankruptcy laws 
Tax rates tax rate (% commercial profits) 
Kaopen Financial openness measured by  “extent and intensity” of 
capital controls of countries 
Openk openness to trade measured by net exports as a percentage of 
GDP 
labourparticipation proportion of working age population which is economically 
active 
inflation growth rate of the GDP deflator 
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Table (B): World Governance Indicators 
Voice and accountability Perceptions of freedom of citizen’s in choosing their government 
as well as freedom of press 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Perceptions on the stability of government and on the presence 
of political violence and terrorism 
Government Effectiveness Perceptions on the quality of public and civil services as well we 
effective government policies and their credibility 
Regulatory Quality Perceptions on government regulation, and its ability to foster 
private sector development 
Rule of Law Perceptions on the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence 
Control of Corruption Perceptions on corruption and the power elites and private 
interests. 
Source: www.govindicators.org 
 
Table (C): List of countries in the larger sample: 
Afghanistan Costa Rica Latvia Rwanda 
Albania Cote d'Ivoire Lesotho Samoa 
Angola Croatia Liberia Senegal 
Argentina Czech Republic Lithuania Sierra Leone 
Armenia Dominican Republic Macedonia, FYR Slovak Republic 
Azerbaijan Ecuador Madagascar Slovenia 
Bahamas, The El Salvador Malawi South Africa 
Bangladesh Eritrea Mali St. Lucia 
Belarus Estonia Mauritania St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
Belize Fiji Mauritius Suriname 
Benin Gabon Mexico Swaziland 
Bhutan Gambia, The Moldova Tajikistan 
Bolivia Georgia Mongolia Tanzania 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ghana Mozambique Togo 
Botswana Guatemala Namibia Tonga 
Brazil Guinea Nepal Trinidad and Tobago 
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Turkey 
Burkina Faso Guyana,Co-op Republic of Niger Uganda 
Burundi Honduras Pakistan Ukraine 
Cameroon Hungary Panama Uruguay 
Cape Verde Indonesia Paraguay Uzbekistan 
Chad Jamaica Peru Venezuela, RB 
Chile Kazakhstan Philippines Vietnam 
Colombia Kenya Poland Yemen, Rep. 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Romania Zambia 
Congo, Rep. Lao PDR Russian Federation   
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
  
 132
This thesis sets out to empirically analyze the spatial interactions of institutions across 
countries. To do so, we focus on two fundamental causes of economic growth and de-
velopment, namely institutions and geography. The findings contribute to our under-
standing of the interrelationship between institutions across countries and economic 
growth and development. Our interest is to link institutions and geography to economic 
growth and development using a spatial narrative. It further contributes to our under-
standing of institutional quality at the firm and country level and their influence on FDI 
inflows. We mainly use cross-section analysis. Furthermore, this thesis also contributes 
to the methodology in analyzing spatial correlation using principal components and 
canonical correlation analysis. Below we summarize each chapter and highlight our 
findings. 
1. Summary and main findings 
In the introductory chapter, we briefly survey the literature on institutions and geography 
as fundamental causes of economic growth and development in an economy. We high-
light the need to study not only institutions and 'absolute' geography (the physical en-
dowments of a country, which are independent of its neighbours) but also as the 'relative' 
geography (or spatial interaction) of countries in order to better understand economic 
growth and development of countries. We also note that institutions with in nation-state 
boundaries need to be analyzed at both country level as well as at the micro/ firm-level. 
To understand the relationship between economic growth and development and institu-
tional quality in countries by taking into account the underlying spatial relations (relative 
geography), we begin our analysis by proposing a method for spatial principal compo-
nent analysis. This method is explained in Chapter 2 and produces summary measures 
(or components) that maximize spatial correlation underlying in a dataset. We propose 
an alternative spectral decomposition method to Wartenberg (1985). Our method spec-
trally decomposes a distance weighted Moran matrix to obtain the Eigen vectors and 
Eigen values, thus maximizing the underlying spatial correlation within the data. The 
other feature of our method is that we find an easy and intuitive link to spatial canonical 
correlation analysis. While the spatial principal component analysis is performed on one 
data set, spatial canonical correlation analysis finds the relationship between two sets of 
multiple variables X and Y, for which we obtain two sets of latent vectors, each measur-
ing different phenomena. We provide example applications of the methods and show 
that our variant of spatial canonical correlation analysis may produce rather different 
results than spatial principal components analysis using Wartenberg’s method. We also 
illustrate how spatial canonical correlation analysis may produce different results than 
spatial principal components analysis. 
In chapter 3 we examine the role of institutions relative to economic performance, abso-
lute geography and financial performance of a country. In order to do this, we use the 
spatial principal component analysis and a spatial canonical correlation analysis (dis-
 133 
cussed in chapter 2) to obtain multi-dimensional measure of institutions, economic per-
formance, absolute geography and financial performance of countries. Our analysis 
shows that the first canonical functions in all the cases give us results that conform to 
current literature. That is, we find that a higher level of development is correlated to a 
higher level of institutional quality, deeper financial structure as well as "good" geogra-
phy of the Jeffery Sachs variety. From the second canonical functions we find that eco-
nomic growth is correlated to market steering. We further find that geographic condi-
tions need not define the institutional set up of countries. A similar institutional set up 
need not result in a similar financial structure in countries. We show that there is a ne-
cessity to take spatial interactions with neighbouring countries into account while ana-
lyzing the relationships between institutions, geography, economic and financial perfor-
mance of a country. We find that space indeed has a strong influence on the prevailing 
institutional and economic conditions of countries. While the impact of space on geogra-
phy is very obvious, we find that it has no bearing on the financial performance of coun-
tries.  
In chapter 4, we test the Rodrik et al. (2004) framework to explain differences in devel-
opment levels across countries by using a broader set of definitions for institutions, ge-
ography and economic variables. We use a multi-faceted database to measure institutions 
in an attempt to go beyond the single-dimension measures that are often employed. Us-
ing measures that we obtain in Chapter 3, we test whether it is institutions, absolute 
geography or trade that “trumps” other factors in explaining development differences. 
The regression analysis we use is a two stage least squares – instrumental variable ap-
proach. We find that institutions trump other factors (geography and trade) when we use 
GDP per capita as an independent variable. When we expand the dependent variable to 
include other aspects of development, such as growth and investment, we find that insti-
tutions, growth and geography are all important variables. In this case, institutions no 
longer trump the other factors. In this case, we also find that the same institutions varia-
ble that was positively associated to GDP per capita is now negatively correlated with 
the more dynamic development variable. 
In the last chapter (Chapter 5) we shift from a macro level analysis to a multi-level anal-
ysis. In this study, we empirically analyze the determinants of FDI inflows into develop-
ing countries. We do this by using firm-level data obtained from the Enterprise Surveys 
data of the World Bank and country level data from various sources. Using a multi-level 
logit model, we analyze how institutional and structural variables at both firm and coun-
try levels impact inward FDI. In our view, there is a gap between analysis at the country 
level studies and firm level studies on inward FDI. In this paper, we fill the gap by doing 
a multi-level regression analysis, taking into account both firm variables and country 
characteristics to explain inward FDI. We find that firm structural characteristics and 
obstacles they face most affect inward FDI. While some macroeconomic variables such 
as GDP per capita, inflation and openness have a significant influence, other variables 
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that measure institutional quality of a country do not have any statistically significant 
influence on FDI inflow. 
From the above analysis we find that neither institutions, nor geography or trade theories 
can single handedly explain the economic performance of a country. While all the three 
hypotheses tend to use ‘absolute’ geography as the backcloth in their explanations of 
what is the most fundamental cause of economic growth. In this study we have shown 
that the spatial influence of neighbours has an impact on the economic performance of 
an economy. We find that similar geography does not necessarily result in the same level 
of economic development. We do find clusters of institutional quality but these do not 
always reflect the level of development in the countries. We find that taking convention-
al measures such as GDP per capita give us results that are in line with conventional 
theories of growth, but these do not always hold water when we take a more multi-
dimensional measure of economic performance. Similarly, when we take single variables 
such as democracy to measure institutional quality we find our results in line with main-
stream theories, which is not so when we take multi-dimensional measures. Studying 
institutional quality within a country, we find that firms are mainly attracted by econom-
ic profitability in a foreign country. Their perceived sense of institutional quality does 
not seem to be as big a hindrance at the micro-level. Firms seem to be influenced by the 
level of GDP per capita which reflects institutional quality measured as an aggregate at 
the country level influences the level of FDI in a country. This means that more im-
portance needs to be given to firm level workings of institutions and their interactions 
with country level perceptions in order for countries to attract more FDI which would in 
turn help the country’s economic performance. 
2. Further Research and limitations of the study 
In Chapter 3, we construct latent variables that take into account the multi-dimensional 
nature of institutions, absolute geography, economic development and financial devel-
opment using spatial PCA and spatial CCA. These methods prove to be very useful 
when tackling with a large number of variables that measure similar phenomena, and are 
possibly highly correlated. These latent variables however are very sensitive to the data 
used. This is an often mentioned criticism for both principal component analysis as well 
as canonical correlation analysis. Thus, the validity of these conclusions are often based 
entirely on the choice of the data.  
A related limitation is that of causality. Does a higher level of development lead to better 
institutions or do better institutions lead to a higher level of development. Current re-
search on institutions and economic development assumes that causality runs from the 
former to the latter, and reverse causality is often neglected. The methodology used in 
Chapter 2, Canonical correlation analysis does not allow for such directionality, either 
from institutions to development or the other way around. While we do not set out to 
address this question, this study neglects causality in Chapter 2. One way of incorporat-
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ing reverse causality is to use an instrumental variable approach, which we do in Chapter 
3. 
The data on institutional quality used in this thesis are perceptions indices. Institutions 
are by definition harder to measure than other macroeconomic policy variables. Macro 
level measures of institutions are often indices constructed based on perceptions. These 
measures are oftentimes biased towards European/American institutions. As Chang 
(2011) puts it, these measures try and fit a certain description (such as the liberalization 
narrative) thus showing a rather biased picture on their influence on economic growth 
and development. We thus expect that institutional quality of countries might be overes-
timated for those countries that have high growth rates, if only because they are expected 
to have better institutions. The inherent biases in perceptions indices might undermine 
the conclusions of the study, thus making it difficult to make concrete policy recommen-
dations.  
In Chapter 3, we use an instrumental variable approach. We instrument for institutions 
using settler mortality and percentage of English and European language speaking popu-
lation, which are popular in this literature. These are rather weak instruments as has been 
pointed out by Albouy (2012) the settler mortality data suffers from various problems. 
Similarly, the Hall and Jones (1999) instruments also suffer from weak correlation to 
institutional quality. For this line of research to go forward, we need to look for a wider 
choice of instruments, which prove to be better than those that are currently in vogue. 
The findings in this thesis have a number of implications for future research. Firstly, we 
confirm that relative geography needs to be given more attention in order for us to get a 
better understanding on the relationship between various “fundamental sources of 
growth” and growth and development itself. By including relative geography in the pic-
ture, this study moves away from fatalistic explanations of absolute geography, as well 
as bring into picture the need for specificity of circumstances, rather than sweeping gen-
eralizations that may or may not hold across time and space, in understand the links 
between institutional quality and economic performance.  
From our analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, we know that institutions that are important for 
growth and development when bundled together are different from those that seem to be 
important for growth at a given time. Further research in this field will need to explain 
which specific institutional characteristics within classes of institutions matter for growth 
and which matter for development.   
Finally, it should be noted that multi-level modelling has not been used much in eco-
nomics, even when analyzing those economic phenomena that we know have explicit 
micro-meso-macro dimensions. Further research on institutional quality and its influence 
on economic growth and development would benefit from this type of analysis. 
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The national  innovation systems literature emphasizes on how institutions are important 
for encouraging and fostering innovation in a country. This thesis has only touched upon 
institutions in relation to economic and financial performance and geography. To take 
this research forward in this direction, it would be interesting to see how institutions and 
innovation systems are correlated spatially amongst countries, and what institutional 
aspects matter most in forstering growth.. 
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Valorization 
 
Sources of growth and development have preoccupied economists since the inception of 
the discipline itself. There has been an explosion of empirical work building on earlier 
theoretical models of growth and development. This has been made possible due to the 
improved methods of quantification and collection of data on such measures of growth. 
Among these discussions of sources of growth, what are called the "ultimate" sources 
have gained much attention in the recent past. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
institutions and geography are among those "ultimate" sources.   
Studies that have talked about institutions and geography mainly fall into the debate of 
which of these two sources of growth are more  important, i.e., is it the geographic na-
ture of the country or is it the institutional structure and quality that prevails in the coun-
try that ultimately changes the course of the country's growth path and hence its devel-
opment pattern as well. In this academic debate, economists like Jeffery Sachs, John 
Gallup, Andrew Mellinger among many others argue that it is the geography of a coun-
try that decides the fate of its economic growth and development. On the other side of 
the debate fall economists such as Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, 
Kenneth Sokoloff, Dani Rodrik etc, who argue that it is institutions that are the most 
important factors that lead a country into positive or negative paths. When a case for 
geography is made in latter's argument, it is that geography  influences the type of insti-
tutions that develop in a country. One explanation given by (Acemoglu et al 2005), is 
that geography may have played a role in determining where colonizers decided to settle 
(settler colonies), and where they wanted to just extract resources (extractive colonies), 
since they could not adapt to the environment. Thus according to them, geography 
played a role in the set up of historical institutions, but not necessarily current ones. The 
institutional hypothesis thus says that geography has an indirect role influencing eco-
nomic growth and development.  
When considering which countries fall into developing and which into developed 
groups, we find a lot of clusters across the globe. These clusters might occur because of 
various spatially correlated attributes. It is not unrealistic to assume that countries that 
are neighbours share some common climatic conditions, physical geographic endow-
ments, soil fertility conditions etc. When considering these 'absolute' aspects of geogra-
phy, we tend to take into account only those time-invariant factors that cannot be influ-
enced directly and in a short period of time. The reason for this is because 'absolute' 
geography allows us to circumvent the problem of endogeneity. Yet, if we consider how 
institutions and geography reinforce each other and in turn institutions and growth, we 
find that 'absolute' geography falls short as an 'ultimate' explanatory variable.  
One channel through which institutions and geography are related to each other is 
through space. What much of the literature on the geography and institutional hypothesis 
misses is the socio-spatial interaction between countries. The political and economic 
conditions of neighbours influence a country's own political and economic structure and 
vice versa. For example, if a neighbour has political unrest, it is likely that a country will 
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have to adjust its migration policy to adjust and accommodate incoming refugees. This 
not only impacts the political but also the economic fabric of the country. Neighbouring 
country spillover effects lead to spatial correlations that cannot be ignored in explaining 
the economic performance of a certain country. These spatial correlations could also lead 
to more direct effects on the institutional structure of a country. For example, what start-
ed off as protests against the Tunisian government in 2010 resulted not only in changes 
in the political system within the country, but also to major protests, government over-
throws and governmental changes in many neighbouring countries such as Algeria, Lib-
ya, Yemen, etc. Thus, we take into account the 'relative' geography of countries. The 
main contribution of this thesis is the inclusion of this 'relative' geography in explaining 
the roles of geography and institutions in economic performance. We contend that it is 
not only the common historical experiences but also common or similar cultural practic-
es that neighbouring countries may share, that lead to similar institutional structures.  
Studying 'relative' geography to explain economic phenomena is not new. Spatial influ-
ence in regional income convergence, technology diffusion, migration, housing prices 
etc have been studied using explicit geographic components such as bilateral distance 
between countries, dyadic trade distances,  distance from school districts and various 
forms of social distance as well. Related to institutions, Gleditsch and Ward (2000), and 
Cho (2003) among many others have studied the results of spatial distance on the levels 
of democracy in countries. Taking cue from these studies, in this thesis, we attempt to 
understand the underlying spatial nature of the institutional qualities of countries.  
In order to understand this spatial structure, we study the institutional structure with 
respect to a country's economic performance, financial performance as well as its 'abso-
lute' geography. All these measures are not easily defined by single variables. For exam-
ple, GDP per capita is often used as the measure of economic development of a country. 
However, it does not reflect the various aspects of development that need to be account-
ed for when talking about development, such as growth rates of GDP, levels of con-
sumption and savings in the economy, to determine the health of the economy overall. 
Similarly, we construct measures for institutional quality, financial performance and 
geography. We construct these measures using  Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
and Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) with spatial weighting. This is another con-
tribution this thesis makes. The methodologies are explained in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
Using our Spatial PCA and Spatial CCA, we construct and interpret the results.  This 
method proves to  be useful in the study other spatial correlations at cross country and 
regional levels. It is possible to use weighting schemes based on the study at hand, and 
this can easily be routinized on Matlab, Stata and other software. 
The debate of primacy mentioned above has one more player. Open economies that trade 
more with other countries are said to grow faster (Frankel and Romer 1999, Dollar and 
Kraay 2001). Rodrik, Subramaniam and Trebbi 2004, study these three contesting theo-
ries together to see which one has the most impact on economic performance. They find 
that institutions are more important than both geography and trade. These studies too 
ignore the influence of neighbouring countries on both the external trade of a country 
and its institutional quality. In Chapter 4 we analyze the Rodrik, Subramanuium and 
Trebbi (2004) using our measures (using SPCA and SCCA). Our analysis confirms that 
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spatially weighting institutions do indeed strengthen the results of the Rodrik et al type 
regressions. This makes a case for more closely looking at the spatial influence that 
institutions are subject to, and thus, it becomes more policy relevant to look at these kind 
of influences.  
Institutions, their structure, quality and governance are certainly important in determin-
ing the economic performance of a country. But how important is the perception of qual-
ity of governance important to economic entities within a country? In order to under-
stand this, the last chapter in this thesis analyzes a multi-level framework. It studies the 
impact of firm and country variables on a firm's foreign investment level. Multi-level 
analysis is rather new to the field of economics. The novelty in this particular study is 
that it is applied to perceptions of institutional quality in relation to FDI. While a firm's 
decision to enter a country to do business is a micro level decision, institutional quality is 
often a country level aggregate measure. In this analysis, we attempt to look at these two 
different levels and their interactions with respect to inward FDI. What we find is that a 
firm's idiosyncratic factors and the host country's macroeconomic factors are most im-
portant in attracting inward FDI. We find, interestingly, that institutional quality does not 
play a significant role in FDI decisions of firms.  
Much has been said about developing countries and their institutions and governance. It 
has often been said that improving institutional quality would lead to higher FDI inflows 
and hence would lead to more growth in developing economies. This has been propagat-
ed by international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Most 
studies which either agree or disagree with this view are exclusively country level or 
exclusively firm level analyses. Our results are pertinent in that, when both levels are 
accounted for in a multi-level framework, we find that it is the economic fundamentals 
that drive firms to invest in foreign countries and not their perceptions of governance of 
these host countries. 
This thesis thus stresses on the importance of scale in studying institutional quality and 
its relationship to economic performance. In a highly globalized world such as ours, it 
becomes even more important to study these interactions carefully. The results of this 
study are useful for both poor and emerging countries. These countries run the risk of 
falling into short run growth paths rather than the more stable long run growth paths if 
they overlook important aspects of growth and development. Even rich countries that are 
currently at the top may lose their positions to other countries if the global centre of 
economic activity shifts to other parts of the world. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Een populaire bevinding uit de empirische literatuur over economische groei en ontwik-
keling is dat de economische en sociale instituties van een land economische activiteit 
stimuleren. Het beleid van deze instituties kan de groei en ontwikkeling van het land 
bevorderen of belemmeren. De economische ontwikkeling van landen wordt ook vaak 
toegeschreven aan geografische aspecten. Voorstanders van deze literatuur benadrukken 
dat de geografische aspecten van een land, zoals tropische ziekten of natuurlijke hulp-
bronnen, de groeivooruitzichten van een land beïnvloeden. Voorstanders van de litera-
tuur over instituties vinden geografische aspecten eveneens van belang maar redeneren 
dat geografische aspecten een effect hebben op institutionele aspecten en enkel een indi-
rect effect hebben op economische groei en ontwikkeling. Deze literatuur houdt geen 
rekening met de ruimtelijke interacties tussen de landen. Door middel van ruimtelijke 
interactie hebben buurlanden soortgelijke instituties. Buurlanden hebben deels een ge-
meenschappelijke geschiedenis en beïnvloeden elkaar meer dan landen die zich in een 
ander werelddeel bevinden. In dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht of de resultaten van de 
literatuur over instituties kan worden beïnvloed door rekening te houden met deze ruim-
telijke interacties.  
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt de literatuur en de motivatie voor deze scriptie samenge-
vat. In het tweede hoofdstuk introduceren we de methodologie van ruimtelijke principale 
componentenanalyse (SPCA) en ruimtelijke canonische correlatie analyse (SCCA). Met 
behulp van SPCA en SCCA methodologie construeren we samenvattende indicatoren. 
De doelstelling van deze methode is om de ruimtelijke correlatie van de data te maxima-
liseren. Terwijl SPCA wordt gebruikt om een database met verschillende variabelen 
samen te vatten, wordt SCCA gebruikt om de ruimtelijke correlatie tussen twee databa-
ses samen te vatten. In dit hoofdstuk vergelijken we de twee methoden met de hulp van 
voorbeelden. We vergelijken onze resultaten met de Wartenberg methode van ruimtelij-
ke principale componentenanalyse. Om de voordelen van deze specifieke werkwijzen te 
tonen introduceren we een voorbeeld met geografische data. Wij vinden dat onze metho-
de resultaten geeft die makkelijker te interpreteren zijn dan de eerder beschikbare me-
thode. 
De studie in hoofdstuk 3 maakt gebruik van de methode beschreven in hoofdstuk 2. De 
doelstelling van hoofdstuk 3 is om indicatoren te construeren die verschillende multidi-
mensionale verschijnselen samenvatten. We construeren nieuwe indicatoren voor de 
instituties, geografische dimensies en de economische en financiële ontwikkeling van 
landen. We evalueren hoe onze indicator van de kwaliteit van instituties gerelateerd is 
aan de andere bovengenoemde indicatoren. Deze studie draagt bij aan het onderzoek 
naar interacties tussen de bovengenoemde fenomenen door middel van een ruimtelijk 
verhaal. Wij vinden dat de eerste principale componenten van de SPCA en SCCA over-
eenkomend zijn met de resultaten beschreven in de literatuur wanneer deze ruimtelijke 
gewichten hebben. Maar we vinden ook dat de  tweede principale componenten met 
ruimtelijke gewichten nieuwe resultaten tonen. Terwijl economische ontwikkeling sterk 
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gecorreleerd is met institutionele kwaliteit is economische groei  sterk gecorreleerd met 
meer overheidsingrijpen. De resultaten tonen ook aan dat geografische factoren niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs bepalend zijn voor het economisch lot van een land. Landen met 
vergelijkbare geografische factoren hebben niet altijd dezelfde of soortgelijke instituties. 
We concluderen dat het mogelijk is om institutionele veranderingen in een land beter te 
begrijpen wanneer er rekening wordt houden met de ruimtelijke interacties. 
In het volgende hoofdstuk maken we gebruik van deze ruimtelijk geconstrueerde indica-
toren van instituties en geografie, en ook een proxy voor economische handel, om te 
analyseren welke indicatoren economische ontwikkeling het beste verklaren. Met behulp 
van het kader beschreven in Rodrik et al. (2004) vinden we dat instituties de belangrijk-
ste verklarende indicator is maar enkel wanneer economische ontwikkeling wordt geme-
ten als BBP per capita. Wanneer we gebruik maken van een bredere definitie van eco-
nomische ontwikkeling (hetgeen we construeren met behulp van SPCA) zijn de resulta-
ten niet langer toonaangevend van het belang van instituties. De resultaten suggereren 
ook dat instituties een negatief effect kunnen hebben op economische ontwikkeling, 
hetgeen betekent dat de kwaliteit van instituties gecorreleerd is met economische ont-
wikkeling maar dat er geen causaal verband is. 
Schaal en ruimtelijke interactie hoeft niet te worden beperkt tot het cross-country niveau. 
In hoofdstuk 5, verleggen we de focus naar een multi-level analyse. We analyseren de 
determinanten van buitenlands bezit in binnenlandse bedrijven met behulp van een mul-
ti-level kader. Met behulp van structurele en institutionele data van bedrijven en macro-
economische en macro-institutionele variabelen schatten we een multi-level logit model. 
Dit hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de bestaande literatuur door middel van een multi-level 
model dat controleert voor het effect van micro en macro niveau factoren op buitenland-
se investeringen. We vinden dat structurele kenmerken en (institutionele) belemmerin-
gen op het bedrijfsniveau de belangrijkste determinanten zijn van buitenlandse investe-
ringen. Op het macro niveau tonen de resultaten aan dat macro-economische variabelen 
die de winst van het bedrijf kunnen beïnvloeden belangrijk zijn maar daartegenin zijn 
instituties niet invloedrijk in het aantrekken van buitenlandse investeringen.  
In hoofdstuk 6 van het proefschrift worden de resultaten samengevat. In conclusie, dit 
proefschrift probeert de ruimtelijke interacties te analyseren die invloed hebben op de 
kwaliteit van instituties. Een bijdrage van dit proefschrift was het ontwikkelen van een 
methodologie om de ruimtelijke correlatie tussen variabelen te maximaliseren. Met be-
hulp van deze methodologie, hebben we geprobeerd om de relatie tussen instituties, 
geografie en economische ontwikkeling beter te begrijpen. De multi-level analyse is 
gericht op het ontrafelen van percepties van instituties op macro-niveau en de percepties 
van instituties op bedrijfs-niveau om aan te tonen of micro of macro factoren meer in-
vloed hebben op het bedrijfsleven. 
 
 
  
 149 
Biography 
 
Samyukta Bhupatiraju studied her Bachelor's degree in Chennai and completed her Mas-
ters degree in Economics at University of Hyderabad. She studied International Econo-
mics at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy in 2008-09 before joining UNU-
MERIT. While at UNU-MERIT she worked on the EXPLORE project launched under 
the DIME (Dynamics of Institutions and Markets in Europe) network in 2009. She was 
also a part of the "Institutions, Governance and Long-term Growth" project by Maas-
tricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University and the Agence Française 
de Développement (AFD).  
 
  
 150
 
 
 151 
 
2014 
86.Samyukta Bhupatiraju 
The Geographic Dimensions of Growth and 
Development 
 
85. François Lafond 
The evolution of knowledge systems 
 
84. Annalisa Primi 
Promoting Innovation in Latin America: What 
Countries Have Learned (and What They Have Not) 
in Designing and Implementing Innovation and 
Intellectual Property Policies 
 
83. Fatoumata Lamarana Diallo 
Evaluation of Meal and Deworming Programs for 
Primary Schools in Rural Senegal 
2013 
82. Anant Kamath 
Information Sharing through Informal Interaction in 
Low-Tech Clusters 
 
81. Flavia Pereira de Carvalho 
What we talk about when we talk about Brazilian 
Mulitantionals: an investigation on Brazilian FDI, 
economic structure, innovation and the relationship 
between them 
 
80. Jun Hou 
Complementarity in Innovation and Development: 
A Cross-country Comparison 
 
79. Rufin Baghana 
Impacts of Government Incentives to R&D, 
Innovation and Productivity:  
A Microeconometric Analysis of the Québec Case 
 
78. Lilia I. Stubrin 
High-Tech Activities in Emerging Countries: A 
Network perspective on the Argentinean biotech 
activity 
2012 
77. Abdul Waheed 
Innovation Determinants 
and Innovation as a Determinant:  
Evidence from Developing Countries 
76. Bilal Mirza 
Energy Poverty and Rural Energy Markets in 
Pakistan 
75. Benjamin Engelstätter 
Enterprise Software and Video Games: An 
Empirical Analysis 
Fulvia Farinelli 
Natural Resources, Innovation and Export Growth: 
The Wine Industry in Chili and Argentina 
Rodolfo Lauterbach 
Innovation in Manufacturing: From Product Variety 
and Labor Productivity Growth to Economic 
Development in Chile 
74. Kirsten Wiebe 
Quantitative Assessment of Sustainable 
Development and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
73. Julio Miguel Rosa 
Organizational Strategies, Firms' Performance and 
Spatial Spillovers. The Canadian Case in Research 
and Development. 
Johannes Wilhelmus Marie Boels 
Joseph Schumpeter, honderd jaar economische 
ontwikkeling. Een historisch-theoretische 
beschouwing.  
2011 
72. Daniel Vertesy 
Interrupted Innovation: Emerging economies in the 
structure of the global aerospace industry.  
71. Tina Saebi 
Successfully managing alliance portfolios: an 
alliance capability view.  
70. Nora Engel 
Tuberculosis in India - A case of innovation and 
control.  
69. Evans Mupela 
Connectivity and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
The role of communication satellites 
 152
68. Nantawan Kwanjai  
Cross cultural intelligence amid intricate cultural 
webs – A tale of the UnDutchables in the land of 
1002 smiles 
67. Lina Sonne 
Innovation in Finance to Finance Innovation: 
Supporting pro-poor entrepreneur-based innovation 
2010 
66. Fernando Santiago 
Human Resources Management Practices and 
Learning for Innovation in Developing Countries: 
Pharmaceutical Firms in Mexico 
65. Zakaria Babutsidze 
Essays on Economies with Heterogenous Interacting 
Consumers 
64. Bertha Vallejo 
Learning and Innovation Under Changing Market 
Conditions: The Auto Parts Industry in Mexico 
63. Donatus Ayitey 
Technical Change, Competitiveness and Poverty 
Reduction: A Study of the Ghanaian Apparel 
Industry 
62. Sergey Fillipov 
Multinational Subsidiary Evolution: Corporate 
Change in New EU Member States 
61. Asel Doranova 
Technology Transfer and Learning under the Kyoto 
regime; Exploring the Technological Impact of 
CDM projects in developing countries 
2009 
60. Alexis Habiyaremye 
From Primary Commodity Dependence to 
Diversification and Growth”. “Absorptive Capacity 
and Technological Catch Up in Botswana and 
Mauritius”. 
59. Yoseph Getachew 
The Role of Public Capital in Economic 
Development 
58. Sandra Leitner 
Embodied Technological Change and Patterns of 
Investment in Austrian Manufacturing 
57. Semih Akçomak 
The Impact of Social Capital on Economic and 
Social Outcomes 
56. Abraham Garcia 
The Role of Demand in Technical Change 
55. Saurabh Arora 
Coherence in socio-technical systems: a network 
perspective on the innovation process 
2008 
54. Rutger Daems 
Medicines for the developing world 
53. Johannes Hanel 
Assessing Induced Technology - Sombart's 
Understanding of Technical Change in the History 
of Economics 
52. Rifka Weehuizen 
Mental Capital: the economic significance of mental 
health 
51. Danielle Cloodt 
The relationship between R&D partnership 
formation, social embeddedness and innovative 
performance 
50. Sabine Fuss 
Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty 
2007 
49. Tobias Kronenberg 
Reconciling Environmental Conservation with 
Economic Prosperity: The Feasibility of Double 
Dividends in the Short and Long Run 
48. Viktoria Kravtsova 
Assessing the Impact of Foreign Direct Investment 
in Transition Economies 
47. Suhail Sultan 
The Competitive Advantage of Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises: The Case of Jordan's Natural 
Stone Industry 
2006 
46. Bulat Sanditov 
Essays on Social Learning and Imitation 
 153 
45. Mamata Parhi 
Dynamics of New Technology Diffusion: A Study 
of the Indian Automotive Industry 
44. Andreas Reinstaller 
Social structures and the innovation process: Their 
role in the demand of firms and consumers 
43. Rose Kiggundu 
Innovation systems and development : the journey 
of a Beleaguered Nile Perch Fishery in Uganda 
42. Thomas Pogue 
The Evolution of Research Collaboration in South 
African Gold Mining: 1886-1933 
41. Geoffrey Gachino 
Foreign Direct Investment, Spillovers and 
Innovation: The Case of Kenyan Manufacturing 
Industry 
40. Önder Nomaler 
Technological Change, International Trade and 
Growth - An Evolutionary, Multi-Agents-Based 
Modeling Approach 
2005 
39. Samia Satti Osman Mohamed-Nour 
Change and Skill Development in the Arab Gulf 
Countries 
38. Elad Harison 
Intellectual Property Rights: Economics and Policy 
Analysis 
37. Daniel Dalohoun 
The relationship between R&D partnership 
formation, social embeddedness and innovative 
performance: a multi-level approach of social 
embeddedness 
36. Müge Ozman 
Networks, Organizations and Knowledge 
35. Bas Straathof 
Product variety and economic growth - The 
counteracting effects of scale and idiosyncrasy 
34. Wilfred Schoenmakers 
Knowledge Flows between Multinational 
Companies: A Patent Data Analysis 
33. Myriam Cloodt 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in High-Tech 
Industries: Measuring the Post-M&A Innovative 
Performance of Companies 
2004 
32. Paola Criscuolo 
R&D Internationalisation and Knowledge Transfer. 
Impact on MNEs and their Home Countries 
31.  Maarten Verkerk 
Trust and Power on the Shop Floor 
30. Gottfried Leibbrandt 
Adoption, harmonization and succession of network 
technologies across countries 
29. Mark Sanders 
Skill Biased Technical change - Its Origins, the 
Interaction with the Labour Market and Policy 
Implications 
2003 
28. Nadine Roijakkers 
Inter-firm cooperation in high-tech industries: a 
study of R&D partnerships in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology 
27. Viki Sonntag 
Speed, Scale and Sustainability 
26. Masaru Yarime 
From End-of-Pipe Technology to Clean Technology 
25. Stéphane Malo 
The combinatorial Chemistry Revolution - 
Sustaining a Superior Performance Position through 
Technological Learning 
2002 
24. Annelies Hogenbirk 
Determinants of Inward Foreign Direct Investment: 
the Case of the Netherlands 
2001 
23.  John Adeoti 
Technology Investment in Pollution Control in Sub-
Saharan Africa: The Case of the Nigerian 
Manufacturing Industry 
 154
22. Edward Huizenga 
Innovation Management: How Frontrunners Stay 
Ahead. An Empirical Study on Key Success Factors 
in the ICT sector 
2000 
21.  Machiel van Dijk 
Technological Change and the Dynamics of 
Industries. Theoretical Issues and Empirical 
evidence from Dutch Manufacturing 
1999 
20.  Jan Cobbenhagen 
Managing Innovation at the Company Level: A 
Study on Non-Sector-Specific Success Factors 
19. Marjolein Caniëls 
Regional Growth Differentials: The Impact of 
Locally Bounded Knowledge Spillovers 
1998 
18. Aldo Geuna 
Resource allocation and knowledge production: 
Studies in the economics of university research 
1996 
17.  Reinoud Joosten 
Dynamics, Equilibria, and Values 
16. Hugo Kruiniger 
Investment, R&D, and the Financing Decisions of 
the Firm 
1995 
15. Hans van Meijl 
Endogenous Technological Change: The Case of 
Information Technology. Theoretical 
Considerations and Empirical Results 
14. René Kemp 
Environmental Policy and Technical Change. A 
Comparison of the Technological Impact of Policy 
Instruments 
13. Rohini Acharya 
The Impact of New Technologies on Economic 
Growth and Trade. A Case Study of Biotechnology 
12. Geert Duysters 
The Evolution of Complex Industrial Systems. The 
Dynamics of Major IT Sectors 
11. Marjan Groen 
Technology, Work and Organisation, A Study of the 
Nursing Process in Intensive Care Units 
1994 
10.  Huub Meijers 
On the Diffusion of Technologies in a Vintage 
Framework; Theoretical Considerations and 
Empirical Results 
9. Theon van Dijk 
The Limits of Patent Protection. Essays on the 
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights 
8. Hans Voordijk 
Naar Integrale Logistiek in Bedrijfsketens, 
Ontwikkelingen in de Bouw 
1993 
7.  Paul Diederen 
Technological Progress in Enterprises and Diffusion 
of Innovations. Theoretical Reflections and 
Empirical Evidence. 
6. Ben Dankbaar 
Economic Crisis and Institutional Change. The 
crisis of Fordism from the perspective of the 
automobile industry 
5. Hanno Roberts 
Accountability and Responsibility: The Influence of 
Organisation Design on Management Accounting 
1992 
4. Bart Verspagen 
Uneven Growth Between Interdependent 
Economies. An Evolutionary View on Technology 
Gaps, Trade and Growth 
3. Sjoerd Romme 
A Self-organization Perspective on Strategy 
Formation 
 155 
1989 
2. John Spangenberg 
Economies of Scale, and Atmosphere in Research 
Organisations 
1988 
1. John Hagedoorn 
Evolutionary and heterodox innovation analysis : a 
study of industrial and technological development in 
process control and information technology 

